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PREFACE
The electric co-op system in Louisiana had its start 
as a New Deal agency, as a direct result of the legisla­
tion passed in 1936 to establish the Rural Electrification 
Administration which was to bring lights to rural America. 
But like several other New Deal programs, the REA had its 
roots early in the twentieth century, Gifford Pinchot, 
who, as governor of Pennsylvania in the mid-Twenties, saw 
how an electrified rural population would benefit the 
entire nation, had advocated the idea since 1910. But 
Pinchot, in this and other ways, was before his time. It 
would be his young assistant, Morris Llewellyn Cooke, who 
would transfer Pinchot’s dream into reality as FDR's first 
REA Administrator. None of this may seem to have a direct 
effect on Louisiana, but without the dreams of these early 
idealists, no rural electrification system could ever have 
gotten off the ground in Louisiana--or probably anywhere.
Cooke is the obvious link between Pinchot's dreams 
of the Twenties and the REA legislation of 1936, but there 
was a similar link between that legislation and the rural 
co-op system in Louisiana. Unfortunately, it is not as 
easily documented. There was no one man, such as Cooke,
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to connect both parts. Of course, there were connections ; 
someone had to discover that there was money available, 
that it all could work. In most areas of the state, that 
was usually a county agent. He may have been informed of 
the program through the state university system, or through 
government publications. These men were not much more 
than administers of the information. The real initiative 
came from prominent local citizens, usually police jurymen. 
They set up the organization, borrowed the money, and, most 
importantly, took on the responsibility. They were the 
Morris Llewellyn Cookes of the local co-ops ; they were the 
connection between one facet of the program and another.
But these local men were not dreamers, they were doers. 
They had been doers all their lives. They were pragmatists 
with pragmatic goals. Many of them were pragmatic to the 
point that they were motivated to get electricity for them­
selves. But they all realized that electricity connected 
to their farms meant electricity for others, and that their 
ability to pay for it meant that those who could not would 
also receive it. Furthermore, many of them must have seen 
that the future would eventually bring electricity to every­
one. They were not dreamers, but they were idealists.
It is difficult to know if these men saw the economic 
importance of what they were doing. Did they see that 
lights in the countryside would bring prosperity in the 
form of increased agricultural production, industry, jobs.
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and activity where there had been virtually none before?
Did they see that this economic activity would bring on 
more economic activity, and then still more? Possibly 
they did, to some extent. Certainly they saw that elec­
tricity would make farm life easier, even desirable for 
those who were leaving the farm, scrambling to the cities 
for jobs. There was a great fear in the Thirties that 
dwindling rural populations would somehow cause America 
to go hungry. But Louisiana advocates of rural electrifi­
cation probably did not know that this electrification 
would be one of several factors that would lead to the end 
of farm tenancy in the South by making it possible for 
just a few men to farm a large plantation. By the time 
World War II had begun, tenants were no longer needed on 
the farms, while at the same time, war industry jobs in 
the cities pulled them away even faster. But, of course, 
because of increased mechanization, no one starved, and 
production soared. These men were not seers, but some of 
what the future held for a rural population with electric­
ity at its fingertips must have been apparent.
There were thirteen co-ops in Louisiana that began 
operations between early 1937 and 1940. Each one began 
in a very similar way, but each had unique characteristics, 
as well. Many of those who organized these programs are 
still around today, still active, able to see what has 
become of a plan some forty-five years ago to bring lights
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to a few people here and there. The passage of the REA 
bill in 1936 would have had no significance for Louisiana 
had it not been for these people. They made it work, and 
they influenced what has transpired since the formation 
of these groups. The formation of these thirteen groups 
is the basis of the history of rural electrification in 
Louisiana. Everything else is either a foundation for, 
or a creation of, that group.
A few years after their organization, it became ob­
vious that these thirteen co-ops needed, in some manner, 
to consolidate their interests. Just as they could not, 
as individual farmers, get electricity, as individual co-ops 
they were not powerful enough to do the things that needed 
doing, everything from buying trucks at group prices to 
having needed legislation passed. So, they simply formed 
a statewide co-op of their individual co-ops. That group 
was immediately successful, and it became apparent that 
organization meant power. When they felt it was time to 
generate their own electricity, to get out from under the 
private utilities that sold them the power they distributed, 
they again organized. They found that alone, the individual 
co-ops could not stand up to the private utilities, but 
together, they were strong enough.
In the early period of the program in Louisiana, say 
up to 1950, the goal had been to make the idea work, to 
put into practice what many had longed for for years—
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rural electrification. To achieve that goal, the rural 
co-ops needed the cooperation of the federal government 
and the state government, and, most of all, they needed 
the cooperation of the state's private utilities to sell 
them the power they would distribute. But these organizers 
were the quintessence of the conservative, rural farmer.
They were independent in every way, in politics, in economics, 
in character. When the programs were on their feet, when 
these men felt that they could stand without the props of 
the government and the utilities, they began to consider 
making the co-ops independent of those groups, to make them, 
in fact, free enterprises. Much of this feeling began to 
be expressed in the early Fifties when REA and the local 
co-ops became the objects of conservative fingerpointing 
by those who found socialists and communists under every 
bush. To them, co-ops were the seed that would grow into 
something anti-American. It is difficult to tell whether 
these local co-op organizers were reacting to this national 
wave of insecurity, but by the mid-Fifties, they were look­
ing to become free of all constraints. For the next three 
decades they would do what was necessary (everything from 
removing "REA" from the co-op buildings to generating their 
own power) in order to achieve independence from the 
federal government, from state regulations, and, most of 
all, from the private utilities. The enemy became anyone 
who opposed them; and anyone who opposed them became the
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subverters of free enterprise, the ones who would end 
competition, the ones who were un-American. The pursuit 
of independence became a crusade. By the late Sixties, 
it looked like the crusade would succeed, but within ten 
years, it was apparent that it could not. Their power 
system, so they found, could not operate independently of 
private power and keep prices reasonable. It also became 
apparent that consumers wanted their utilities (whether 
they owned them or not) to be regulated by the state, and, 
lastly, taking "REA" off the buildings did not automatically 
make the co-ops independent of that group. Washington was 
still there, and is still very much a part of the system.
The quest for independence was definitely a failure, 
but the program was not— by any means. Rural Louisiana 
has lights today because of the co-ops, because of those 
men who first took the responsibility, and they will have 
lights in the future because of the co-ops.
This work is divided into three parts. The third part 
deals with these statewide groups from their inception in 
1950 until 1983. The second part is a history of the 
formation, growth, and development of each of the thirteen 
co-ops in the state from their beginnings to 1983. The 
first part deals with the national program from the early 
dreams of rural electrification, to the realization of 
those dreams, to 1983.
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The Rural Electrification Administration was created 
by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1936. There were attempts at 
rural electrification prior to that date, but FDR's program, 
as part of the New Deal, was the beginning of the modern 
system. The REA was put into operation by Morris L. Cooke, 
and expanded by John Carmody and Harry Slattery through 
1944. The Fifties ushered in a conservative presidential 
administration that opposed organizations such as co-ops, 
and, consequently, funds were cut. But on the local level, 
co-ops continued to grow. The Sixties brought with it 
financial cooperation from Washington, and many co-ops 
around the country found that there was enough money avail­
able to begin generating their own power.
In Louisiana, the REA came not as a government organi­
zation, but as a generous banker--a lender of low interest 
money. The co-ops began in Louisiana in late 1937 at Teche 
Electric, and developed to a total of thirteen individual 
groups through the late Forties.
During the War, the thirteen co-ops in the state organ­
ized a statewide association, the purpose of which was to 
lobby and to promote the idea of rural electrification
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In the early Fifties they founded a newspaper and threatened 
to generate their own power in the face of excessive fuel 
costs from the private power companies in the state. In 
1962, prices again rose and the state's co-op leaders, 
through their statewide organization, began a serious move 
to generate their own power. After a hard-fought struggle, 
a loan was finally approved in 1964. But it was not until 
four years later, after extensive compromise with the 
private utilities, that the money was finally granted for 
the construction of the first plant. It was also at this 
time that the group fought battles over right-of-way regu­
lation and Public Service Commission regulation.
Between the completion of the first plant in 1972 and 
today (1983) Cajun Electric has completed three other 
plants, all coal.
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CHAPTER 1
VISIONARIES; GIFFORD PINCHOT TO MORRIS L. COOKE
Today, through the REA, nearly every rural American 
who wants electricity can get it; nearly all the loans 
granted to REA have been paid on time; and now generation 
and transmission plants and a new loan system have made 
the program nearly self-sufficient. The result has been 
a marked uplifting of rural life and important changes in 
agriculture and in demography. The Rural Electrification 
Administration has helped give rural America a new look.
The founding and development of the program is often 
referred to as a movement. It could not be more aptly 
described. Financial gain did not motivate the movement's 
leaders. On every level of the program— federal, state 
and local--men and women worked tirelessly, often without 
pay, to make this program work, and work it did. The story 
of the movement is the story of its leaders.
Many of these leaders became involved because of a 
personal incident that forced them to realize how badly 
rural Americans needed electricity and what wretched treat­
ment they were receiving from the private utility companies. 
Reflecting on the early days of the REA, Clyde T. Ellis, a
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leader in the movement, states: "I am convinced the treat­
ment which the power companies handed out to so many people 
has been one of the prime reasons the rural electrification 
program has had so many great leaders. In a now famous 
incident, Franklin D. Roosevelt experienced just such treat­
ment. Roosevelt traveled to Warm Springs, Georgia, in 1924, 
to seek a miracle cure for his crippled legs. The electric 
bill for his "little cottage," as he called it, was eighteen 
cents per kilowatt hour, "about four times what I pay at 
Hyde Park." He saw the incident as the beginning of REA: 
"That started my long study of public utility charges for 
electric current and the whole subject of getting electricity 
into the farm home. . . . "  So, it was, he continued, "that 
a little cottage in Warm Springs, Georgia, was the birthplace 
of the Rural Electrification.
FDR was the present-day movement's founding leader. He 
brought to realization the hopes and plans of a few dreamers. 
Through his power and leadership a solvent social program 
developed that uplifted the lives of millions during his 
twelve years in office.
Rural America needed federal assistance for electricity, 
but in the South there was a need for focused attention, as 
FDR had recognized at Warm Springs in 1924. By 1938, two
 ̂Clyde T. Ellis, A Giant Step (New York, Vintage Books,
1966), 29. 
2 Ibid., 34.
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years after the REA was underway, he expressed his thoughts 
on the economic situation in the South: "It is my conviction 
that the South presents right now the number one economic 
problem--the nation's problem, not just the South's. For 
we have economic imbalance in the nation as a whole due to 
the very condition of the S o u t h . R u r a l  electrification, 
FDR hoped, would at least partially bridge the gap between 
urban and rural dwellers, but also between what was quickly 
becoming the urban North and the rural South.
FDR's affection for the South came from other than his 
love for the area. The South's political leaders supported 
him wholeheartedly. At the 1928 convention, a poll of 
southern delegates revealed that every southern state, ex­
cept Arkansas, had supported his nomination. By 1932, he 
had the support of every southern delegation except two 
that had supported favorite sons.̂  As an important factor 
in FDR's victory, the South could look forward to assistance 
from the new president--a New Deal.
It is difficult to imagine the conservative, plebian 
South taking to its heart this Duchess County, New York 
patrician, but it did. Throughout the Twenties the South
"A Message to the Conference on Economic Conditions 
of the South," The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt (13 vols.. New York, Random House, 1941), VII, 42l.
^ George B. Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, 
1913-1945 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, T9F7TT3ÏÏ7.
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had supported its favorite Democratic son, William Gibbs 
MeAdoo, the heir-apparent to Wilsonianism. In 1928, Texas, 
Florida, and the border states, unable to accept A1 Smith, 
the wet. New York Catholic, defected and voted for Herbert 
Hoover. But by 1932, FDR was able to stitch together the 
wet-dry, urban-rural, North-South split that had plagued 
the Democrats since the end of Wilson's presidency. The 
mending was easy; the Depression monster loomed larger 
than those petty squabbles of the past decade. The South 
was at the end of its economic rope and easy pickings for 
a political ally. It would get behind FDR. Six years 
after his election he would boast: " . . .  let us rejoice 
and take pride in the undoubted fact that in [the] past 
six years the South has made greater economic and social 
progress up the scale than any other period in her long 
h i s t o r y . T h e  REA had played a large part in this progress.
It was the South that was to benefit most from the REA 
and other New Deal legislation. It needed help desperately. 
In fact, even before the 1929 crash, the section was so 
economically destitute that the effects of the Depression 
were barely visible. Despair was only added to abjection.
The one-crop system and farm tenancy had already prostrated 
the section. And with no real tax base, local and state 
assistance was either inadequate or non-existent.
In 1929, the average American made $703 per year. But
 ̂pie Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D .
Roosevelt, VII, 100.
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in the South, the average was about half that--and this at 
the end of the so-called boom decade of the T w e n t i e s I n  
Louisiana at that time, the average income was a lean $415.  ̂
But it was the rural income in the South that was the most 
revealing. The average southern farmer in 1929 made only 
$183 a year.̂  Difficult as it is to imagine, the situation 
worsened as the Depression deepened. In 1932, the farm 
income fell to thirty-nine percent of the 1929 level.^ The 
Louisiana average was a measly $239.^® Certainly, despair 
had been added to abjection.
There were, of course, reasons for the poverty. In 
1927, cotton had reached a high of twenty cents. Five 
years later, the price at New Orleans had plummeted to 5.6 
cents, the lowest since 1894.^^ Louisiana's sugar prices
Paul Mertz, New Deal Policy and Southern Rural Poverty 
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1978), 3; 
Charles F. Schwartz and Robert E. Graham, Jr., ed. Personal 
Income by States Since 1929: A Supplement to the Survey of 
Current Business (Washington, USGPO, 1956), 142-143; Calvin B. 
Hoover and B. U. Ratchford, Economic Resources and Politics 
of the South (New York, MacMillan, 1951), 50.
Mertz, New Deal Policy, 3. The per capita income 
ranged from a low of $129 in South Carolina to $419 in 
Florida. Ibid., 3.
 ̂Hoover and Ratchford. Economic Resources, 53. In the 
agricultural non-South, income fell to 33 percent of the 
1929 level. Ibid., 3.
U.S. Bureau of Census, Historical Statistics of the 
United States (Washington, USGPO, 1975), 5l7.
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dropped below three cents in 1930 from a post-war high of 
$8.50 per t o n . T o b a c c o  farmers suffered similar thrash­
ings.^^ The combinations of bad weather, overproduction, 
crop disease, and the general state of the national economy 
sent prices to the rock bottom. Diversification was unheard 
of. Southern farmers had put all their eggs in one basket, 
and the bottom had fallen out. There was nothing to fall 
back on.
The most poverty-stricken groups in the South were the 
agricultural workers : the tenant farmers, sharecroppers, 
and farm laborers. At the beginning of the Depression,
55.5 percent of southern farms were operated by tenants,
1.8 million of the 3.4 million farmers in the South— one out 
of every four southerners.
Nearly half of all southern tenants were sharecroppers, 
the lowest rung on the ladder. They subsisted by farming 
small plots of their landlord's property. They were paid 
at the end of the season with a portion of the crop they had 
raised. The landlord normally supplied the house and mule, 
but often fertilizer and even some hand tools. The landlord's
Joseph Stitterson, Sugar Country : The Cane Sugar 
Industry in the South, 1753-1950 (Lexington, Kentucky7 
University of Kentucky Press, 1953), 353.
Joseph C. Robert, The Story of Tobacco in ^erica 
(Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1967), 
207.
Emergence of the New South, 409.
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role was also to pay in advance for the projected crop,
which was, of course, deducted from the tenants' share.
The cropper's only contribution was his and his family's
labor. The scheme had a wealth of disadvantages. James
Agee, a unique observer of the sharecropper system in the
mid-Thirties, reported on its unreliability:
It can be enough to tide through the dead months 
of the winter, sometimes even better : it can be 
enough to spread very thin, to take through two 
months, and a sickness, or six weeks, or a month: 
it can be little enough to be completely meaning­
less : it can be nothing: it can be enough less 
than nothing to insure a tenant only an equally 
hapless lack in the way of good luck, there is 
never any reason to hope that that luck will be .c 
repeated in the next year or the year after that.
If the cropper did not make enough to tide him over 
he could look for an outside job--a scarce commodity in the 
Depression years. Failing that, he could draw on a line of 
credit with the local merchants. Indebtedness was the 
cropper's way of life.
The southern farmer in the Thirties had very few con­
veniences . Most of his work was done by hand, with the aid 
of only a few simple tools and a mule. The work was hard 
and the land was poor. In some parts of the South the soil 
is good, but most areas have poor to medium grade soils, 
kept fertile and protected against erosion only through con­
siderable effort. The practice of growing row crops in a
James Agee, and Walker Evans, Let Us Now Praise 
Famous Men (New York, Ballantine Books, 1976; first pub­
lished, 1939), 107.
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rainy climate leaves the ground unrpotected in winter, and 
most southern soil is sandy and leaches easily. By the 
Thirties, the result was that the top soil had been washed 
away from millions of acres of southern farm land. Compared 
to the Midwest, the South had only one-third as much first 
quality land. By 1934, sixty-three percent of the land in 
the South had lost twenty-five percent or more of its top- 
soil, compared to a loss in the Midwest of only forty-five 
p e r c e n t . T h e  whole area had suffered a tremendous amount 
of erosion. "I was utterly amazed and appalled at the red 
gashed hillsides," wrote FDR's Secretary of Agriculture,
Henry Wallace. "It was a situation that was almost unbe­
lievable."^^
The one-crop economic system, farm tenancy, and poor 
land provided a tax base that was not large enough to allow 
state and local governments to give any real assistance to 
the downtrodden southern farmer. Worse, southern politicians 
often steered their states into an economic policy of re­
trenchment ; what little money that came in was sparingly 
spent. It was often an unstated policy that the poor were 
not thought to be worthy of assistance: they were lazy, un­
able to cope with the system, unable to lift themselves up.
Frank Freidel, FDR and the South (Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana State University, 1965), B.
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Whatever the cause of the rural South's economic 
debility, the region's hopes rested in electricity which 
would bring new life, convenience and facility to rural 
life in the South. FDR recognized this in Warm Springs 
in the mid-Twenties. But the idea for a government agency 
to advance rural electrification was first conceived near 
the turn of the century. Visionaries such as Gifford 
Pinchot had then concluded that there was a direct connec­
tion between electricity and prosperity. A few had even 
contemplated electric cooperatives. Some early fights to 
establish them were won, some were lost. Some succeeded, 
some did not. But all attempts laid a foundation that the 
REA was able to build upon--and upon that foundation a firm 
institution was built.
Rural electrification had its beginnings in the North­
west, not the South. In 1909, Puget Sound Power and Light 
Company began to distribute power to a few rural residents 
near Seattle. Five years later, near Granite Falls, Minne­
sota, the nation's first rural electric co-op was formed.
In 1919, eight co-ops were set up around Webster, Iowa,
tion (Washington, USGPO, 1944), 131 Some rural electrifica- 
tion did exist prior to 1909, but it was mostly confined to 
irrigation and not residential or farm areas. Mark Cordell 
Stauter, "The Rural Electrification Administration, 1935- 
1945, A New Deal Case Study" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Duke University, 1973), 4; Jerry Voorhis, American Coopera­
tives (New York, 1961), 55.
Harry Slattery, America Lights Up (Washington,
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It was not a heralded beginning, but it was a beginning.
The rest of the western world outside the U.S. had, 
by the mid-Twenties, made a more positive step toward 
providing electricity to rural areas. Rural Sweden was 
fifty percent electrified; France, seventy-one percent ; 
Finland, forty percent; Denmark, fifty percent ; and in 
Czechoslovakia, seventy percent of the farms had received 
electricity.^^ The European countries obviously felt more 
of a social responsibility to extend electricity to their 
rural areas than America did at that time. By as late as 
1935, when REA was just getting under way, only one in ten 
rural Americans had electricity and most of those lived on 
the urban fringe. The 1920 census listed six and one half 
million farms in America. Only 552,620 had electric lights. 
Only 643,899 had running water.
If the market was there, why was rural America denied 
electricity? Why could not, or would not, the private 
utilities run lines to America's farms? Private power 
companies often received the brunt of criticism in this
National Home Library Foundation, 1940), 7 ; Ellis, Giant 
Step, 33.
D. Clayton Brown, Electricity for Rural America: 
The Fight for the REA (Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood 
Press, 1980), 16.
The census reported 6,448,343 farms in 1920. De­
partment of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Fourteenth Census 
of the United States: 1920. Farm Population of the United 
States (Washington, D.C.,USGPO, 1926), 183; ibid.. Agri­
culture (Washington, USGPO, 1922), V, 512.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
period for not providing electricity to rural areas. Their 
inability to do so was usually attributed to greed and 
social irresponsibility. Of course, their costs were high, 
from $2,000 to $5,000 per mile.^^ But it was the desire 
for big profits that kept the private companies in the 
cities and out of the rural market.
The free market simply could not accomplish rural 
electrification. The profits did not exist for the compa­
nies, and until there were profits they would have no in­
centive to supply power to the countryside. Farmers used 
only small amounts of power for the first years of service, 
making for low revenue to offset a large capital investment. 
A comparable investment in urban lines would bring five 
times the profit, ^fter the first few years of service, 
farmers would usually buy enough appliances and use enough 
electricity to make the investment worthwhile, but the 
elapsed time did not produce a quick return. In the 
Depression South, where even less electricity was used.
It is difficult to show that the private companies 
thought that costs were this high. Clyde Ellis cites the 
above figures. Ellis, Giant Step, 33. See, also, Deward 
Clayton Brown, "Rural Electrification in the South, 1920- 
1955" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA, 1971), 95; 
Marquis Childs, The Farmer Takes a Hand (Garden City, New 
York, Doubleday, 1953), 49-50. For another opinion on the 
social responsibility of the private companies, and their 
various attempts at rural electrification see Edward Venard, 
The Deviation of REA (Washington, n.p., n.d.), passim.
This work is published by the Edison Electric Institute, 
a lobby group for private utility companies.
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The private companies did make some early efforts, 
even if the motive never went beyond immediate profits.
That farmers were traditionally conservative consumers of 
electricity kept them from getting power from the private 
companies. The Depression kept farmers from buying the 
appliances that would use enough power to make it worth­
while for the private companies to service their area. 
Farmers, the companies felt, would use little power because 
of high rates, and, of course, they had high rates because 
they used little power. To make service profitable in the 
average rural area of between two and five houses per mile, 
the companies demanded about $2,000 per mile. They usually 
demanded, in addition, between $500 and $1,000 per farmer 
as a deposit, and charged between nine and ten cents per 
kilowatt hour. In the city the price was as low as four 
c e n t s . B u t  to most farmers, even the option of electric­
ity was not there; the private companies were just not 
interested in the rural American market.
There was one exception. In 1922 the National Electric
tration in Perspective," Agricultural History XXIV (April, 
1950), 77. Person was the consulting economist to the REA 
in the Fifties. See, also, Brown, Electricity for Rural 
America, 4.
For another opinion, see Venard, Deviation of REA,
pass
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Light Association,^^ together with the American Farm Bureau 
Federation, the National Grange, and other groups represent­
ing rural America, met in Chicago to look at the possibili­
ties of rural electrification. The meeting was led by 
Grover C. Neff, the President of Wisconsin Power and Light, 
an early leader in rural electrification in that part of 
the country. The meeting created the Committee on the 
Relation of Electricity to Agriculture which was officially 
established in September, 1923. By the mid-Thirties, CREA 
committees had been established in twenty-seven states.
CREA had little success in bringing electricity to 
rural America; it could not solve the problem of high ex­
pense. It was still impossible for the farmer to pay for 
construction of lines, and that was CREA's only solution 
to the problem of rural electrification. As always, the 
private companies assumed no public responsibility. Either 
the extension of electricity to rural areas would be profit­
able, or there would be none. It had become increasingly 
evident that rural electrification would not occur if left 
in the hands of private utilities. By 1930, only 9.5 
percent of America's farms had received central station
The National Electric Light Association became 
Edison Electric Institute in 1933.
Slattery, America Lights Up, 15-17; Venard, 
Deviation of REA, 9.
Electrical World stated in 1935 that 10.4% of
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and the National Grange withdrew from the organization in 
1934. A year later, the Departments of Agriculture, Com­
merce, and Interior also withdrew. In 1939, in the face 
of REA's humiliating success at achieving CREA's objectives, 
CREA accepted failure and disbanded without a whimper.
The path of rural electrification divided in the 
Twenties. One path led to what proved to be the dead end 
of private power and CREA. The other, moving" slowly at 
first, led ultimately to REA and to the success of rural 
electrification. America followed that path led by men 
who saw the need for electricity in the rural areas, who 
saw it as the responsibility of the federal government to 
aid in the fulfillment of that need: men such as Gifford 
Pinchot, Morris L. Cooke, and George Norris. But the real 
credit goes to the men who made the visionaries' ideas 
work, the men who set up the co-ops on the local level, 
found the subscribers, and ran the lines. They all chose 
the second path, and they all made REA a success.
The first great leader of the rural electrification 
movement was Gifford Pinchot. From him all else grew. As
America's farms were electrified in 1930. Electrical World 
105 (January 5, 1935), 45. The census reported 13.47o for 
the same year. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, 
Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930. Agriculture 
(Washington, USGPO, 1932) , 5 6. D. Clayton B r o ^  cites 9.5% 
for rural customers receiving central station service as 
opposed to other systems such as home generation. Brown, 
Electricity for Rural America, 10.
Slattery, America Lights Up, 21.
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Morris Llewyln Cooke, the first REA administrator, put it, 
"the shadow of the Great Forester was looming o'er the 
l a n d . H e  meant, of course, that Pinchot was about to 
marshal his strength behind rural electrification.
Pinchot served as governor of Pennsylvania from 1923 
to 1927, and again from 1931 to 1935. In his first year 
as governor he appointed the young Morris L. Cooke to head 
his Giant Power Survey. The Survey looked at the feasibility 
of rural electrification and set up guidelines for its ad­
ministration. The plan was to cancel private company char- 
ers in unserved areas and set up local co-ops there. The 
co-ops could borrow money, finance construction, and dis­
tribute electricity. The Giant Power Board was to have 
authority over all electrical power in Pennsylvania, not 
unlike public service commissions today. But the proposal, 
plagued by the politically conservative Twenties, was de­
feated in the Pennsylvania legislature. Despite its defeat, 
the plan received widespread attention and became the basis 
for the REA a few years later.
Probably the most important outcome of the survey was 
that rural power was shown to be financially feasible;
Morris Llewellyn Cooke, "The Early Days of the Rural 
Electrification Idea," American Political Science Review 
XIII (June. 1948), 438.
M. L. Cooke and Judson C. Dickerson, Report of the 
Giant Power Survey Board to the General Assembly of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 
Telegraph Printing Co., 1925), passim.
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farmers were greater potential users of electricity than 
city dwellers, and as long as there were at least three 
farms per mile, rural service could be self-supporting.^^ 
The Giant Power Survey was published in 1925 as a 
proposal to the people of Pennsylvania and their legisla­
tors. Cooke compiled it and Pinchot wrote the introduction. 
Several of Pinchot's comments looked to the future: rural 
electrification was to bring "cheaper and better electric 
service to all those who have it now, and to bring good 
and cheap electric service to those who are still without 
it. It is a plan by which most of the drudgery of human 
life can be taken from the shoulders of men and women who 
toil, and replaced by the power of electricity."^^ He 
added a prediction: "I venture to say that if the United 
States ever turn to the nation-wide public ownership of 
electric utilities, it will be because the companies have 
driven them to it."^^
From Pinchot, the lineage leads directly to the New 
Deal. In 1931, FDR, as governor of New York, set up the 
Power Authority of the State of New York. He chose as his 
chief assistant, Morris L. Cooke. The story of Morris L. 
Cooke is the story of the early years of REA. Cooke began 
his distinguished career in 1911 as Philadelphia's Director 
of Public Works. From that position he defeated the 
Philadelphia Electric Company in 1915 in a rate battle
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and won. The victory forced Philadelphia's utility bills 
down. But more importantly, the victory established the 
precedent of public control over private monopolies.
After FDR's innaugurat ion in 1933, Cooke headed the 
Mississippi Valley Committee, George Norris's plan for a 
Mississippi Valley Authority similar to the Tennessee Valley 
Authority. He also worked as a consultant for the Public 
Works Administration, This position put Cooke close to 
FDR for whom he acted as the President's advisor on power 
matters.
Cooke suggested to Harold Ickes, head of the PWA, 
that a commission be set up to study the problem of rural 
electrification. Cooke wanted to work with the private 
utilities, lending them money to serve the rural areas.
The government would then act as a giant regulatory agency, 
keeping the utilities in line. Cooke's "old progressive" 
ideology was showing through here. A Republican weaned on 
the liberal progrèssivism of the Republican Roosevelt, his 
aim was a private-public coalition. Harold Ickes, a "new 
Progressive," would have nothing to do with such a plan.
He promptly told Cooke to put aside his idealism. "I 
honestly thought we could work out something with the 
private people," Cooke later told his biographer, "but
Kenneth Trombley, The Life and Times of a Happy 
Liberal, Morris Llewellyn Cooke (New York, Harper and 
Brothers, 1954), 43-44.
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[Ickes] said it was a waste of time." Cooke, though, 
could compromise to achieve his goal. When he asked Ickes 
if he might consider a plan for rural electrification ex­
cluding the private utilities, Ickes responded: "Shoot.
The Executive Order creating the REA was issued by 
the President on May 3, 1935.^^ That same day Cooke wrote 
to Roosevelt: "This is to advise you that the rural elec­
trification unit is a going concern." Cooke wasted no 
time. The REA was officially in existence on May 11, eight 
days later. FDR commented at a press conference that Cooke 
had things going even before the Executive Order was signed.^® 
The President was delighted with the plan and looked to 
the future with hope : "We are going to see, I believe, 
with our own eyes, electricity and power made so cheap that 
they will become a standard article of use, not only for 
agriculture and manufacturing, but also for every home 
within reach of an electric line.
Cooke told reporters that there were four ways to 
distribute the $100 million he had at his disposal: 1) aid 
private utilities, 2) depend on municipal power groups,





Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin 
D . Roosevelt (12 volumes, New York, DaCapo Press, 1972), V,
imr.
Ellis, Giant Step, 38.
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operate plants and lines. Although he had succeeded in 
selling Ickes on the program by promising that the private 
companies would be left out of the deal, he still groped 
for the "old progressive" coalition of public and private 
interests. On May 19, he told the New York Times : " . . .  
the program is intended to . . . aid the farmers and the 
utilities. . . . [no] greater opportunity has ever been 
presented to private industry in recent y e a r s . B u t  the 
private companies, the only potential borrowers, would not 
be interested.
On May 20, 1935, the executives from the largest com­
mercial utilities met with Cooke in Washington to survey 
the new situation. The companies reported to Cooke in a 
fourteen-page letter whose tone would set the stage for 
years to come. The report stated that "there are few farms 
requiring electricity for major farm operations that are 
not now served," and that "additional rural customers must 
largely be those who use electricity for household purposes." 
But the companies would cooperate only under the right con­
ditions : Cooke was to hand over his $100 million to which 
they would add $13.5 million. With this money, the companies 
would agree to connect 351 consumers. The federal government 
would then lend $125 million to these new customers for
New York Times, May 14, 1935. 
Ibid., May 19, 1935.
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wiring and appliances. An REA official's later comment 
on this letter was certainly a mammoth understatement:
It was "not met by enthusiastic response on the part of 
REA."̂ ^
In November, 1935, in Kansas City, Cooke looked to 
the second option: he met with 152 representatives from 
municipally owned companies. The result was not much bet­
ter than the outcome of the Washington meeting. The 
municipals had no concern for the farmer and feared higher 
rates in the cities if they connected the rural areas.
Most were less interested than the private companies.
Cooke felt he had only one viable option left. By December, 
he had decided on the co-op system.
The private utilities were not without their reasons 
for snubbing Cooke and the REA. They saw the concept as 
new and uncharted. Also, they expected the New Deal to 
be overthrown quickly and they wanted to avoid boarding a 
dinking ship. Furthermore, the utilities expected soon to 
fight the federal program in the courts— where its in­
evitable demise would probably come. They could hardly be
1935; Rural Electrification News 1 (September, 1935), 18. 
Person, "REA in Perspective," 74.
Cooke, "Early Days," 446; Trombley. Dife and Tiiaes,
149; Brown, Electricity for Rural America, 5Y
Trombley, Life and Times, 147; Childs 
a Hand, 57; Slattery, America Lights Up, 109.
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recipients of the program's money while trying to make a 
case that it was unconstitutional. Besides, if the whole 
New Deal program did not fail, they thought, certainly REA 
would, and any construction that it completed would be 
taken over by the private companies. Twenty years later 
they would still be hoping to take over the nation's co-op 
system.
But it was the issue of area coverage that really 
turned the private companies away. Area coverage means 
simply that all who want electricity in a given area should 
have it. Not only were the profit-making consumers to be 
served, but also poor farmers— the tenants and sharecroppers 
of the South who stood to gain the most from electricity, 
the ones least capable of paying. But while area coverage 
was the nemesis of the private companies, it was the obses­
sion of Morris Cooke : ". . .in the past the electric in­
dustry has skimmed the cream and left the milk. Today it 
must take the milk with the cream. . . He would stand
by his word.
By December, 1935, Cooke had given up all the options 
except co-ops. The die had been cast by default. In REA's 
first annual report he stated that it has become "apparent 
that the industry was not going to use even a substantial 
portion of the funds available for rural electrification.
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and farm organizations of a cooperative nature [have] 
forged to the front as the principal borrowers under the 
REA p r o g r a m . R E A  began setting up co-ops and supporting 
those already operating. One reason Cooke shrank from 
co-ops at first was that he felt they would be difficult 
and slow to form. But the co-op way was familiar to farmers, 
and they wanted electricity. Under REA's direction, co-ops 
slowly began to organize. But despite REA's direction and 
the huge demand, the program lagged behind other New Deal 
programs. Norris, FDR, and Ickes were dissatisfied with 
the progress of REA by the end of 1935, and pushed Cooke 
for a more aggressive a t t it ud e. C oo k e, in a radio speech, 
expressed his anxiety at the program's lack of an explosive 
New Deal-like character: "Farmers have not seen the way 
clear to overcome the obstacle presented by the necessity 
of an organization for financing, promoting, construction, 
and operation. One doesn't go into a retail store and buy 
a package of electricity. . . Changing legislation
into electricity, it turned out, was not an easy matter.
By October, 1935, Cooke wanted REA to be made a per­
manent agency. Norris agreed, and in January, 1936, he 
introduced a bill in the Senate to achieve that end. Sam
50 Rural Electrification Administration, First Annual
Report (Washington, USGPO, 1936), 5.
51 Person, "REA in Perspective," 74. 
Ibid., 76.
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Rayburn of Texas sponsored the bill in the House; it thus 
became the Norris-Rayburn Bill. In April, Rayburn silently 
slipped the bill through the House on a voice vote, but in 
the Senate there was pandemonium. Norris would not accept 
a House amendment to end REA money to private companies. 
"The big power systems," he said, "which have been holding 
up rural electrification ever since they had a grip on the 
country are in no position now to come to the government 
of the United States and ask it to loan them money.
The discussion became deadlocked, and Norris walked out. 
John Rankin of Mississippi, Norris's chief ally and one 
of the most important supporters of REA, finally coaxed 
him back. A compromise was reached. Loans would be made 
to power companies, but co-ops would receive preference.
The bill established REA as a permanent agency. Loans 
would be repaid over twenty-five years, with interest rates 
set to the federal government's long-term securities.
Norris wanted a one-billion-dollar appropriation over a 
ten-year period, but he had to settle for less than half 
that. A provision was included to channel the money into 
the less electrified areas of the country, particularly the 
South. FDR signed the bill on May 20, 1936. Cooke was
Congressional Record, 74th Congress, 2d session 
(February 26, 1936), 2826.
Ibid., 5273-5318; See also, George ¥. Norris, Fight- 
ing Liberal; The Autobiography of George W. Norris (New 
H !H-32T:York, Macmillan, 1945),
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named to head the "new" REA, and the bill went into effect 
on July 1, 1 9 3 6 The REA was here to stay.
The story of the early years of the REA is therefore 
the story of Morris Cooke. He bridged the gap of rural 
electrification from the dreams of Gifford Pinchot to the 
reality of a permanent institution. But Cooke was an in­
novator, an idea-man, not an administrator— and he knew it. 
After he had done his job of setting up the program he 
felt it was time to bow out. He twice tried to resign in 
1936, but FDR would not accept his resignation. Finally, 
in 1937, he simply quit. "The thing has become routine," 
he told a friend, "and you know how I feel about that. I 
feel the challenge is gone. Now it will be so much shuffling 
of papers. . . Cooke saw the REA as his greatest
achievement. He can rightly be called the father of rural 
electrification.
Congressional Record, 74th Congress, 2d session 
CMay 21, 1936), 7675; New York Times, May 22, 1936.
Trombley, Life and Times, 173.
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CHAPTER 2
DOERS; THE REA UNDER CARMODY AND SLATTERY
From 1937 to 1944 nearly one and a quarter million 
Americans received electric service from REA co-ops.̂
During the terms of John Carmody and Harry Slattery, the 
REA administrators during these years, American farmers 
finally achieved rural electrification. The farmers 
organized, loans were granted, lines were run, and kero­
sene lanterns were put away as the lights came on. The 
private companies rallied in opposition, putting up some 
of their biggest fights. World War II nearly halted REA 
growth, but the post-war years would see a boom that would 
make up for lost time. These were the flowering days of 
REA, and there was a brightness in the rural American sky.
When REA began in 1935, the new office was flooded 
with requests from rural Americans : "How can I get elec­
tricity?" Many organized and applied for loans even before 
procedures for doing so were established. The method of 
organizing varied from place to place. Usually co-ops had
Electrification Administration, Annual Statistical Report, 
1950 (Washington, USGPO, 1951), viii. In 1937, the number 
of consumers connected was 255,961. By 1944, 1,484,417 
had been connected.
25
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their beginnings where farmers met: churches, courthouses, 
meeting halls. A few local leaders would start the ball 
rolling with the assistance of a county agent. Although 
these local leaders were usually farmers, it was not un­
common for local businessmen to be a part of the Initial 
effort. They were often the same men who served on the 
local farm bureau, or the soil conservation committee, or 
the school board— they were the community's most active 
members, the accepted leaders. These men (they usually 
became the board of directors once the cooperative was set 
up) went from house to house signing up members--getting 
pledges of interest and collecting membership fees. They 
became the real heroes of the co-op movement. They did the 
hard work, and asked nothing in return.
The membership fee was usually $5.00. In the South, 
the fee came hard to tenant farmers and was often paid by 
the local leaders to boost membership and make organization 
possible. Near New B-oads, Louisiana, one organizer found 
that only one of twenty-five families in his area was able 
to afford the fee.^ Either the fee was paid for them, or 
they were allowed to pay when they could. Only three 
customers per mile at $1.00 per month had to be guaranteed 
to make the program work. It cost, then, $10.00 to wire 
the house, which could be paid with an initial $1.00 down
Interview with A. A. Robinson, New Roads, Louisiana, 
September 11, 1980.
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payment. This gave a family two or three bulbs. Other 
down payments could be made for appliances. For some there 
was the "Arkansas Plan": twenty cents down and ten cents 
per month to eventually pay off the membership fee. And 
all of this could be paid "in kind" by working on the 
co-op crews.^
Once the corporation was set up, enough members signed 
on, and a source of electricity found, an application was 
made to REA in Washington. But getting the plan accepted 
was not always easy. It had to show promise of success. 
Harry Slattery, the REA administrator from 1937 to 1944, 
wrote that the plan "must be approved by our engineers.
It is not a matter for novices. But once the application 
was accepted and the loan made, work could begin. And 
again, it was the board of directors--the local leaders—  
who organized, supervised, and often participated in, 
construction of the lines.
In Washington, the connection was usually the Congres­
sional Representative, or even the Senator. He might help 
or he might not, depending on his sympathies toward the 
program. But in the Thirties assistance was usually forth­
coming ; the New Deal bandwagon was in high gear, and
South, 1920-1955" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA, 
1971), 175.
^ Harry Slattery, Rural ^erica Lights Up (Washington, 
National Home Library Foundation, 1940)7 58.
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assistance to a local co-op allowed a Congressman to receive 
a good deal of credit (and votes) for bringing the miracle 
of electricity home to the farmers, It made him a man of 
the people; it made him electable. This factor may have 
done as much to boost rural electrification as anything
If an area could not generate enough interest, REA 
might send in what was called the "REA circus," a demonstra­
tion caravan complete with big top. On display was every 
manner of electrical equipment that could aid the farmer's 
tasks: grinders, hoists, pumps, heaters, refrigerators.
But the emphasis was usually on home appliances. The display 
was invariably a regional hit— and a successful sales pitch 
for the program.
"I just turned on the light and kept looking at Paw.
It was the first time I'd ever really seen him after dark.
It is hard for those of us who have never lived without 
electricity to understand what it was like to turn on lights 
for the first time. "I'll never forget that day," one farmer 
recalls of his youth, "it was late on a November afternoon 
just before dark. All we had was wires hanging down from 
the ceiling in every room, with bare bulbs on the end. Dad 
turned on the one in the kitchen first, and he just stood 
there holding onto the pull-chain. He said to me, 'Carl,
^ Clyde T. Ellis, A Giant Step (New York, Vintage Books, 
1966), 59.
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come here and hang onto this so I can turn on the light 
in the parlor.' I knew he didn't have to do that and I 
told him to stop holding it, that it would stay on. He 
finally let go, and then looked kind of foolish."^ Flip­
ping the switch in a newly serviced area for the first 
time excited local leaders and REA officials. They would 
often drive out to the area about to be energized just to 
witness the excitement of the event. The night's fascina­
tion and thrill were occasionally followed the next day by 
a symbolic funeral for the kerosene lamp.̂
After lights, most farms acquired an iron, then a 
radio. It is difficult to measure what percent of energy 
was used for what function, but one author estimates that 
as much as ninety percent was at first used for household 
chores.̂  This was particularly true in the South, where 
planting, cultivating, and picking cotton depended only on 
tractors (or more commonly, mules) and hand labor. Ginning, 
the only process using electricity, was usually done at a 
community gin. There was no grinding, threshing, or refrigera­
tion needed. The most popular household convenience was in­
door plumbing, but it was expensive and often had to wait
Ibid., 58-59.
 ̂ Interview with E. E. Taylor, Farriday, Louisiana, 
December 14, 1981.
^ D. Clayton Brown, Electricity for Rural America; 
The Fight for the REA (Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press),
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for better times. Many farmers were able to install plumb­
ing with an individual REA loan.
Lights did more than let rural Americans see better 
at night. It protected their eyes, promoted cleanliness, 
prevented accidents, and had various psychological benefits.
One REA official in Louisiana recalls that the first thing 
recipients did after receiving electricity was to paint 
the inside walls of their house--usually white.^ Electricity 
also saved time. The TVA estimated that two to four working 
hours were added to the farmer's day. Inside the house, the 
time spent washing and ironing, a two-day job without elec­
tricity, was cut by as much as seven hours. In one recipient's 
calculations, the time spent on maintaining kerosene lamps 
and other lighting equipment alone totalled two days per 
year.^®
Refrigeration ended the need for gardens, smokehouses, 
and cold storage, while it improved the farmer's diet. The 
southern diet was heavy on salted fatback, cornmeal, and 
molasses, products that required no refrigeration. The re­
sult was often pellagra, a chronic disease caused by a niacin 
deficiency and characterized by skin eruptions. This disease, 
along with hookworm and malaria, accounted in part for the 
reputation of southerners as shiftless, lazy people. But
1980.
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with refrigeration, farmers could keep a variety of foods 
on hand. Refrigeration also lessened the chance of food 
poisoning and staphylococcus,
Of all the conveniences made possible by electricity, 
radio opened the most doors. The farmer could reach out 
and touch the rest of the world. He could listen to Edward 
R. Morrow from London, FDR from Washington, the commodity 
prices from Chicago, or the weather report from the local 
station. Through the miracle of radio, he was privileged 
to have the same information as other Americans, And if 
he wished he could tune in to Major Bowes, Fibber McGee 
and Molly, or listen to the "songbird of the South," Kate 
Smith, every Thursday night at eight— "Hello everybody," 
Through the radio, the American farmer was becoming a part 
of mainstream American life, where he belonged, and where 
he remained,^^
The outhouse was a plague on rural life. When elec­
tricity came, the bathroom moved inside, and health condi­
tions in the rural areas improved markedly. This was 
particularly true in the South where outdoor toilets were 
the cause of many health problems. Frequently the water 
supply would become contaminated, causing typhoid, dysentary.
Rupert B. Vance, Human Geography of the South: A 
Study in Regional Resources and Cultural Adequacy (Chapel 
Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1932), 437-438,
Brown, Electricity for Rural America, 118.
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and various other gastrointestinal disorders. Hookworm, 
a parasite causing anemia and loss of energy, inhabited 
the damp sandy soils of the South, but it most often in­
fested the vicinity of outdoor toilets. Writes one observer 
of this illness, "Their skin is yellow, wrinkled and waxy; 
their hair, dry and lustreless ; their eyes without color 
or sparkle; their expression, dull, stupid, and intensely 
melancholy. In the South the disease became known as 
the "big lazy," or simply "the lazy sickness," and was, 
with pellagra, generally responsible for creating the 
stereotype of southern shiftlessness. In 1924, the Inter­
national Health Board reported that hookworm infection was 
most severe in rural white school children of the southern 
s t a t e s . T h e r e  were attempts to halt hookworm, such as 
placing outdoor toilets on concrete slabs, but it was rural 
electrification, making indoor plumbing possible, that 
finally curbed the debilitating infection.
Once the farmers began using their newly acquired elec­
tricity, private companies began to see more profit in rural 
electrification than they had first thought possible. They 
were still not willing to accept area coverage, nor were 
they willing to bring prices down, but they wanted the new
Vance, Human Geography of the South, 381.
Ibid., 389.
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lucrative rural market, and they would fight for it, fight 
to keep REA out.
The private companies complained that the low rate of 
interest that REA received was an unfair advantage. REA 
borrowed its money from the federal government at about 
three percent interest. The going rate in the open market 
in the mid-Thirties, the amount the companies had to pay 
for their money, was about four p e r c e n t . W h e n  REA was 
established. Congress' justification for lending money below 
the prime rate was that several handicaps were intrinsic 
to bringing electricity to rural areas. There was low con­
sumer density, the customers were usually of low income and 
would not use much power, rural lines were more expensive 
to build than urban lines, and there were few large loads.
The subsidization was intended to offset these disadvantages. 
The private companies screamed of unfair competition, and 
they screamed loudly through their lobby groups.
The first strong stand made by the private companies 
was against the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.
Between 1936 and 1940, REA paid an average interest 
rate of 2.81 percent. The private companies paid an average 
of 3.68 percent, a difference of .872 percent. National 
Rural Electric Cooperative Association, Rural Electric Pact 
Book (Washington, n.p., 1965), 99.
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The Wheeler-Rayburn Bill, as the act was most commonly 
known, was aimed at regulating the utilities by breaking 
up profit-draining holding companies. The bill passed 
despite strong lobbying attempts by the private companies, 
and was declared a victory by the trust-busting progressives 
in the administration. The defeat stung so badly that the 
utilities temporarily abandoned the Congressional fight.
The battle in Congress seemed over, a decisive defeat for 
the utilities, but they were not finished yet. The battle­
ground simply moved to the countryside.
As co-ops began to form, the movement became more and 
more of a threat to the private companies. REA officials 
reported such unscrupulous activities as "spite lines"—  
the practice of running electrical line into an area simply 
to gain possession of it so that the co-ops could not build 
there. Often lists of the most lucrative rural areas were 
covertly passed to the private companies so that they could 
move into these areas ahead of the co-ops. Spite lines were 
often constructed out from urban areas in a pinwheel pattern 
along main roads in the lucrative outlying areas, leaving 
to the co-ops the poor isolated houses between the spokes. 
The result was that co-op formation was difficult or impos­
sible. In some areas raging battles occurred where co-op 
workers and company construction crews literally raced into
William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Robsevelt and 
the New Deal, 1932-1940. (New York, Harper and Row, 1963) 
156-157.----
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areas. Other company tactics included sending men into 
rural areas to spread false rumors about the co-ops. Com­
mon stories were that their electricity would not be as 
"hot" as the electricity the company could provide or that 
if the co-op failed the farmers would be held financially 
liable, and that if the Republicans won in 1936, power 
would be cut o f f I t  was also not uncommon for the 
companies to refuse to sell electricity to the co-ops who 
were at that time totally dependent on outside sources of 
power. Often the prices charged by the companies were 
prohibitive--well above what the co-ops were capable of 
paying. Much of this activity, writes one past REA leader, 
caused the resentment and hard feelings that exist between 
the two groups even today.
This sort of activity became worse as the REA program 
began to grow and threaten the potential expansion of the 
companies. But not all private company expansion into 
rural areas was spite lines. When it became apparent that 
there were profits in rural electrification, many companies 
entered the rural market in a significant way. With co-op 
competition spurring them on, they electrified a sizeable 
portion of rural America.
tration in Perspective," Agficultural History XXIV (April, 
1950), 78; Brown, "Rural Electrification in the South," 179.
Ellis, Giant Step, 45.
Edwin Vennard, The Deviation of REA (Washington, 
n.p., n.d.), 14-15.
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If FDR was the REA's creator and preserver, and Cooke 
was the movement's father, then John Carmody was its motivat­
ing force— he was the man who made things happen. Never 
under Carmody's administration would there be difficulty in 
spending Congressional appropriations. He got the money 
to the farmers. He turned the money into electricity.
Carmody's beginning in rural electrification was as 
Cooke's right-hand man. When he took that position, Cooke 
told him that he would be the next administrator. So, it 
was no surprise when FDR nominated him to the post in 
February, 1937.^^ His administration lasted only two and 
one half years, but his impact was great. Where Cooke was 
short, Carmody was long. Carmody could deal with politicians, 
Cooke could not. He was an administrator ; Cooke was an 
idea man. Carmody was a Democrat ; Cooke was a Republican.
But their objectives were the same : to electrify rural 
America.
Clyde T. Ellis, an important figure in the rural elec­
trification movement, liked Carmody. He saw him as "one of 
the most brilliant men and one of the toughest administra­
tors I ever k n e w . B u t  Harold Ickes and Hugh Johnson 
did not like him, and they made no secret of it. Ickes 
felt that the REA should have been under his direct control 
as administrator of the Public Works Administration. When
New York Times, February 16, 1937.
Ellis, A Giant Step, 54.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Carmody was appointed, thereby taking the REA out of Ickes' 
reach, Ickes felt that the reason was that the REA under 
Cooke had not spent enough money, and that under him it 
would spend even less. Ickes wrote FDR just after Carmody's
appointment: "If the agency which spends its appropriation
the fastest is the one that is considered the most success­
ful, then I admit that PWA is not in the running with some 
others. But quick spending of Federal funds has never been 
our g o a l . B u t  FDR knew that the only way rural America 
would get electricity was to distribute the money to the 
farmers as quickly as possible, and Ickes' past record was 
one of moderation. Johnson, head of the National Recovery 
Administration, agreed with Ickes. He saw Carmody as a 
stuffed shirt, "a fat toad sitting on the wet end of a 
log. . . . But there is no evidence that this dislike
for Carmody ever adversely affected his work with the REA,
or that FDR ever lost confidence in him because of it.
The statistics of Carmody's brief administration are 
impressive. By the time he left in 1939, 417 co-ops had 
been formed, and twenty-five percent of all farms had service. 
In 1938 alone, 168,000 farms received electricity.^^ Under
Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes, 
Vol. II, The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939 Ç3 vols.. New York, 
Simon and Schuster, 1954)7 665.
Rural Electrification Administration, 1939 Annual 
Report (Washington, USGPO, 1940), 3; Slattery, America Lights 
UR, 76.
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Carmody, innovations made construction easier and cheaper. 
Longer spans between poles were used, with the line mounted 
on the poles, one above the other, instead of on cross-arms. 
Hardware was standardized, and purchased in great quantities 
at the lowest possible price. The price of construction 
came down as a result— by one estimate, from $2,500 to $941 
per mile.^^
Under Carmody, FDR placed the REA in the Department of 
Agriculture, "I know, it bothers me too," FDR told Ellis, 
"but there's so much trouble in the world now and there are 
so many demands on me that I just can't have all these in­
dependent agencies reporting to me. I have to have some 
relief from these administrative matters. As long as I am 
President, you need have no w o r r y . B u t  Ellis did worry, 
and rightly so. The reorganization was ambiguous and would 
cause conflict later. Carmody's reaction to the reorgani­
zation was decisive and swift. He would have none of it.
He quit in June.
Carmody later reflected on the condition of things when 
he came to EŒA: "It was almost dead when I went there. The 
few projects were small and c r e e p i n g . H e  took hold of 
a program that had been born of idealism and turned it into
Person, "REA in Perspective," 77-78; Brown, Elec­
tricity for Rural America, 69; Ellis, Giant Step, 57.
Ellis, Giant Step, 63.
Brown, Electricity for Rural America, 68.
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a realistic one that brought light, instead of dreams, to 
rural Americans.
Carmody remained in FDR’s favor. He was appointed to 
head the Federal Works Administration just seven days after 
his resignation. Unitl 1946, he served on the Maritime 
Commission. He died in 1963 after a distinguished career.
Within two months of Carmody's resignation, Harry 
Slattery was named to head the REA. There was not much 
excitement surrounding his appointment. Like Cooke, 
Slattery's political initiation had been at the feet of 
Gifford Pinchot. As Pinchot's personal secretary, he be­
came deeply involved in the early conflicts with the power 
companies. He was a part of the Ballinger-Pinchot Affair 
in 1911 which contributed to the Taft-Roosevelt split. He 
was best known for his uncovering of the Teapot Dome oil- 
lease scandals. In 1932, with the rise of FDR, he came to 
Washington as Ickes’ personal assistant, later to become 
Undersecretary of the Interior. At first, he refused the 
REA post, evidently seeing it as a step down, but FDR per­
sisted and Slattery finally accepted. He took office in 
September, 1939.^*^
Maxine Block, ed., Current Biography: Who's Who and 
Why CNew York, W. H. Wilson and Company, 1940), 141-142; 
t^o Was Who in America with World Notables IV, 1961-1968 
(Chicago, A. N. Marquis Co., 1968).
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Slattery's administration was stormy. There was con­
flict from within and without. He proved to be a poor 
administrator; some have even questioned his sanity. He 
left in disgrace, but the REA under his direction grew 
rapidly.
FDR's reorganization of the Department of Agriculture 
did not specify whether or not the REA administrator was 
subordinate to the Secretary of Agriculture. This was 
not an immediate problem when Slattery came in. He and 
Wallace got along well. But when Wallace left to be FDR's 
third-term Vice-President, Claude Wickard took the post.
By 1941, Wickard had decided that his plans for REA did not 
include Slattery; he wanted him out. The subsequent fight 
drew in the biggest names of the day.
The conflict began over how to manage the co-ops. 
Slattery wanted them to be nearly independent, private 
businesses, in the hands of the people. Wickard wanted a 
hand in their affairs, even to the point of overseeing 
the selection of co-op officers. But Slattery's objections 
did not concern Wickard. To him the REA and Slattery were 
his to direct.
Slattery's ability to run the REA was encumbered by
Mark Cordell Stauter, "The Rural Electrification 
Administration, 1935-1945: A New Deal Case Study," (unpub­
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 19731, 143.
32 Brown, Electricity for Rural America, 78-79.
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Wickard's continued needling. At one point, Wickard had 
REA personnel investigated. He asked Rankin and Norris 
to urge FDR to fire Slattery. Slattery tried to fight 
back by building his own coalition, but Wickard was too 
s t r o n g . T h e  fight would not end until Slattery fell 
from Presidential grace.
REA's problems were compounded by World War II. Co-op 
construction material was restricted by the war effort. 
Cooper, in particular, was scarce, and almost all construc­
tion ceased. Any copper that remained on the market was 
quickly bought up by the private companies. Finally, the 
War Production Board put a freeze on nearly all construc­
tion materials. In addition, the loan allocation for 1943 
was slashed to a thin $10 million, and that was to be used 
for defense purposes only.
To many public power supporters, there was another side 
to the wartime curtailments. They felt that REA increased 
farm productivity, eased food shortages, and allowed farmers 
enough free time to work in defense plants. With less farm 
labor needed, more men could join up. Slattery may have 
agreed, but he did not press the point. Many began to see 
the need for a more active REA spokesman than Slattery.
probed. Newspaper columnist Drew Pearson picked up the 
story and printed it. Ibid., 78.
Person, "REA in Perspective," 79-80; Cohgressional 
Record, 77th Congress, 1st session (October 27, 1941), 
8240-8242.
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In late 1941, the REA was accused of hoarding copper in 
Texas for its own use. A congressional hearing was held 
and REA was easily and quickly exonerated.But, again, 
there was no one to speak for REA. Slattery had been 
silent. Several public power advocates got together to 
establish a voice for REA that would be heard on Capitol 
Hill.
In March, 1942, this group met in Cincinnati and the 
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association was born. 
The organizer and first manager was Clyde T. Ellis of 
Arkansas. Slattery got along well with the NRECA, but not 
with Ellis. At the first annual convention in January, 
1943, Slattery called the new organization "the beginning 
of another stage in the progress of rural electrification 
in the United States. But he and Ellis would soon lock 
horns, and the conflict would make the Slattery-Wickard 
hostility seem mild in comparison.
The NRECA's strength grew enormously during the war 
years. In Congress its biggest support came from the 
biggest names— George Norris, John Rankin, Robert Poage-- 
and it won every early fight. It got the freeze lifted on 
construction materials. It set up an insurance plan for 
the co-ops. By its first annual meeting 175 co-ops had
Congressional Record, ibid. (December 2, 1941), 
9312-9316; New York Times, December 2, 1941.
New York Times, January 20, 1943.
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had j o i n e d . T h e  power of NRECA was growing, and Ellis' 
power grew with it.
Like so many other public power enthusiasts, Ellis 
lived most of his early life without electricity. He 
recalled unsuccessful attempts by his father to get elec­
tricity for their home, and by his principal to get lights 
for the schoolhouse. He was born near Pea Ridge, Arkansas, 
where the backward way of life was the only way. When he 
went to Washington in 1939, he took with him memories of 
his early life without electricity, the hard life of hand- 
pumped wells, wood stoves, and dark nights. The rest of 
his life, as a Congressman and then as NRECA manager, would 
be devoted to rural electrification.^^
Ellis was elected to the Arkansas state legislature 
at age twenty-three on a public power platform. Six years 
later, in 1938, he was elected to the House of Representa­
tives, again as a supporter of public power. He served 
there only four years. In 1942, he lost a bid for the 
Senate to John McClellan. In order to run for the Senate, 
he turned over his seat in the House to his protege William 
Fulbright.^^ In 1943, a public power enthusiast without 
a job, Ellis was in a prime position to organize and then 
head the NRECA.
Brown, Electricity for Rural America, 87; Ellis, 
Giant Step, 75-81.
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From his position at the NRECA, Ellis soon gained 
enough power to take on Slattery. Slattery was generally 
thought incompetent, even mentally i l l . H e  was chronically 
ailing, always absent from his desk. At the REA office, 
there was constant bickering between Slattery and Carmody's 
heir apparent, Robert Craig. Craig constantly chomped at 
the bit as number two, always regarding Slattery as an inter­
loper. The result of this interior squabble and Slattery's 
administrative intertia was, as might be expected, poor 
morale at REA top l e v e l s . A n d  these internal problems 
made Slattery vulnerable to attack from Ellis.
All of these conflicts resulted from a changing of 
the guard which was taking place not only within the REA 
in the mid-Forties, but throughout national politics. The 
new was replacing the old. The new liberalism of the 
Roosevelt Administration was replacing, and often clashing 
with, the old liberalism of the Progressive Era, and nowhere 
was it more strongly felt than at REA. This new group had 
no illusions of cooperating with the private sector; the 
companies were viewed with disdain, and for the most part 
excluded from future plans. Ellis led the new Young Turks. 
They would not be satisfied with simply serving rural 
America with electricity bought from the private companies.
Brown, Electricity for Rural Aiaefica, 8S. 
Ibid., 87-90.
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They would generate it themselves, removing themselves 
from under the thumb of private power, and never look 
back. The fight over electrical generation would be 
fought on the battle grounds of the states until the mid- 
Sixties when the new liberals would finally come away with 
all the cards--bloody, but victorious.
Slattery was the focal point of the opening battled.
He was the last administrator to oppose electrical genera­
tion. His species was becoming extinct. He was unable to 
adapt, and was pushed aside by a stronger, new breed.
Ellis was, of course, the leader. But the first skirmishes 
were fought between Slattery and Craig. Craig had approved 
a Texas plan for generation during one of Slattery's ex­
tended absences in 1941, When Slattery tried to stop it, 
the wrath of Sam Rayburn came down on him like a ponderous 
weight. Rayburn called for Slattery's immediate resignation 
and accused him of being "mentally ill, incompetent and 
ruining the program.
The differences between Ellis and Slattery were dif­
ferences in philosophy— two clashing ways of thinking 
about rural electrification. They were brought to combat 
over how co-op liability insurance should be provided.
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the beginning. Private insurance companies were gouging 
them, citing the inexperience of REA linesmen as a high 
risk. Ellis wanted the NRECA to set up an insurance 
company for the co-ops out of surplus REA funds. Slattery 
killed the plan. The fight was on. Ellis wrote FDR com­
plaining of Slattery's incompetence. He sent anti-Slattery 
letters to co-ops. On July 10, 1943, Businessweek reported 
that the end was near for Slattery; he was expected to 
resign soon.^^ Rankin defended Ellis in the House. FDR, 
wanting to end the embarrassing controversy, offered the 
REA job to Norris, hoping that Slattery would get the hint 
arid step down. Norris refused, and so did Slattery. FDR 
tried again, this time using an emissary to bring down 
Slattery. He would not budge.
Slattery hoped to get a Senate investigation of REA 
underway. In May, 1944, he succeeded. The report from 
the hearings exonerated him, while criticizing FDR, USDA, 
Wickard, NRECA, and Ellis. The committee even commended 
Slattery for his obstinence in not resigning.
Slattery had been victorious against Craig, Wickard, 
Ellis, and even FDR. He had fought the powers that be and 
won. But he was isolated in a political world. He would
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soon wither and die. In 1944 he supported Dewey, A few 
days after the election, he resigned.
The Slattery-Wickard feud could have been avoided had 
the 1939 reorganization of REA been clear. But the fight 
with Ellis was a fight waiting to happen. The conflict 
between these two men was a conflict of basic philosophies 
over how the REA would be run in the future. Had the ques­
tion not been insurance, it would have been something else.
Slattery was the REA's tragic character. He was cut 
from an old mold. To him, the ideas of generating elec­
tricity and setting up an insurance company were moving 
too far from the public-private coalition that was the 
foundation of progrèssivism. When the fight was at its 
peak, Slattery sought counsel from his mentor, Gifford 
Pinchot, by then certainly the last of the Progressive 
Era's great leaders. Pinchot characteristically advised 
Slattery to fight it out to the very end. David Lilienthal, 
director of the TVA, saw Slattery as "highly deserving as 
an old progressive."^^ Lilienthal might as well have 
characterized Slattery as obsolete.
During Slattery's administration, the number of con­
sumers jumped from just over 800,000 to 1.5 million.
47 David Lilienthal, The Journals of David Lilienthal,
Vol. I, The TVA Years, 1939-1945 (New York, Harper and Row, 
1964), 280.
REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1950, viii. In 
1939, 849,588 consumers were connected. By 1944, that 
number was up to 1,484,417.
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It is difficult to see how such growth could come out of 
such chaos. But the growth can be attributed to the capable 
leadership of the local co-op managers, not to Washington,
In the last few months of Slattery's administration. 
Congress passed the Pace Act, the most significant piece 
of legislation affecting the REA since the program's in­
ception in 1935,^^ It fixed interest rates at two percent 
and extended the amortization period to thirty-five years.
It was a significant liberalization of the program, and it 
showed the willingness of Congress to see REA's objectives 
through to the end. When FDR signed the bill on September 
21, 1944, he called it "a great step forward in achieving 
the ultimate objective of the rural electrification program 
. . . ." The NRECA led the fight, and Slattery, by then out 
in the cold, opposed it.
In that same year, Congress continued to show its 
support of rural electrification by approving the formation 
of the Southwest Power Administration. In the early years 
of the war, several dams were built in the Southwest to 
bring power to military installations there. In 1943, 
these projects were consolidated into one program under 
Ickes' direction. As the war drew to a close. Congress 
stipulated in the Flood Control Act of 1944 that the
introduced February 29, 1944, hy^ 
Stephen Pace of Georgia as the "Omnibus Agriculture Bill," 
H.R. 4278.
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electricity generated at these projects was to be sold 
to co-ops. Today, twenty-five dams generate electricity 
for co-ops and private companies in Texas, Oklahoma, 
Arkansas, Missouri, Kansas, and Louisiana.
With the passage of the Pace Act and the formation 
of SPA it looked as though Congress was planning a bright 
future for rural electrification. Despite the hindrances 
of severe internal strife under Slattery, his apparent 
incompetence, and the wartime slowdown, REA was enjoying 
a resurgence in the post-war era, and about to move ahead 
into the period of its greatest growth.
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association,
People— Their Power: The Rural Electric Fact Book (Washington, 
n.p., 1980), 66.
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CHAPTER 3
POWER TO THE RURAL PEOPLE; WORLD WAR II TO PRESENT
At the end of World War II, over half of America's 
rural population was still without electricity; within 
twenty years, almost no one would be without it. These 
twenty post-war years were a period of phenomenal growth 
and expansion for rural electrification. The Pace Act 
allowed co-ops enough financial independence to move into 
even the most remote areas. As the co-ops expanded, they 
grew in strength and as a result, conflicts with the 
companies grew more fierce. In the face of this, an in­
creasing number of public power supporters began to follow 
Ellis' lead in the direction of generation and transmission-- 
in the direction of total independence from the companies.
By the mid-sixties the Republicans in Congress and a few 
conservative southerners had adopted the ideas of Cooke, 
Carmody, and Slattery; the ideas of the old progressives 
had become the ideas of the post-war conservatives. The 
liberals, led by Ellis, came to dominate the power platform 
of the Democratic Party. They opposed cooperation with the 
private companies ; generation of their own power was the 
only way for them. New battle lines had been drawn, new 
sides were chosen, an old conflict was renewed.
50
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The war slowdown had created a logjam of applications. 
Construction began slowly. Hardware, poles, and trained 
technicians were hard to find, and it was not until 1948 
that construction got into full swing. By that year, over 
40,000 customers per year were being connected. By June, 
seventy-eight percent of America's farms were receiving 
REA service.̂
Just when REA was about to shift back into high gear, 
the program was nearly blocked by the 1947 Republican cut­
backs in the House. Everett Dirksen. Chairman of the Sub­
committee on Appropriations, tried hard to have REA funds 
cut, but the Senate, still in the hands of the Democrats, 
restored the appropriation to its original level of $250 
million. The 1948 request, higher still, was passed with­
out a fight.^
By 1948, it was no secret that rural electrification 
had become a big success. But the comforts of electricity 
could not compare with the access to communications net­
works in bringing rural America into the mainstream of 
American life. In 1949, only thirty percent of the rural 
population had telephone service--the twentieth century
United States Department of Agriculture, Rural 
Electrification Administration, Rural Lines--USA: The 
Story of Cooperative Rural Electrification (Washington, 
D.C., USGPO, 1981), 19.
^ Deward Clayton Brown, "Rural Electrification in the 
South, 1920-1955" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA, 
1971), 258-261.
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link to the rest of the world. In that year. Congress 
amended the REA Act to lend money to telephone co-ops in 
rural areas. The program was sponsored by the NRECA, and, 
as might be expected, was opposed violently by AT&T. 
Nevertheless, by 1959, there were 679 telephone co-ops in 
the country.^ Rural Americans took another step out of 
the non-electric past.
REA's growth in the post-war period had the full sup­
port of President Harry S. Truman. In a time when many 
members of Congress were beginning to look over their 
shoulders for a socialist bugaboo and to imagine they had 
found it in such programs as REA, Truman, characteristically, 
defended it. "The power companies, who said the dams are 
socialism, are not passing power along to their rural 
customers. Power ought to go to the farmers, and as long 
as I have anything to do with it, that's where the power 
will go,"^— this remark, coming in 1952 at the height of 
the red-baiting, from a President commonly known for not 
provoking the red-baiters. He was, said Ellis, "a genuine
tion. Rural Electric Facts : American Success Story (Washing­
ton, D.C., n.p., 1970), 27, 170; See also, ibid., The REA 
Rural Telephone Loan Program (Washington, D.C., n.p., n.d.), 
passim.
^ Rural Electrification 10 (August, 1952), 26.
^ Clyde T. Ellis, A Giant Step (New York, Vintage 
Books, 1952).
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Truman appointed Claude Wickard to head the REA.
Wickard had been FDR's Secretary of Agriculture, and had 
submitted his resignation after Roosevelt's death. As 
administrator, he began a policy of bringing independence 
to the co-ops, of letting them run their own affairs in­
dependent of the Washington office. Many of the co-ops 
had seven or eight years' experience by this time, and 
some had even grown to resent federal interference. During 
Wickard's administration, cries of socialism grew louder.
He answered by emphasizing that co-ops were not government- 
owned agencies, and that there was nothing socialistic 
about the programs. "REA borrowers are private enterprises," 
he said, "just as much as are the commercial companies 
The Washington office put the previously mandatory services 
of audits, advice, and assistance on a voluntary basis.
Thus, these independent businesses were thrown more and 
more on their own.
The Democratic hold on the Presidency ended with 
Eisenhower's election in 1952. The ascension of a Repub­
lican to the White House was accepted with some anxiety by 
REA officials. The REA program had been created by Demo­
crats, it was a Democratic triumph, and, by the early 
Fifties, a Democratic sacred cow. There was a fear that
 ̂H. S. Person, "The Rural Electrification Administra­
tion in Perspective," Agricultural History XXIV (April, 
1950), 83.
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Eisenhower would try to kill it, even the entire New Deal. 
But Eisenhower accepted the New Deal, and by doing so, he 
cemented the New Deal programs into the American economic 
system. Nevertheless, public power did not fare well 
under Eisenhower. Although much of Eisenhower's wrath was 
directed at TVA, in the minds of many of his supporters 
REA was somehow lumped together with TVA; consequently,
REA suffered. "Those were hard years for us," said Ellis 
of the Eisenhower Administration. He "just never did seem 
to comprehend what rural electrification was all about.
Eisenhower mildly endorsed REA in 1952. But when he 
came to Washington, big business came with him as Douglas 
McKay, Eisenhower's Secretary of the Interior, boasted: 
"We're here in the saddle representing big business.
The National Chamber of Commerce and the National Associa­
tion of Manufacturers supported private power in their 
fight against REA. And soon, public power became the 
target of a large propaganda campaign. In 1953, Eisenhower 
stated his dislike for TVA, and the "creeping socialism" 
of public power in general: "By God, if we ever could do 
it before we leave, well I'd like to see us sell the whole 
thing, but I suppose we can't go that far.
Ellis, Giant Step, 105,122.
^ I ^ .  , 105.
 ̂Quoted in Emmet John Hughes, Ordeal of Power : A 
Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years (New York, Antheneum,
1962), 152.
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Appropriations— and therefore electrical connections-- 
were extremely low during Eisenhower's Administration. In 
1950, before Eisenhower's election, REA appropriations had 
jumped to $470 million, the highest ever. By 1953, REA 
money was cut by three-fourths, just above the 1937 level.
The program had nearly been stopped dead in its tracks.
One of the greatest challenges to REA in the Eisenhower 
years, and for that matter throughout the program's exist­
ence, was the reorganization of the Department of Agriculture 
in 1953. The power to make REA loans was taken from the REA 
administrator and given to the Secretary of Agriculture, then 
Ezra Taft Benson. Immediately, Benson began reviewing and 
restricting REA loans over the head of REA administrator,
David Hamil. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Democrat from 
Minnesota, and Representative C. Melvin Price, Democrat from 
Illinois, introduced a bill to return the loan-making powers 
to the REA administrator. A classic partisan battle began 
over the Humphrey-Price Bill.
Much of the fighting went on in Senate and House Sub­
committees. Homer Capehart of Indiana led the fight against 
the bill in the Senate, where Humphrey was flanked by John 
Kennedy and Frank Church. The bill passed easily, reflecting
trification Administration, Annual Statistical Report, 1953 
(Washington, D.C., USGPO, 1954), xv.
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 
People--Their Power : The Rural Electric Fact Book (Washing- 
ton, D.C.. n.p., l980), 31; Ellis, Giant Step, 3~23.
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a grassroots desire to keep the program in full swing.
The Senate passed it on April 8, 1959, with a vote of 
sixty to twenty-seven. In the House, the margin was 254 
to 131. A few days later, to no one's surprise, Eisenhower 
vetoed the bill. The Senate voted to override with six 
votes to spare, but the House fell short by four. Presi­
dent Eisenhower's opinion would stand,
The REA was damaged during Eisenhower's Administration, 
but despite appropriations cuts and other hindrances, local 
co-ops for the first time managed to boost the number of 
electrified farms to over ninety percent. In the South, 
eighty-six percent were finally receiving p o w e r . T h e r e  
were actually few local setbacks. The program had marched 
on during the war; it would march on under Eisenhower.
It "was the good rain that ends a long drought.
That was how Ellis characterized John F. Kennedy's election 
in 1960. Kennedy's Vice-President, Lyndon B. Johnson, had 
been, as Rayburn's protege, one of REA's most avid supporters. 
He had even been a co-op organizer in Texas, and had directly 
supported the formation of NRECA. The future again looked 
bright for the program. But the political atmosphere was 
not, at first, as favorable as it might have seemed. First
Congressional Record, 86th Congress, 1st session 
(April 28, 1959), 6919; ibid., (April 30, 1959), 7207.
REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1953, 14-16.
Ellis, Giant Step, 145.
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of all,, Massachusetts was one of four states that had been 
taken over by the power companies; there were no co-ops in 
the President's home state. And secondly, Kennedy had a 
nasty habit of talking as a liberal and acting as a conserva­
tive. Not long after the inauguration, Ellis, along with 
many other liberals, quickly became disenchanted with JFK.
"As time passed after the inauguration," Ellis remembered,
"it became increasingly clear that while the new President 
might be sympathetic to resource development, he did not 
intend to lead any crusade for it." The President made 
sympathetic recommendations to Congress, "but in most cases 
there was no concentrated administrative effort. . .
This was not an uncommon feeling among New Deal liberals 
when JFK came to office. They had been stifled by the War 
and then by Eisenhower, with only a short interlude of 
social program growth under Truman. Many of them expected 
more from JFK than he was willing to give— Camelot was not 
utopia.
JFK finally did support public power, but more because 
of a desire to aid rural America, particularly the South, 
than truly to carry on FDR's legacy. His Area Redevelopment 
Administration, set up in April, 1961, was aimed at reversing 
the decline of the rural South. Of course, it was not so 
much a decline as it was the South's age-old problem of
Ibid., 160. 
Ibid., 160-161.
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consistently lagging behind the economy of the rest of the 
country. The rural standard of living was much lower than 
that of urban areas. Rural southerners received little 
or no health care, and their educational level was well 
below that of the rest of America. For most, rural life 
offered only one alternative to living in poverty: moving 
to the city where better jobs might produce a better 
standard of living. The result was that JFK's "war on the 
poverty of opportunity" spilled over into REA coffers, REA 
loan allocations were raised back to their pre-Eisenhower 
levels, and rural Americans could again hope to achieve 
parity with the rest of the country.
By the 1960s, it had become apparent that the New Deal 
and the War had remarkably changed the face of rural America. 
But to those who felt an attachment to ruralism, the change 
was not necessarily good. The most obvious phenomenon was 
migration; much of rural America had moved to the city since 
the War, to the land of opportunity. In the South, migration 
had its greatest effect. It chnaged the character and even 
the meaning of the American South.
What had caused the exodus? Southern blacks had been
George Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, 
1913-1945 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 
1967), 432; Robert Coles, Farewell to the South (Boston, 
Little, Brown and Company, 1963), 60, 63, 100, 371, 130.
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the first to leave. They saw opportunities in urban 
factories during World War I and in the Twenties and stormed 
the cities, particularly in the North, to find a better 
life. The Depression worsened the problems that had plagued 
southern agriculture throughout the Twenties, and when World 
War II came and defense plants called for workers, southerners 
responded with a mass migration.
The New Deal programs had much the same effect. Al­
though there might be some question as to whether the New 
Deal brought the nation out of the Depression, there is no 
doubt that the millions of dollars pumped into the rural 
economy resulted in an uplifting of rural America. Much of 
this money was directed toward the South, making farming 
profitable. Profitability led to mechanization, and mechani­
zation pushed the tenant farmer, sharecropper and farm 
laborer off the land and into the city. The overall effect 
was good for all involved; the surplus manpower was absorbed 
by the wartime factories, but the traditional character of 
the South was lost to memory.
REA, of course, was one instrument in this change.
It made farming easier and more profitable. It was at 
first thought that the program would make rural life pal­
atable, that it would keep another generation of youth down
Tindall, Emergence of the New South, 432; Coles, 
Farewell to the South! 130.
Tindall, Emergence of the New South, 432; Coles, 
Farewell to the South! 130.
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on the farm, keep the bright lights of the city from luring 
the kids away. REA pamphlets often reported: "We have 
noticed that these boys become more enthusiastic about 
agriculture as a means of earning a living when they come 
to realize that electricity means more profits and less 
work. . . . But the mechanism and profits that came as 
a result of REA and other New Deal programs allowed for a 
rural-to-urban migration that was beneficial to all involved. 
An equilibrium was reached in the American economy whereby 
factories received much needed labor at the same time that 
less farm labor was needed.
A direct result of REA was rural industry. This 
phenomenon barely existed before the 1930s, and if it did, 
it generated its own power. By the 1950s and 1960s, the 
small farmer, now with less to do because of mechanization, 
could complete his chores in the morning (or leave them to 
a son or even a farmhand) and work a later shift at a 
nearby factory. The standard of living of this part-time 
farmer quickly jumped from poverty to middle class. And 
his money was circulated into the rural economy, benefitting 
everyone who came in touch with it.
But where did the factories come from? By the 1960s, 
profits in the northern urban, industrial complex were
Rural Electrification Administration (Washington, B.C., 
ÜSGPO, 1939), 50.--------------------
D. Clayton Brown, Electricity for Rural America : The 
Fight for the REA, (Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1980), 
120, 129.
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being cut drastically by high labor demands and high taxes. 
Rural America, but particularly the South, quickly became 
a haven from these profit-cutting demands. An exploitable 
labor supply, low tax rates and, now, cheap power brought 
industry to the S o u t h . I t  is ironic that while southerners 
were flocking to the North to work in factories, northern 
factories were moving to the South for cheap labor.
Despite the economic advances made during the New Deal 
and the War, the South remained the most poverty-stricken 
section of the country until the recent r e c e s s i o n . T h e  
War on Poverty programs during the Kennedy-Johnson years 
were, above all, directed toward the South, but even more 
specifically at Appalachia, where the inhabitants had 
barely risen above Thirties Depression levels. They be­
came the symbol of the War on Poverty programs and personi­
fied the liberal doctrine that pervaded the Sixties of the 
perfectability of man. All they needed, it was thought, 
was opportunity. Attempts to give that opportunity brought 
REA increased appropriations.
The decade of the Sixties was a time of change for the 
rural electrification program. With over ninety percent of
World War II (Lexington, Kentucky, University of Kentucky 
Press, 19757, 11-18, 55.
Eric F. Goldman, The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson (New 
York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), 55; Arthur Schlesinger, A 
Thousand Days ; John F. Kennedy in the Whitehouse (Boston, 
Houghton Miflin, Co., 1965), 1009-1014.
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rural America receiving electricity, local co-ops turned 
their attention to the generation and transmission of their 
own power. As long as they depended on private power com­
panies for power, their very existence was threatened.
After all, the private companies were doing everything they 
could to destroy the entire program. Placing the fate of 
the co-ops in their hands was like depending on the wolves 
to assist the sheep.
Of course, the co-ops were too small to set up their 
own generation and transmission plants. They would usually 
join with several other co-ops setting up a "super co-op," 
and then apply for loans to build two or three plants.
The local co-ops that set up the program would then, of 
course, buy their power from the super co-op.
REA was well within its rights to lend money for these 
G&T facilities. The REA Act stated that loans might be 
made "for the purpose of financing and construction and 
operation of electric generating plants, electric transmission 
and distribution lines. . . . Loans could be made for 
generation and transmission when there was not an adequate 
available source, when unreasonable conditions or limita­
tions were demanded by private sources, when wholesale 
rates were unreasonably high, or when a savings could be
Congress, May 20, 1936. Act cited in NRECA, People— Their 
Power, 176-187.
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these criteria. Usually, the ability to produce electricity 
at a substantial savings to the consumer was reason enough. 
But power companies, even in the Sixties, still saw co-ops 
as rivals and often charged them unreasonable rates. Fre­
quently co-ops were burdened with dual rates : a regular 
rate for residential rural customers and a much higher rate 
for industrial users. This, of course, was simply another 
attempt by the private companies to force the co-ops into 
the less lucrative markets while keeping the most profitable 
loads for themselves. By the Seventies, power outages 
across the country forced many co-ops to begin G&T plants 
simply to have enough electricity to serve their members.
Understandably, the main opposition to the G&T's came 
from the private companies. Not only did the G&T's mean 
stiffer competition from the co-ops, but the private com­
panies stood to lose the income from power purchased by the 
co-ops. To fight the G&T's, the private companies employed 
delaying tactics to hold up construction. In Louisiana, 
for example, private power halted G&T construction for over 
a decade. By the time they had run the full gambit of 
court delays, the costs had shot up so dramatically that a 
second REA loan had to be obtained before the project could
(February 26, 1936) 2823.
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even begin. Unfortunately, the consumer on both sides of 
the fight bore the brunt.
In many cases, simply the threat of building a G&T 
plant became a successful bargaining tool. The private 
companies often lowered their prices in hopes of making 
G&T construction less attractive to the co-ops. Keeping 
costs down allowed the co-ops to supply low-cost power to 
their consumers, thereby removing the most common incentive 
for building G&T plants. Both sides benefitted as a result.
But where the G&T plants were needed, REA was willing 
to lend the money. In 1940, only 1.8 percent of REA power 
was self-generated. By 1965, 18.3 percent of REA power
was self-generated. By 1965, 18.3 percent came from their
own plants. In that same year, sixty percent of REA loan 
money was used to construct G&T facilities. By the mid- 
Sixties rural electrification had shifted its direction 
toward self-sufficiency--always a mainstay of American rural 
philosophy.
The Sixties was a comfortable time for REA. Although
LBJ did not use JFK's liberal rhetoric, he turned out to
be far more liberal than his predecessor, and rural elec­
trification benefitted from the liberalism. Hubert Humphrey, 
now the Vice President, was one of REA's most avid supporters. 
The program was well represented in the White House.
REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1965, 7.
R
220-221 .
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On Capitol Hill, the Republicans, who had generally 
opposed the program from its beginning, were joined by 
several southern Democrats to oppose generation and trans­
mission. This group of southern conservative Democrats 
was led by the all-powerful Chairman of the Agricultural 
Committee, Allen Ellender of Louisiana. They were instru­
mental in slowing down several G&T programs, not only in 
Louisiana but throughout the nation.
The only substantial threat to REA in the Sixties 
was the 1964 election. Goldwater vowed to kill the program: 
"When the local companies can move in and find it profitable, 
then the REA should move out. America, of course, was 
not listening to the Republicans in 1964, and for the most 
part, Goldwater's right-wing tirades went unheard.
But four years later things were different ; America 
was listening to the Republican Party. When Richard Nixon 
came to office, he re-appointed Eisenhower's REA administra­
tor, David Hamil. Hamil immediately ended loans for wiring, 
plumbing, appliances, and electrical machinery. Then loans 
for G&T programs were severely curtailed. On December 29, 
1972, with the stoke of a pen, Nixon killed the REA program.
NRECA, People— Their Power, 58-59; Interview with 
Hamil, May 31, 1983.
Ellis, Giant Step, 224.
NRECA, People--Their Power, 32; Interview with Hamil,
May 31, 1983.
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The death came hard to Congressional Democrats.
Humphrey called the act "a complete violation, distortion, 
and ultimate repudiation of the Acts of C o n g r e s s . B u t  
Congressional Democrats acted quickly, and on May 11, 1973, 
they had a new bill on Nixon's desk for his approval. He 
willingly signed it because the new program was not sus­
tained from the federal treasury. Most of the money for 
future projects would come from the private sector, guaran­
teed by the federal government. The new rates would be 
raised to five percent interest. There would still be some 
two percent money available to co-ops that served sparsely 
populated, unprofitable areas, but that money would come 
from a revolving-type fund that was to accumulate from 
payments on existing loans, and not from the treasury. The 
purpose of the bill was to make REA self-sufficient.^^ It 
succeeded in that, but it also made more money available to 
co-ops through banks who were eager to loan all the money 
that the government would guarantee. The result has been 
more and more construction of G&T systems throughout the 
nation, and a larger, stronger national and local program.
In the REA's history since World War II, several themes 
have been evident: 1) greater assistance to the South than 
to the rest of the country ; 2) in general, rapid growth
NRECA, People--Their Power, 33.
United States Department of Agriculture, Rural 
Electrification Administration, Rural Electric Fihahcing 
Today (Washington, D.C., USGPO, n.d.), passim.
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under Democratic administrations, followed by stifling of 
that growth under the Republicans; and 3) the new tack 
toward G&T programs. There have also been some minor 
trends. Five of six new connections after 1965 have been 
in suburban areas that have spilled over from rural areas, 
There has also been a general decline in the number of 
farms. That is, as America has moved from the farm to the 
city, REA has come to serve the rural areas around these 
cities. Some co-ops, such as South Louisiana Electric 
Member Corporation, have even moved into small suburban 
towns. This, of course, must be done with money from sources 
other than REA.
Nuclear power appears to be the trend of the future 
for REA. The great expense of nuclear power plants has, 
ironically, brought public and private power together. In 
most cases, neither the co-ops nor the private companies 
can justify the entire expense of a nuclear plant, so they 
have reluctantly shaken hands. Unfortunately, the price of 
the plants is rising so rapidly that, in many cases, neither 
side will benefit for a long time. Nevertheless, this 
public-private power cooperation in the nuclear field is a 
situation that would have brought smiles to the faces of 
Cooke, Pinchot, and other old Progressives of the Thirties.
From the time of these Progressives up through today, 
REA followed a path of growth that brought electricity to 
rural America. There were, as we have seen, conflicts from 
within and without: internal conflicts over cooperation
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with private companies, and later, the development of G&T 
programs; and external conflicts— the constant threat from 
the strong private companies and their political allies.
But these conflicts were not restricted to the national 
level. In fact, the national experience is only a small 
part of the story. It was on the state and local levels 
where the real skirmishes, the real hand-to-hand combat 
took place--where the war was really won or lost. Local 
lenders fought over many of the same issues, and the private 
companies infringed on co-op rights at the state and local 
levels as well. And Louisiana was, and is, a perfect 
example of these conflicts, both from within and without.
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CHAPTER 4 
LOUISIANA'S THIRTEEN CO-OPS
Development of the federal program, followed by the 
establishment of the individual co-ops, may seem to have 
left a gap in the growth of the system. But that is how 
the REA program developed. Once it became law, and once 
the funds were allocated, the next step was for the infor­
mation to filter down to the grassroots, to the farmers 
and rural leaders, who would trans form ideas into reality—  
electricity. Once the local programs were set up and on 
their feet, once they were large enough to need advice and 
to have common problems, only then did they collaborate 
and consult each other and set up statewide organizations, 
thus filling the gap between the federal and local programs.
These grassroots beginnings became the real heart of 
the movement. Here was a true frontier, where the leaders 
were true pioneers, who took the initiative, sacrificing 
time and money to bring electricity to people who had never 
had it--to the areas that would prosper because of it. As 
electricity moved into these areas, as the poles and lines 
went up, lives were bettered in Louisiana. In some areas, 
entire economic systems developed around co-op lines. It 
is difficult to calculate the effects precisely, since the
69
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ten-year period from the mid-Thirtles to the mid-Fortles 
was so economically volatile in Louisiana, but the advent 
of electricity had a staggering effect on the economy of 
rural life in the state.
These Louisianians were as different from each other 
as would be expected of a cross-section of Louisiana rural 
people. Many were the wealthy planters, farmers, and 
cattlemen of the state, while others were small-town 
businessmen, political leaders, and lawyers. They were 
as different from each other as Terrebonne Parish is from 
Webster Parish, as different as the swamp is from the 
Louisiana prairie. But at the same time, there were im­
portant similarities among them. They were all community 
leaders ; uppermost in their minds was the welfare of their 
little corner of the world . Most were also in some ways 
visionaries ; they saw how electricity would aid the growth 
of their community, bring in business and industry, and 
upgrade the financial status of the general population. 
Everyone in the community would benefit.
These Louisiana men were, of course, southerners.
This, in the Thirties, meant they were Democrats. And it 
meant that they were part of FDR's New Deal coalition, but 
it did not necessarily mean that they were liberals. 
Southerners had been the conservative arm of the Democratic 
Party since the Civil War. In the Thirties, little had 
changed. These southern conservatives were about as far 
removed as possible from the liberal philosophy and
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Keynesian economics of FDR and his Brain Trust. But politics 
had little to do with their attitude toward co-ops and the 
co-op movement. They were almost never moved by political 
ideology or rhetoric. There was no vast economic scheme of 
things that motivated them. Very simply, they wanted lights 
for themselves and their communities, and they were willing 
to take whatever steps were necessary to achieve that end.
Each co-op had its unique aspects of growth and develop­
ment, but as a rule they all began in virtually the same 
way. Usually a wealthy landowner would approach the electric 
company in the area and ask to be hooked up to a nearby line. 
He was either told that it could not be done, or that he 
would have to pay for the lines, poles, and labor to make 
the hookup. The private companies were never of the gambling 
sort; either the venture would yield immediate profits, or 
it would not be done. This landowner, then, usually ap­
proached some of his friends who formed an informal group 
and, through either a local politician, a county agent, or 
possibly through the group's own initiative, contacted REA. 
The REA typically responded by sending two or three repre­
sentatives to survey the area and determine if a co-op was 
feasible. The major criterion was density: were there 
enough houses per mile to make it work? The magic number 
was three, but in some parts of Louisiana in the late 
Thirties, this was a difficult criterion to meet. And 
each householder had to pay a five dollar deposit in order 
to be hooked up. So, meetings were held, interest was
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drummed up, and if necessary, the applicants lied to REA 
about the requirement of three houses per mile. Often 
barns, even unoccupied houses, were counted. And in nearly 
every case, community leaders paid the five dollar deposits 
where others could not.
But once REA was convinced, a loan could be obtained, 
and usually within a year of application the first lines 
were energized. In Louisiana this process began as early 
as 1937 at what became Teche Electric Membership Coopera­
tive, and in just five years construction had swept across 
the state as quickly as the lines could be built. In 1942, 
when Concordia Electric, the last co-op to organize, 
energized its first lines, the organizing was done, but 
the program had just started.
The co-ops in Louisiana had an easy birth. The product 
was in demand, the price was low, and both community leaders 
and federal officials were eager to cooperate. Even the 
private companies were enthusiastic. They clearly had no 
interest in the rural areas, and they stood to make substan­
tial profits by providing wholesale electricity to the co-ops. 
But later, in the late Fifties and early Sixties, when rural 
Louisiana began to develop, when oil drilling, fishing, and 
petrochemical industries began to dominate the state's 
economy, and when the cities began to spread out into co-op- 
controlled areas, conflicts arose. As it became increasingly 
clear that the investor-owned companies and the consumer- 
owned co-ops were no longer simply supplier and purchaser.
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but competitors for much of the same market, the entire 
outlook changed. Suddenly, the co-ops were under the 
thumb of their rivals. Prices were only as low as the 
companies wanted them to be. A change was in the offing; 
the co-ops began moving toward developing their own source 
of power and away from their uncertain dependence on the 
companies. It was these years, the Sixties and Seventies, 
that would be the hard times.
But the birth and early years were easy. Each co-op 
in Louisiana had a good strong start due mostly to generous 
assistance from the federal government and an insatiable 
market. All thirteen state co-ops began life with tena­
cious leadership; in nearly every case, one person stands 
out as the one who led the co-op from infancy to maturity. 
The co-op movement is the story of its leaders, of pioneers 
who brought the miracle of electricity to rural Louisiana.
Teche Electric Membership Cooperative 
Jeanerette, Louisiana
Teche Electric Cooperative is considered to have been 
the first co-op in Louisiana, although it is difficult to 
confirm that claim. One or two other co-ops may have had 
earlier meetings, even earlier incorporation, but Teche 
was the first to bring electricity to the Louisiana country­
side; it was the first to attain its objective. On April 
15, 1938, just three years after FDR signed the Executive 
Order creating the REA, Governor Richard Leche pulled the
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switch that energized a small rural section of Iberia 
Parish.^
That, of course, was the most dramatic aspect of the 
birth of the co-op movement in the state. The real begin­
ning of Teche Electric was in a small grocery store in the 
Four Corners area of St. Mary Parish, southwest of 
Jeanerette on Highway 90. There A. M. Boudin, the store 
owner, collected the five-dollar membership fee from the 
prospective co-op members.̂  On June 12, 1937, presumably 
with all the necessary qualifications met, Teche Electric 
was chartered.̂  Two days later, the board received a check
plant the poles, string the line, and, finally, with the 
help of the governor, bring lights to rural Louisiana for 
the first time. Two hundred and eighty-four houses were 
served by 122 miles of line.̂  It must certainly have been 
an exciting event.
The leaders of the co-op movement in Iberia and St. 
Martin Parishes were not really different from those in 
any other part of Louisiana: they were big farmers and
July 23, 1982; interview with Edgar Chaney, ibid. 
^ Interview with Calvin Boudin, ibid.
 ̂ Interview with Verrett, July 23, 1982.
^ Rural Louisiana, May, 1960, 8.
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community leaders. They were certainly the ones who stood 
to gain the most by having electricity brought to their area.
W. Prescott Foster was the most notable. He was the 
son of Murphy J. Foster, governor of Louisiana from 1892 
to 1900 and later United States Senator. Foster's holdings 
included the largest sugar cane plantation in the state.
He had 20,000 acres under cultivation, with another several 
hundred in cattle and dairy farms. He owned the Alice C 
and Maryland plantations near Franklin in St. Mary Parish.̂  
He became the first president of the board of directors of 
Teche Electric. It was his prestige that lent credence to 
the local organization, and it was his influence that 
brought Teche to Jeanerette in April, 1938.^
Another important figure in the history of Teche Elec­
tric was Leon Landry. He was elected the co-op's first 
vice-president and later president. He was a West Point 
graduate and, like Foster, a large sugar cane planter in 
St. Mary Parish.̂  Another board member was Howard Olivier. 
He was also a successful planter.̂  Alexander V. Allain, 
also on the first board, owned Marguerite Plantation seven
 ̂Ellis Arthur Davis, ed., The Historical Encyclopedia 
of Louisiana (2 vols. New Orleans? n.p., 194?), I, 956.
 ̂ Interview wi 
with Chaney, ibid.
 ̂ Interview with Verrett, July 23, 1982; interview 
with Boudin, ibid.
 ̂Davis, Historical Encyclopedia of Louisiana, I, 511.
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miles south of Jeanerette. He was on the Police Jury in 
St. Mary Parish, and was President of the Board of Direc­
tors at Teche Electric during the 1960s.
But among all the people who got Teche Electric 
started and of those who later watched it grow, Edgar 
Chaney has had more influence over the co-op than anyone 
else over the years. Just released from the Army in 1945, 
Chaney came to the co-op to replace his brother, John, as 
manager. His brother had been killed in an automobile 
accident just a few months before, and the co-op was 
desperate for a replacement. Chaney was not an engineer, 
and, at first, REA would not approve his appointment. But 
after Prescott Foster placed the weight of his influence 
behind Chaney and made some Washington contacts regarding 
the matter, Chaney was approved.
He went on to serve the co-op as manager for by far 
the longest period of any other manager there--until 1978. 
He saw the co-op through most of its lifetime, and he 
built it to its present position on an exceptionally 
strong foundation.
Chaney was asked to retire in 1978 in the midst of 
somewhat hushed surroundings. A new board of directors had 
been voted in, and, evidently unhappy with Chaney, they
Ibid., I, 487.
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voted him out. After over thirty years of service, Chaney 
was out of the picture.
Although Teche Electric has the distinction of being 
the first co-op in the state, it also remains the smallest. 
It serves fewer than 7,000 members in only three small 
south Louisiana parishes: Iberia, St. Mary, and St. Martin. 
The rural population in these parishes is generally densely 
settled— there are nearly twelve electrical meters per mile 
of co-op line, by far the highest density in the state.
But the population as a whole in these parishes is sparse, 
only 79.6 per square mile.^^
This is because the majority of the population is 
located along the area's bayous (specifically Bayou Teche) 
that connect the small urban settlements. The rest of the 
land, mostly swamp, is virtually uninhabited. This phenomenon 
has allowed Teche to serve a large population with a small 
amount of line. The result is that Teche Electric has 
grown to be a wealthy concern, so much so that the statis­
tics should be preceded by fanfare. In 1980, the co-op
1982; interview with Chaney, July 23, 1982.
United States Department of Agriculture, Rural 
Electrification Administration, ^nual Statistical Report, 
1980 (Washington, D.C., USGPO, 1980), 68.
James Calhoun, et al., Louisiana Alnlanac, 1979- 
1980 (30th ed., Pelican PuETishing Company, Gretna, 
Louisiana, 1979), 128-29. This is particularly true of 
St. Martin Parish with only 44.1 per mile.
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boasted owning a whopping eighty-five percent of its 
system. The only co-op in Louisiana coming close to this 
figure is SLEMCO, reputedly the largest co-op in the 
country, with sixty-five percent equity ; the next in line 
drops to thirty-one percent.
Some critics have spoken out against the Teche 
management for not having been more aggressive in the 
early years, for not having taken in more territory, for 
not having taken more r i s k s . B u t  Edgar Chaney's sound 
management with an eye toward financial solvency has 
allowed Teche Electric to remain economically the strongest 
co-op in the state.
Concordia Electric Cooperative 
Farriday, Louisiana
Everyone in the co-op movement has heard numerous 
stories of how the private utilities would not serve a 
certain farmer, who then joined with others who had had 
the same experience and formed a co-op. The story is al­
most as apocryphal as that of the worker who becomes able 
to buy out his uncaring employer. But Tam Winston was one 
of those farmers ; he lived that experience, and he remem­
bers it well. The result was the organization of Concordia 
Electric Cooperative.
REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1980, 68. 
Interview with Mark Bonner, July 29, 1982.
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Winston is an old southern gentleman who still dis­
plays photographs in his study of his two indomitable 
heroes, Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee. For a man ob­
viously steeped in the southern political tradition, he 
is curiously reluctant to talk about politics. Those 
pictures might say something about his political philosophy. 
He says he has none, only that he is from the "old school.
In the late Thirties, Winston was without electricity.
In those days, he recalls, "farmers worked from can't to
can't: from can't see in the morning to can't see in the
e v e n i n g . B u t  he saw an opportunity to get electricity
when Louisiana Power and Light built a line to a Mississippi
River levee construction project in his area. The line was
to pass by his house:
I got two or three people . . .  to refuse to give 
them right-of-way unless they would put a permanent 
line out. And they built the line three miles 
out of their way . . . because we refused to give them right-of-way.19
As the levee construction project grew and moved along 
the river bank, LP&L built a second line, and then a third. 
The three lines, says Winston, were built on simple willow 
poles and torn down when the project was completed. "They 
wouldn't serve us electricity," Winston remembers, "because
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they said it was too sparsely settled. They wouldn't serve 
anybody; they wouldn't listen.
Not long afterward, Winston was approached by Sam 
Calvert and L. F. Marks, two local leaders like himself.
It was Marks, according to Winston, who had first received 
information from REA. He and Clavert told Winston that if 
they could get a five-dollar deposit from each person in 
the area, with an average of at least 2.5 people per mile, 
REA would consider granting a loan to the group. They had 
little trouble arousing interest, but, Winston recalls, 
many could not pay the five-dollar deposit. Thus they 
lacked the needed amount to make the loan application.
"So my father, Mr. Cliff Godbold, and I all went in on a 
note and borrowed the five dollars membership at the bank 
and put up the five dollars membership for I think some­
thing like fifteen or twenty additional, so that we could 
go on and get our loan application in. . . . "  There was 
considerable urgency; they feared that the coming war 
would end the loan program from REA.
The first meeting was at the courthouse in Vidalia, 
but to centralize the location, the office was moved to 
Ferriday. Winston was elected president, a position he 
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On April 11, 1941, these pioneers in rural electrification 
received $120,000 from REA for construction of 140 miles 
of line to serve 344 rural members. On January 29, 1942, 
after nine months of construction, the last co-op in 
Louisiana to organize energized its first lines.
The co-op began in parts of Concordia and a small 
piece of Tensas Parish. Today Concordia Electric serves 
about 10,500 members in those two parishes, in addition 
to all or parts of Catahoula, LaSalle, Franklin, Caldwell, 
Grant, and Rapides parishes.
Concordia Electric was the last co-op in Louisiana 
to organize mainly because it is located in one of the 
most sparsely populated areas in the state. The co-op 
serves an average of only 4.78 consumers per mile, by far 
the lowest density in Louisiana. This condition has brought 
financial hardship at times,but it is one of the few co-ops 
in the state still making loan payments to REA in advance 
of schedule.
Many co-ops in Louisiana had a leader who brought it 
from birth, through adolescence, to maturity— as did 
Concordia Electric. After Barnett died in 1948, E. E.
Taylor took the job, and remained there for thirty years.
Louisiana, December 14, 1981.
REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1980, 70.
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Before he came to Concordia, Taylor worked for nearly ten 
years as a field man for REA, stationed in Louisiana for 
awhile, and then later in the Kansas-Nebraska-Colorado
area.26
Taylor has an attitude toward rural electrification
that is shared by many pioneers in the field, but it is
seldom expressed as well:
There developed a kind of spirit of. I'm going 
to call it pioneering. I didn't realize it at 
the time, that that was what it was. Many, 
many times I have dropped what I was doing to 
go watch the turning on of the lights in a 
particular area. The thrill in seeing the ex­
pression on their faces just did something to 
people like me, to see the changes in those 
people's lives. . . .  It became almost a religion 
to people like me to try and see that everybody 
had electricity. You kind of caught the feeling 
of wanting to see that they had it
Taylor fulfilled his idealistic goals : by 1960, vir­
tually everyone within the boundaries of the Concordia 
Electric service area had electricity, and in 1978 when he 
left, there were over 10,000 c on su me r s . T a y l o r was more 
instrumental than anyone else in seeing that the program 
was complete--that the dream was fulfilled for both himself 
and the recipients.
Taylor's influence on the growth and development of 




Interview with Taylor, December 14, 1981; REA 
Statistical Abstract, 1978, 97.
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pioneering work at Concordia Electric. He had a signifi­
cant hand in the birth and growth of the statewide movement, 
and later in the movement to begin generation. In the 
Sixties, when it became apparent that local co-ops would 
no longer be able to borrow two percent money from REA, 
Taylor assisted on the national scene in the development 
of the Cooperative Finance Association, a co-op bank that 
remains an important source of funds for most local co-ops 
t o d a y . T a y l o r ' s  assistance in the development of rural 
electrification has been unique. He has had influence on 
all three levels : state, local, and national.
Taylor's successor at Concordia was Albert Forrester.
He had been Taylor's right hand man since 1948. He retired 
in 1982 after only four years as manager, but his influence 
as Taylor's assistant goes beyond his short time as manager. 
Forrester's successor was Ben Chance.
Jeff Davis Electric Cooperative 
Jennings, Louisiana
The Jeff Davis co-op had an inauspicious beginning. 
Most co-ops were able to get their systems on line before 
the war began, but Jeff Davis was not so lucky. The co-op
Statistical Abstract, 1978, 97.
Rural Louisiana, January 1982, n.p.; interview 
with Taylor, December 14, 1982.
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was chartered on September 17, 1941, but due to wartime 
delays it did not receive its first loan until May 15,
1944. With the exception of some existing lines that 
were energized almost immediately, it was not until 
December, 1946, over six years after the co-op was organ­
ized, that the Jennings area finally received electricity.^^ 
The problem, of course, was that the materials used in 
building electrical lines were also important to the war 
effort. Without wire, insulators, transformers, and man­
power, .line building was impossible. While the Jennings- 
area co-op was just beginning, a second attempt at co-op 
formation was beginning near the town of Cameron, Louisiana.
Cameron is isolated, even today. But in the early 
Forties, the only access to it was by way of a shell-top 
road from Lake Charles, and a ferry crossing at the inter­
coastal canal. The town's isolation made for a unique 
problem that led local leaders to look to REA for assist­
ance in obtaining electricity.
Cameron, for years before the war, had received elec­
tricity from the Grant Utility Company. It was a local 
operation owned by the Zetman family of New Orleans, and 
was more concerned with making ice than electricity. The 
Grant Utility Company had built a short line to the com­
munity of Cameron, but when the war broke out and the 
company could not get enough fuel to keep the operation
Rural Louisiana, May, 1960, 8.
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profitable, it simply shut down the plant and walked off, 
leaving Cameron in the dark. Joe Docksey, secretary of 
the police jury and a prominent local citizen, knocked the 
lock off the building, started up the generator, and got 
the lights back on. Docksey paid for the service by 
collecting ten or fifteen dollars from the townspeople.^^
Cameron again had electricity, but obviously this 
situation was inadequate at best, so some of the town's 
leaders began working on the more permanent solution of 
organizing a co-op. They wrote REA, which responded in 
the usual manner by sending a field team to Cameron to 
determine whether or not a co-op was feasible. The team 
decided it was not: the area simply lacked the necessary 
population density to support a co-op. But the REA repre­
sentatives did suggest that the Cameron group join with 
the new, but as yet unlighted, Jeff Davis co-op.
On May 15, 1944, the Jeff Davis group purchased the 
Grant Utility Comp'any of Cameron and the two were merged. 
But even this merger would not assure electricity for 
Cameron. The community still had to meet REA's requirement 
of three houses per mile of line, and in Cameron that would 
not be easy. J. S. Robbins, the manager at Jeff Davis,
August 9, 1982. 
Ibid.
34 Rural Louisiana, May, 1960, 8.
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recalls : " . . . they had to count every little house that 
had a cow as a dairy, and I don't know what all, to do the 
paperwork to get the m o n e y . B u t  they did get the money.
The co-op operated Grant Utilities for awhile, but 
the facility was far from adequate. It would be necessary 
to construct a permanent line to Cameron. This line, which 
was finally completed in 1946, ran from the Gulf States 
facility on the east side of Lake Charles, extending to 
Holmwood, across the Intercoastal Canal to Creole, and 
then west sixteen miles to Cameron.
According to Robbins, who came to Jeff Davis in 1947, 
the year after the Cameron line was completed, the line 
should have never been built. It was only a three-phase 
line, not at all adequate to carry a load forty-six miles. 
Robbins said that "when you got to the end of the line, 
you didn't have any power left. It was a terrible mess, 
people'd burn out motors ; everytime it thundered the line 
went off, fuses were off, and the boys [the linemen working 
for the co-op] were either here in Jennings or in Cameron. 
They'd have to drive forty miles to find the trouble. We 
had a hell of a time." One of the first things Robbins 
did as manager was to build a high capacity transmission 
line to Cameron.̂  ̂
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Robbins was not the first manager at Jeff Davis; that 
distinction goes to W. J. Purvis, Purvis had been trained 
as a lineman, a background which did not quite qualify him 
for the manager's job. He yielded the position to Robbins 
in 1947. Robbins, an engineer, who graduated from Louisiana 
Tech in 1936, worked for Gulf Oil Corporation for six years, 
then entered the Navy during the war. After working for 
General Gas after the war for one year, he was offered the 
manager's job at Jeff Davis. He was thirty-two when he 
accepted the position, remaining there until just recently, 
nearly thirty-five years at the helm.^^
Robbins is generally noted for pursuing commercial 
and industrial loads, which often brought him head-to-head 
with the private companies: "We fought, and fought. Un­
fortunately, a lot of times they'd win the battle." One 
major battle that Robbins lost concerned a Phillips Petro­
leum plant that was to be built at Lake Arthur in south­
western Jeff Davis Parish. The co-op had the only source 
of power in the area; in fact, the plant was to be built 
near a co-op line. Robbins had negotiated the contracts 
and even designed the substation. "And doggone, if they 
didn't give that load to Gulf States," Robbins recalls,
"and they used my substation design. It's still there to­
day, with a 300 horsepower load.
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Like so many of the early leaders of Louisiana's co­
op system, Robbins has retired--possibly for the same 
reason that so many others left, Robbins says he was 
"tired of the rat race, tired of fighting the battle.
It is not quite clear what battles Robbins is tired of 
fighting. He fought hard against the utilities in the 
Sixties, but he was also an antagonist within the state­
wide organization. He is often criticized as difficult 
to get along with, opinionated, even rebellious. He still 
feels that some things at the co-op's generating facility 
are not being done correctly, and he voices his opinions 
loudly from his ivory tower of retirement. His voice 
seems to ring in the ears of many of the present co-op 
leaders--a topic to be taken up later.
Jeff Davis is not a large co-op. Today it serves 
only about 8,000 members, the second smallest membership 
in the s t a t e . I t  serves Jeff Davis, Cameron, and 
Calcashieu parishes and has extended lines into Vermillion 
and Allen parishes.Robbins' successor at Jeff Davis 
is J. H. deCordova.
Ibid.
Interview with Mark Bonner, July 29, 1982; inter­
view with Chaney, July 23, 1982; interview with Scott 
McVea, Baton Rouge, July 13, 1982.
REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1980, 70.
Rural Louisiana, May, 1960, 8.
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Southwest Louisiana Electric Membership Corporation 
Lafayette, Louisiana
Louisiana has some very small co-ops. Teche, Jeff 
Davis, and Pointe Coupee, for instance, have under 8,000 
members each. But among Louisiana co-ops is one of the 
nation's largest. Southwest Louisiana Electric Membership 
Corporation. In 1980, SLEMCO was serving nearly 70,000 
m e m b e r s . I t  is not only big, it is growing. In that 
year, it began serving the entire city of Opelousas.
SLEMCO's size has led to an independent attitude, a tend­
ency not to cooperate (or possibly a lack of need over 
the years to cooperate) with the other co-ops in the state. 
Tliis has led to resentment, rivalry, and even animosity 
among other co-op managers that exists even today. Much 
of this difficulty concerns the development.and growth of 
the generating facility, and will be dealt with later.
SLEMCO had a fragmented beginning that eventually 
ended in a united effort. In the Acadian parishes in 1937, 
the population seemed dense enough that each parish could 
set up its own co-op. So, four co-ops were organized: 
Lafayette, St. Landry, St. Martin, and Acadia. County 
agents took the lead in organizing all four. The agent in 
Lafayette Parish was Sidney Bowles, in Acadia it was Lloyd 
Bruitt, in St. Landry it was A. K. Smith, and in St. Martin 
the agent was Stanley Angele.
REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1980, 68.
Interview with U. J. Gajan, Lafayette, Louisiana, 
November 16, 1981.
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When it soon became apparent that the four co-ops 
could not do the job as well as one, they merged to form 
SLEMCO in 1937. Vermilion and Evangeline parishes later 
joined the organization, making up the territory that 
comprises SLEMCO today.
SLEMCO had some difficulty getting its first loan.
To meet the requirements, each co-op had to be surveyed 
for feasibility by REA. An official from Washington, a 
Miss Lighter, nearly killed at birth what would become 
the nation's largest co-op. She inspected ane examined 
the area, concluded that a co-op in that part of Louisiana 
was not feasible, and reported that to Washington.
The response from the co-op founders was to call REA, 
though making a call to Washington for these men was not 
easy. Pitifully broke, they passed the hat in order to 
make the call. Their office was as unimpressive as their 
financial position. It was "just a little old hole-in- 
the-wall," one early member recalls. They even lacked 
office furniture; they used apple crates for chairs. But 
despite their condition, they were able to contact an REA 
official in Washington, C. 0. Faulkenwald. He took an 
interest in the new co-op, and made a trip to Lafayette 
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It was still 1937.
The new co-op hired the William G, Morrison engineer­
ing firm to do the pre-allotment work and the surveying.
One of their engineers was U. J. Gajan. He would become 
manager of SLEMCO in 1941, remaining there for forty years. 
He would build the co-op from its birth to the largest in 
the country. And in the process, he would become the 
focal point of a controversy over the concept of generation 
that would divide the statewide organization.
Gajan went to work for Morrison in 1937. The pace 
was frantic, since they had to get the lines up as quickly 
as possible to maintain local support. "We were putting 
in sixteen to eighteen hours a day, because we had to get 
the lines staked, make our notes at night . . .  it was a 
touch-and-go-deal. They finally got the lines built 
and energized on May 11, 1938. They initially bought their 
power from the city of Lafayette.
Gajan worked for the engineering firm for about two 
years. On July 1, 1941, he was given the position of 
general manager at SLEMCO. "And from then on," he says, 
it's been just a heavy construction program.
"Biography of U. J. Gajan," unpublished vita in 
possession of Gajan.
Interview with Gajan, November 16, 1981.
Ibid.
52
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Gajan is the quintessential self-made man, complete 
with bootstraps. His early life was meager at best. He 
grew up on a small farm near New Iberia where electricity 
was the luxury of others. Not unlike many other co-op 
leaders in Louisiana, Gajan was denied access to a private 
utility line that ran near his home. The price quoted 
for the hookup was an out-of-reach $1,500. So, he lived 
his early life without lights. After high school, he 
attended a small preparatory school in New Iberia, and 
became a licensed professional engineer after twenty years 
of experience. Now, after forty years of service to 
SLEMCO, he is retired.
SLEMCO's size has always made it an aberration among 
the other co-ops in the state. It has always been big 
enough to stand on its own, and even to stand toe-to-toe 
with the private utility companies. Over the years, SLEMCO 
and Gulf States Utilities (the main private utility in 
SLEMCO's service area) have developed a healthy respect 
for each other. Throughout the years, there have been few 
conflicts between the two, and there has always been com­
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in the rest of the state. The smaller co-ops— many very 
small--formed a statewide organization to marshal enough 
money and strength to keep from being virtually crushed 
by the private companies. SLEMCO joined this organization 
in the early Fifties, and Gajan was an early leader. But 
in the mid-Sixties, when the other co-ops decided that 
the only way to remove the dominance of the private com­
panies was to generate their own electricity, SLEMCO re­
fused to join in. Gajan felt that he could still buy 
power from GSU cheaper than the united co-op group could 
generate it. He was right, but his critics have said 
that he was being used by GSU to break up the co-op 
generating plan.^^ Whether Gajan received good contracts 
because of his past association with GSU, or because GSU 
hoped to break up the co-op consortium is not clear, but 
the effects were to damage the united co-op effort to 
generate, to oust SLEMCO from all statewide dealings, and 
to shape Gajan as the bad boy of it all. It was a deep 
wound that even today occasionally arouses animosity. It 
involved personalities, egos, and a lot of hostility. It 
will be worth a closer look later.
The controversy ended in 1973 when SLEMCO joined the
Interview with Gajan, November 16, 1981.
Interview with McVea, July 13, 1982; interview with 
A. A. Robinson, Baton Rouge, May 19, 1982; interview with 
Merle Burgin. New Roads, Louisiana, August 5, 1982; inter­
view with Robbins, August 9, 1982.
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other co-ops in their generating plans and, on the surface 
at least, all was forgiven. Today, SLEMCO's involvement 
in the affairs of the statewide organization is not quite 
up to par with the other members. This might be due to 
past grievances, SLEMCO's size, or even its heritage of 
independence. But for whatever reason, SLEMCO remains 
the state's black-sheep, the aberration.
When Gajan retired, Herman Kesel took his place.
Kesel was Gajan's longtime assistant. In fact, Gajan 
hired Kesel as a young stake-and-chain-man in the early 
days of the co-op. Kesel has carried on Gajan's amicable 
association with GSU.̂ ^
Despite that association, in the fall of 1980, Kesel 
aimed all his guns at GSU in an all-out bid to serve the 
town of Opelousas. The old gas-fired plant there had be­
come too expensive to operate, and the town leaders had 
begun looking for a new source of p o w e r . S L E M C O  and GSU 
both wanted the town. Each tried to sway the voting public 
by sweetening the pot: GSU offered to absorb some of the 
town's energy costs, while SLEMCO offered free street 
lights, free distribution, and free insurance.Throughout
with Kesel, ibid.
Opelousas Daily World, March 29, 1981, 1.
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the battle, the Opelousas city council supported SLEMCO’s 
bid.60
The controversy seemed rather calm until April 11,
1981, when fights broke out at the city council meeting 
and police had to be brought in on two different occasions. 
The Opelousas Daily World stated that the "shouting and 
decision-making . . . has become as popular in some circles 
as the LSU Tiger basketball t e a m . A n d  in 1981, the 
LSU Tigers were commanding considerable attention through­
out the state.
As the conflict grew, each side continued to up the 
ante: GSU finally underbid SLEMCO by twenty-five cents per 
kilowatt hour; Kesel countered by agreeing to hire all the 
employees from the old plant, a touchy point that many had 
d e m a n d e d . B u t  the deciding factor seems to have been 
that GSU's cheap gas contracts would soon run out, forcing 
its fuel costs to rise substantially in 1984, and probably 
resulting in higher long-term consumer costs under GSU than 
SLEMCO. The final popular vote was a three-to-one margin 
in favor of SLEMCO. The co-op took every precinct.
Only SLEMCO, with its enormous size, could challenge
Opelousas Daily World, February 22, 1981, 5.
Ibid., April 12, 1981, 1; ibid., March 29, 1981, 1.
Ibid., March 10, 1981, 1.
Interview with Kesel, November 16, 1981.
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GSU and take over the utilities of a city the size of 
Opelousas. Such a power play exhibits both strength and 
independence. It also shows indifference for the co-op 
movement. And, more than anything else, it shows SLEMCO, 
because of its size, to be something quite different from 
the other twelve co-ops in the state. It may very well 
be the foreshadowing of what the other twelve will become 
as they pass from the middle age of their development 
into old age.
Valley Electric Membership Corporation 
Natchitoches, Louisiana
Valley Electric is one of the largest co-ops in 
Louisiana. With 29,000 members, it ranks third behind 
only SLEMCO in Lafayette and Dixie in Baton Rouge. In 
addition to having a large membership, Valley Electric 
also has the largest service area of any co-op in the 
state. It serves all or part of eight parishes : Caddo, 
Grant, DeSoto, Sabine, Natchitoches, Winn, Red River, and 
Vernon in West Central Louisiana. Its service area spans 
both banks of the Red River from the outskirts of Alexandris 
in the south to the outskirts of Shreveport in the north.
Probably the most notable feature of Valley Electric, 
other than its size, is the dedication of its employees. 
Three employees at Valley have worked there for over forty
Louisiana, May, 1960, 8.
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years. Odessa Winn came to the co-op in October of 1937, 
just one year after the first organizational meeting and 
seven months before the first lines were energized. Her 
husband was Valley Electric's first lineman. "We were 
rich," she recalls, "he was making $110 [per month]."
But she had to work for nothing for the first three months 
until the co-op received its first loan from R E A . A f t e r  
a few months as secretary-bookkeeper, Mrs. Winn hired an 
assistant, Vannie Rogers. Mrs. Rogers has been at Valley 
Electric since then, with the exception of a leave of 
absence in 1945.^^ In that year, Homer Cox came to Valley 
as a lineman's helper at the grand salary of thirty cents 
per hour. He moved up the ranks, serving under six 
managers, as acting manager twice, and finally, in October, 
1981, became Valley Electric's eighth m a n a g e r . H e  does 
not have the engineering degree usually required at most 
co-ops to fill the manager's post, though the thirty-seven 
years of hard-knocks education he has received at Valley 
may be as valuable.
It was first intended that Valley Electric be located 
in Grant Parish rather than in Natchitoches Parish. But 
the town of Natchitoches had long been the central place
January 21, 1983.
66 Ibid. Interview with Vannie Rogers, ibid. 
Interview with Homer Cox, ibid.
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for that section of Louisiana, and more of the board 
members were from in and around Natchitoches than were 
from Grant Parish. Possibly of more importance, J. H. 
Henry, the co-op's first president and the main thrust 
behind its beginning, was from Natchitoches Parish. At 
any rate, the plans were changed; the co-op was moved 
from Grant to Natchitoches Parish, with the office even­
tually being relocated to the town of Natchitoches.^^
The first meeting was held at the American Legion 
Hall in Natchitoches on November 30, 1936. According to 
the minutes, it was called by S. B. Thorton, Natchitoches 
Parish County Agent, and attended by C. 0. Faulkenwald, 
the REA representative from Washington who had a hand in 
the formation of several co-ops in Louisiana.
On May 16, 1937, J. H. Henry was elected President 
of Valley Electric. Henry was from Melrose, Louisiana, 
south of Natchitoches on the Cane River. Melrose was also 
the name of his plantation, possibly the largest pecan 
orchard in the state. His home today is a Louisiana 
historic monument, partly because of several "African 
style" cabins on the property. The main house, "Yucca 
House," was built in 1796.^®
Interview with Winn, January 21, 1983; interview 
with Rogers, ibid.
Valley Electric Membership Cooperative, "Minutes," 
November 30, 1936.
Baton Rouge State Titries, September 29, 1964.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
E. J. Giering was the first to receive .the designa­
tion of manager at Valley Electric, elected to that post 
in August of 1937. But the first manager was really 
Randall MacNeely. His position was described as "Temporary 
Project Superintendent," and his main job was to obtain 
rights-of-way for the first lines. He was probably 
hired more for his ability to climb a pole than for his 
managerial skills.
A story is often told at Valley Electric about a 
member who would not relinquish a right-of-way to the co-op 
because construction of the line necessitated the removal 
of one of a magnificent stand of oaks on his property.
Two days after the request was made, an electrical storm 
hit the area, and lightning shattered the oak that the 
co-op wanted to move. Faced with what seemed to be the 
wrath of God, the man relented.
The first loan from REA was for $390,000, and arrived 
on June 28, 1937. The bids for construction came in on 
September 24, 1937. As an interesting side note, two com­
panies submitted identical bids to sell electric meters 
to the co-op. Henry simply suggested that they flip a 
coin--heads won.
Valley Electric Co-op, "Minutes," June 19, 1937; 
interview with Winn, January 21, 1983.
Clyde T. Ellis, A Giant Step (Random House, New 
York, 1966), 57-58.
Rural Louisiana, May, 1960, 8; Nat chitbches Times,
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The first line was built south of Natchitoches toward 
the Cane River area, toward Henry's plantation. It spanned 
185 miles, serving 391 members, and was energized in May 
of 1938. Other lines followed, expanding west toward 
Robeline, and then north to Powhatan.
As the lines were being built people would come out 
of their homes to watch. Mrs. Winn recalls, "They wanted 
so bad to get lights. They understood that as soon as 
they built that line, they'd be on it." The co-op soon 
developed a good reputation. "Valley Electric was one of 
the most wonderful things ; we could do no wrong." But 
things are different now, she says. "As time goes on, the 
people's attitude has changed a whole lot. Now they just 
take [us] for granted.
The annual meetings at Valley were significant local 
events in the early days. They brought together the 
farmers and other rural people much like the county court­
house days, 4-H fairs, and church picnics did in other 
parts of the country, in other periods. The town merchants 
in Natchitoches held sales on that day, the co-op provided 
food, and everyone had a good time. But co-op business
September 24, 1937, clipping in "Valley Electric Co-op 
Scrapbook," in possession of Vannie Rogers, Valley Electric 
Co-op.
Rural Louisiana, May, 1960, 8.
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was the main order of the day. Decisions were made, and 
members voted— after all, it was their co-op. Unfortunately, 
there is not as much interest on the part of members today ; 
in fact, there is very little. As Mrs. Winn has stated, 
"times have changed.
Valley Electric has a sparse 5.3 consumers per mile.
The co-op covers so much area that it has almost as many 
miles of line as SLEMCO, while SLEMCO has nearly twice as 
many consumers per mile. Such a situation would normally 
bring financial disaster, but Valley Electric has obviously 
been well managed over the years. Its equity is high at 
eighteen percent, and its current and accrued assets are 
the second highest in the s t a t e . I t  is by no means the 
wealthy concern of Teche Electric or SLEMCO, but it does 
operate efficiently under a severe handicap of only 5.3 
members per mile.
Northeast Louisiana Power Cooperative 
Winnsboro, Louisiana
As stated earlier, most of the co-ops had a manager 
who was responsible for building the organization to its 
present place. Northeast Louisiana Power Co-op is no 
exception. The first manager there was Robert Holladay.
He helped to construct the first lines, and under his
76
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supervision, rural northeast Louisiana received electricity. 
Most of these co-op leaders are now retired, or on the 
verge of retiring; several have logged as many as forty 
years as manager. Holladay, though, left the post in 1965 
because of illness, at about the time when most of the 
construction was completed. Although he did not have the 
opportunity to serve for forty years, as did Gajan, Taylor, 
Killingsworth and others, he got the job done before he 
left.
When Holladay became manager in 1939, much of the 
paperwork was completed and construction was ready to 
begin. At several other co-ops in the state, someone often 
took over the reins of command, completing this work before 
the first manager was hired. He obtained rights-of-way, 
did the paperwork, and, in come cases, began construction. 
At Northeast, this job fell to three men, David Anders, 
Edgar Lowrey, and W. L. Rush.
Anders is a lawyer. He helped to organize the cor­
poration and did all the other legal graoundwork to get 
the co-op on its feet. He served as assistant manager 
under Holladay and eventually took over as manager when 
Holladay left in 1 9 6 5 . Although Anders is not an 
engineer, he seems to have fulfilled the engineering re­
quirements of the job quite well. He was one of those
Interview with Eugene Lowrey, March 28, 1983, 
Winnsboro, Louisiana.
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who worked tirelessly for the co-op but received little 
in return. One employee recalls that when she came to 
work for the co-op in 1941, she discovered that Anders 
had never been on the payroll; he had worked three years 
without pay. Today Anders is retired and living in 
Winnsboro--just around the corner from the co-op office.
Edgar Lowrey is one of those who began at the bottom 
and worked to the top; he claims to have held every job 
in the co-op. His first job was obtaining rights-of-way 
and staking lines for sixty cents an hour. After the war 
he moved into the office, working mostly on insurance and 
retirement programs. During the few months between the 
time Anders left and the present manager, John C. Tucker, 
took over, Lowrey temporarily held the manager's post.
W. L. Rush was an REA representative sent from 
Washington to get the co-op started. The role of most 
REA representatives around the state was to do little 
more than attend the first organizational meeting and in­
form the organizers about REA. But Rush seems to have 
been more than that. He stayed on at Northeast until 
well after Holladay was hired, until the first lines were 
energized in December, 1939.^^
view with Eugene Lowrey, March 28, 1983.
Interview with Lowrey, ibid.
id. Northeast Louisiana Power Cooperative, 
"Minutes," July 15, 1939-December, 1939, passim.
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These three men, Anders, Rush, and Lowrey, together 
with Holladay, did much of the work that took the co-op 
from the organizational stage to the energizing of the 
first lines. Ttie organization of the co-op— the conception 
of the idea, the first contact with REA, the recruitment 
of interested local leaders, the real beginning of the 
co-op--was initiated by a different group led by H. B. 
Landis and W. P. Sellers.
Sellers was the county agent for Franklin Parish, and 
his role was the same as the role of other county agents 
in the state : to assist with the organization, get it on 
the right track, and then, when things were rolling along 
on their own, hand the leadership over to the co-op board 
of directors.Sellers was important in the organization, 
but it was Landis who deserves most of the credit for 
bringing the co-op together. He was the community leader 
whose prominence brought enough weight to the organization 
to recruit other community leaders, and eventually many 
members to the co-op.
Landis owned a variety store in Winnsboro, and when 
he died, in January, 1941, he was mayor of the town. He 
was elected president of the board of directors at the 
organizational meeting on July 15, 1938, and held that 
position until he died. Although he was president for
82 Interview with Lowrey, March 28, 1983.
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only two and a half years, he is credited by those who 
remember him as laying the foundation for the co-op.
When these organizers got the co-op on its feet, and 
were ready to begin construction, they hired Holladay. 
Holladay was born in 1894 in Swollie, Louisiana, in Sabine 
Parish. Before he came to the co-op he had had some 
limited experience in managing utilities. He began his 
career working at a sawmill in his hometown. Before REA, 
sawmills often provided electricity to a small area, or 
even a town located near the mill. Apparently, Holladay's 
job at the mill was associated with electrical generation 
because from there he went to Gibsland, Louisiana, in 
Bienville Parish, where he managed a small municipal plant. 
He eventually became mayor of the town. That plant was 
bought out by LP&L when the utility expanded in the mid- 
Twenties and Holladay accepted a position with the utility 
company as a district manager in Bastrop, Louisiana, 
probably as part of the buy-out agreement. He stayed 
there until he went to the Winnsboro co-op in May, 1939.
He was lured from LP&L by a grand salary of $139 per month.
Holladay's administration was benevolent. The board 
of directors evidently had enough confidence in his abili­
ties to allow him to operate things pretty much as he
Newspaper clipping entitled, "R.E. Holladay Quits 
Position," in possession of Fannie Bonner, Winnsboro, 
Louisiana; interview with Fannie Bonner, March 29, 1983.
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wanted. He was a true leader, his secretary recalls, with 
a real knack for getting things done. He left the manager's 
post on January 1, 1965, due to illness. He died in 1980 
of Parkinson's disease.
There were, of course, other leaders. J. E. Richardson 
was a farmer from Liddieville in Franklin Parish. He was 
one of the original organizers in 1938. He retired from 
the board in 1969, after thirty-one years of service to 
the c o - o p . W .  P. Martin, also a co-op founder, owned 
the Bel-Mar Ranch near Delhi where he raised one of the 
most celebrated Black Angus herds in the S o u t h . A n o t h e r  
organizer, E. C. Calloway, was from near Holly Ridge in 
Richland Parish. He was also a large farmer and community 
leader. He resigned from the co-op board of directors in 
1968, after thirty years of s e r v i c e . T w o  women were on
interview with Lowrey, March 28. 1983. Newspaper clipping 
entitled "Local Rural Electrification Pioneer Honored for 
Services," in possession of Fannie Bonner, Winnsboro; Rural 
Louisiana, February, 1965.
Newspaper clipping entitled, "Richardson Retires 
from Co-op Board," in possession of Fannie Bonner,
Winnsboro; "Resolution of Commendation and Appreciation 
to J. E. Richardson," issued November 11, 1969, Northeast 
Louisiana Power Cooperative files, Winnsboro.
Newspaper clipping entitled, "Columns Add Grace 
to Country Home," in possession of Fannie Bonner, Winnsboro.
"Information of E. C. Calloway," in Northweat 
Louisiana Power Cooperative files, Winnsboro; "Resolution 
of Commendation and Appreciation to E. C . Calloway," 
November 11, 1969, in Northeast Louisiana Power Coopera­
tive files, Winnsboro.
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the first board, Mrs. T. A. Woodridge from Ft. Necessity, 
and Mrs. G. A. Newcomer from near Crowville in Franklin 
Parish. Both women served on the board for only a short 
t i m e . B e n  Cheeck was also one of the first board members. 
He was a farmer from Mangham in Richland Parish. Richard 
Ward was from near Gilbert in Franklin P a r i s h . T h i s  list 
comprises the original roster of board members and organi­
zers . All were local leaders and prominent citizens.
Of all those who pieced together the whole of North­
east Louisiana Power Co-op, only one more needs attention:
C. J. Grayson. Grayson was a Winnsboro banker. He became 
a board member in early 1941, and was elected president 
one year later, succeeding Landis. Grayson's and Holladay's 
administrations coincided and, evidently, so did their 
personalities. Lowrey recalls that the two got along 
famously, complementing each other's temperament and ability. 
"Mr. Holladay and Mr. Grayson made a real pair." After 
thirty-four years of service, Grayson finally retired to 
his home in Ft. Necessity where he lives today. He is 
eighty-five.^^
"Northeast Louisiana Power Cooperative, Inc.," 
mss. in Northeast Louisiana Power Co-op files, Winnsboro, 
April 24, 1958, 2; interview with Fannie Bonner, March 28, 
1983.
Ibid.; interview with Lowrey, March 28, 1983.
1983.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The current manager, John C. Tucker, was hired by the 
board in 1971 after Anders became ill and had to retire. He is 
from Crowville in Franklin Parish and is a graduate of LSU.
The first loan from REA was for $72,000 for the con­
struction of 158 miles of line to be built out of Winnsboro 
in several directions. The contractor was John Owen from 
Monroe, who was awarded the contract on April 8, 1939, and 
completed construction of the first lines in early December. 
On December 9, 1939, W. L. Rush wrote to his boss in 
Washington, Harry Slattery, informing him that construction 
was c o m p l e t e d . T h e  lines were finally energized the day 
after Christmas, 1939, lighting a rural area toward Ft. 
Necessity and Delhi. Two days later, 290 members received 
power in West Carroll Parish. When construction was finally 
completed, the co-op spread through seven parishes : Franklin, 
Richland, Madison, East Carroll, West Carroll, Morehouse, 
and T e n s a s . T o d a y ,  the co-op serves over 13,000 consumers 
in those parishes.
Contract between Rural Electrification Administration 
and Northeast Louisiana Power Co-op, June 3, 1939, in North­
east Louisiana Power Co-op files, Winnsboro.
Northeast Louisiana Power Co-op, "Minutes," April 9,
1939.
W. L. Rush to Harry Slattery, December 8, 1939, 
Northeast Louisiana Power Co-op files, Winnsboro.
"Northeast Louisiana Power Cooperative, Inc.," 2; 
interview with Fannie Bonner, March 29, 1983.
REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1980, 69.
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Strong leadership was the key to a successful begin­
ning in the life of a -Louisiana co-op. The Northeast Power 
co-op had that strong leadership, not only from Holladay, 
but also from the board of directors who supported him. 
These people worked together to set the foundation, to 
build the co-op, and to assure its success.
South Louisiana Electric Cooperative Association 
Houma, Louis iana
At first glance, there are few things obviously dis­
tinctive about SLECA. This might be because the co-op 
never had its dynamic leader like Chaney at Tech, Gajan 
at SLEMCO, or Robbins at Jeff Davis--no obvious bright star 
to focus on. SLECA just seems to be there, quietly doing 
its part delivering electricity to Terrebonne, Lafourche, 
St. Mary, Assumption, and St. Martin parishes. But despite 
its placid character, SLECA is distinctive in at least one 
area: it is located in one of the nation's most volatile 
economic regions.
SLECA's total kilowatt sales volume is forty-seven 
percent commercial and industrial--nearly half of all elec­
trical sales are to commercial and industrial interests.
And of that forty-seven percent, nearly seventy percent is 
delivered to large corporations. In 1980, SLECA brought 
in nearly as much total revenue from large commercial and 
industrial sales as did SLEMCO, a co-op with three times 
the total kilowatt sales and nearly twice the number
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of commercial and industrial c u s t o m e r s T h e  reason for 
this is obvious to anyone familiar with the oil and gas 
industry in Louisiana: The Houma-Morgan City area is 
saturated with the large companies that comprise that boom­
ing industry.
SLECA is also distinctive in that it serves over four­
teen consumers per mile, the highest density in the state 
by far. The reason for this is the same as at Teche 
Electric, only to a greater degree. The rural population 
lives on the high ground along the bayous that connect the 
small urban settlements. These areas are, of course, 
natural levees formed by centuries of flooding, and may 
extend back from the bayous for as far as five miles. The 
area behind these natural levees is mostly swamp, largely 
unhabited except for an occasional hunting camp. SLECA's 
role, then, has been merely to serve these high ground 
areas. Although SLECA has the same obligation as all 
other co-ops to serve any rural resident within the service 
area who wants electricity, it has seldom had to extend its 
lines into these unprofitable remote areas. So, rather
SLEMCO collected $5,421, 194 in large industrial 
sales in 1980. SLECA collected 4,023,348. SLEMCO sold 
1,015,062 total megawatts in 1980; SLECA sold 326,333. 
REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1980, 68.
Ibid., 68. Teche Electric is second with ten 
consumers per mile. ibid., 68.
Interview with Rickie Pietre., January 17, 1983, 
Houma, Louis iana.
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than distinctive personalities, it has been the economic 
factors of the oil and gas boom in the area, coupled with 
its geographic situation, that gives SLECA its distinction.
The growth in SLECA's service area is extensive. 
Northern Terrebonne Parish, eastern St. Mary Parish, and 
parts of Lafourche Parish are booming. Since the mid­
seventies, the oil and gas industry has not only brought 
in industry and people, but economic growth as well. The 
per capita income for those three parishes is among the 
highest in the state, and all three have had a ten-year 
increase in per capita income of over 100 p e r c e n t . B u t  
without SLECA, the situation might be different today. 
Certainly, if oil and gas is discovered and demand is high, 
the big oil companies will not be held back by a lack of 
electricity. But SLECA has made the job easier and less 
expensive than if the oil companies had had to generate 
their own power or pay high prices for LP&L hookups off 
the utility's main lines. The companies that support the 
oil and gas industry have also had an easy time thanks to 
SLECA; co-op lines were already built in the area where 
much of the support industry is located.
The early organizers of SLECA were C. C. Couvillion, 
the county agent for Terrebonne Parish, and Owen Walther 
from Gibson. Walther was to become the first president
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of SLECA. He was a consulting engineer for a Washington- 
based firm that had installed the first air-conditioning 
system in the United States Capitol. He had also worked 
for the Hershey Company in Hershey, Pennsylvania. Walther 
and Couvillion were influential community leaders as were 
the other co-op founders : Aubin Buquet was a wealthy sea­
food buisnessman from Dulac; W. C. Cooke was a wealthy 
planter; Karl Geist was a German immigrant living near 
Houma; John Mouman was a wealthy sugar planter from Theriot; 
Albert Thibodaux was a successful farmer from the Bayou 
Blue area; Robert Marcel was from Amelia, J. H. Morrison 
was from Mathews, and J. B. Hill from Raceland. All were 
prominent citizens and influential local leaders.
Those early leaders are gone, but one founder remains, 
Claude Duval— and he is still going strong. When the co-op 
was organized in 1938, Duval was an eager young attorney 
less than one year out of Tulane. He and his partner,
Ashby Pettigrew, signed on as the co-op's lawyers, acquiring 
the position by something like default. "We were the young­
est, least knowledgeable attorneys around," Duvall recalls. 
"The other attorneys declined to represent the co-op, I 
think, in part, because they didn't think it would amount 
to a n y t h i n g . T h e  co-op, of course, was a success, and
Houma, Loui s iana. 
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so was Duval. He went on to become a prominent Houma 
attorney, and, from 1967 to 1980, he was a state senator 
from the Houma district. He is still SLECA's attorney, 
after forty-five years.
SLECA had a precarious beginning. After the usual 
process of organization, REA was contacted and a represen­
tative was sent from Washington to assess the feasibility of 
the program. The representative found it unacceptable.
But like SLEMCO, where a similar situation had occurred, 
the organizers appealed, and their application was finally 
approved. Their first loan, in the amount of $110,600, 
was received in October, 1938. They set up shop in an 
old two-room shotgun house on East Park Avenue in Houma.
They were in business.
As the co-op's lawyers, Duval and his partner were 
busy from the start. But Duval's participation in SLECA's 
early years went beyond his services as the organization's 
attorney. Aside from his legal duties, Duval soon found 
himself sorting out rights-of-way. The employees had done 
a poor job of keeping records and no one knew what rights- 
of-way had been obtained where. Duval then got involved 
in obtaining the rights-of-way himself, going from house 
to house, explaining what a co-op was, and how it would 
affect the residents and their entire area--he was a salesman.
Ibid.; Watts Line, April, 1982, 1; Rural Louisiana,
May, 1 9 6 0 7 ^
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The board-of directors, evidently with no other prospects 
for manager, and seeing Duval's youthful enthusiasm, named 
him to the position. This, Duval recalls, was in May of
1938. He was only twenty-five.
Obtaining rights-of-way was not always easy. It would 
seem that the desire for electricity, the desire to finally 
enter the modern world of convenience, would easily out­
weigh any apprehension about lines, poles, or workers on 
their property. But, for whatever reason, a farmer occa­
sionally refused electricity. In one area near Bayou Louis, 
Duval recalls, a group of farmers had gotten together to 
keep SLECA from obtaining rights-of-way--they did not want 
the co-op to build on their land. The group had a ring 
leader, and if he could be convinced, Duval thought, the 
others would easily agree. Several of the co-op's board 
members— influential men--had had no luck with the man.
Duval went out, talked to the man's wife, and settled the 
problem. The entire area came along within a few days. A 
bit of pressure in the right place can make all the 
difference.
In August, 1938, the board of directors chose Nolin 
Cunningham to relieve the overworked Duval as manager. 
Cunningham began linebuilding, first near the Bayou Blue 
area along Highway 90, then south toward the source of
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power at Houma. In the midst of construction an unusual 
incident occurred: "lo and behold," Duval recalls, "LP&L 
started putting up a line on the other side of the highway." 
The law was first-come-first-serve, so Duval and Cunningham 
picked up the gauntlet: "So I told Nolin, 'let's go!'"
And they did; the race to Houma was on. Both crews worked 
into the nights, setting poles as fast as they could dig 
the holes. Edgar Chaney at Teche Electric in Jeanerette 
sent two trucks and as many crewmen as he could spare to 
help. "We had to get our poles and lines up to be able to 
have that territory," Duval remembers. The line was ener­
gized in October, 1938. SLECA won the race, and claims 
the territory today.
SLECA bought its first power from the city of Houma 
in 1938. By 1946, Houma wanted out of its contracts, claim­
ing a lack of generating capacity to serve the co-op, and 
a low return on investment. Duval represented SLECA before 
the Public Service Commission, arguing that a contract had 
been negotiated and that Houma was legally bound to continue 
the service. Duval and SLECA won the point, but immediately 
entered into a contract with LP&L, letting Houma off the
108
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Interview with Duval, February 14, 1983.
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It was at the beginning of the post-war period that 
industry began moving into the Houma-Morgan City area, al­
though it would be another twenty-five years before the 
oil and gas industry would hit full stride. Possibly see­
ing the potential for the area, and seeing that SLECA had 
become a successful endeavor, LP&L attempted a buyout of 
the co-op in 1948.^^^ Duval again took up the gauntlet 
thrown down by LP&L.
"We had a dead dog fight. We bought radio time, we 
bought newspaper ads. We went at it. And we ended up 
whipping the hell out of them." The final blow came when 
Duval had the by-laws changed to make it nearly impossible 
for LP&L to buy SLECA. As of 1948, a majority of the 
membership, and not merely a majority of the quorum, was 
necessary to sell any or all of the co-op's property.
SLECA has gone through some riotous times. When it 
began, the area to be served contained little more than a 
few fishing villages and cane fields in south Louisiana. 
Today, it serves a smattering of boom towns among the oil 
and gas platforms in the Gulf of Mexico. SLECA has not 
only kept up with the boom, it has helped to foster it. It 
is not at all the quiet uneventful co-op that it appears 
to be.
Ibid.; N. J. Cunningham to Allen Ellender, June 15, 
1949, Ellender Papers, Box 9, Allen Ellender Library, Nichols 
State University, Thibodaux, Louisiana.
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Washington-St. Tammany Electric Cooperative 
Franklinton, Louisiana
What is taking place in the Washington-St. Tammany 
service area, while possibly not as glamorous as the oil 
and gas boom near Houma and Morgan City, is certainly as 
dynamic. The Washington-St. Tammany service area, which 
includes Washington, St. Tammany, and Tangipahoa parishes, 
is the fastest growing area in the state.
St. Tammany Parish has had an astounding population 
increase of more than ninety-six percent during the last 
decade ; the population grew from 38,643 in 1970 to 110,869 
in 1 9 8 0 . The reason, of course, is not oil and gas, 
but urban sprawl. In 1955, when the Pontchartrain Causeway 
was built, the north-lake became a New Orleans suburb, and 
the population of St. Tammany Parish boomed. Slidell, on 
the southeastern edge of the parish, is growing even faster. 
It is, in fact, the fastest growing city in the state.
As New Orleans spread eastward in the Seventies into what 
became New Orleans-East, the city continued to spread across 
the east side of the lake into Slidell. These two St. 
Tammany towns have become suburbs of New Orleans, advertis­
ing clean air, clean water, and a general reprieve from
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Census 
of Population. Number of Inhabitants : Louisiana (Washington,
D.C. USCPO, 1982), 9, 14.
Ibid. 14.
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the various and highly publicized problems of the city.
The Washington-St. Tammany co-op does not, of course, 
serve these towns, nor does it serve Bogalusa, Covington, 
Pontchatoula, Hammond, or other even smaller towns in its 
service area. But in the late Thirties and early Forties, 
when the co-op was just beginning, it did serve up to the 
city limits of these towns. Today, as a result of popula­
tion growth, the towns have expanded well into the co-op's 
service area. Therefore, those areas served by Washington- 
St. Tammany include a large urgan population as part of its 
membership.
In 1938, when the co-op first began, very little of 
the three-parish area had electricity. In Washington Parish, 
only Franklinton, Bogalusa, and a couple of C.C.C. camps 
were electrified. In Tangipahoa Parish, only those towns 
along the Illinois Central tracks running north out of New 
Orleans had power. In St. Tammany, only Covington, Slidell, 
Mandeville, and Abita Springs had electricity. The new 
co-op had a big job.
The co-op was chartered September 2, 1938. The first 
lines stretched 109 miles, serving 226 members from 
Franklinton in Washington Parish, north to Warrenton and 
Sunny Hill on the Mississippi border, then south to Folsom
Interview with Lyle Killingsworth, November 20, 
1981, Franklinton, Louisiana.
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in St. Tammany Parish, and southwest to Enon and Sun. 
Service was established quickly; on November 11, 1938, 
just two months after the first loan was received, the 
first lines were energized, and rural residents in 
Washington and St. Tammany Parishes received electricity 
for the first time. About one year later, Tangipahoa 
Parish was brought into the co-op's service area.
The first manager was N. W. Taylor. As was the case 
at several other co-ops in the state, the first manager 
was more of a lineman than an engineer, usually replaced 
once the system was energized and the co-op got on its 
feet. But in this case, Taylor remained on at the co-op 
for a number of years as a serviceman. The second manager 
was S. J. MacMahon, who remained at the post until 1947 
when the current manager, Lyle Killingsworth, was given 
the job.
Killingsworth came to Washington-St. Tammany in 1941 
as a serviceman, worked his way up to operations superin­
tendent in 1943, and then to manager in 1947. He has 
since been regarded by several of the state's managers as 
one of the best managers in Louisiana, by at least one as 
one of the best in the nation.
Interview with Killingsworth, November 20, 1981. 
Ibid.; interview with Mark Bonner, July 29, 1982.
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Killingsworth has a statistical bent. In fact, he 
seems to be as much an accountant as an engineer. Each 
year he reports on the financial situation of the co-op 
to his members through the statewide's organ, "Rural 
Louisiana." He has recently begun using easily understood 
graphs and charts to show each year's progress.
Killingsworth's attitude toward the co-op system is 
the attitude of many of the early members. It is an under­
standing of membership ownership ; it is an understanding 
that possibly only someone who participated in the early 
stages of the co-op can have, someone who saw darkness 
come to light:
I feel that this is something that belongs to 
the people; they control it. If we specialize 
in anything at all, it's providing service for 
the rural people. , . . It's still possible [for] 
a person to build a home two miles from a power 
line [and still get electricity]. I just feel 
that it's a lot of difference in having the 
owner, the consumer, and the operator all the 
same person . . . from having an investor own i
it [who is] looking toward making a profit. . . .
Killingsworth would never deny the right of the investor- 
owned utilities to make a profit, but it was that right that 
kept electricity out of the rural areas until the advent of 
REA. When Killingsworth was a boy in Jefferson County, 
Mississippi, he recalls one of those incidents that touched 
and shaped the lives of so many co-op leaders in Louisiana 
and the nation:
Interview with Killingsworth, November 20, 1981.
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I remember my father and others trying so hard 
to get Mississippi Power and Light Company to 
build a line into the rural area, and they 
wouldn't consider it even with the people paying 
the cost of the line.119
Killingsworth became the co-op's manager just as the 
war broke out, when times were lean for the co-ops due to 
the lack of building materials. But after the war, the 
post-war boom snapped the economy back. The demand for 
electricity in rural areas was high, and Washington had 
the money to lend. Line-building was furious. In the 
Washington-St. Tammany service area, the post-war growth 
brought conflict with LP&L. Both were expanding rapidly, 
trying to tie up as many areas as possible by moving into 
settled areas, or into areas that might develop in the 
future. At one point, Killingsworth remembers, LP&L 
simply built lines along all the public roads, whether 
there were houses on those roads or not. Often the lines 
would never be hooked into a substation, never even ener­
gized; they simply served to tie up areas. At one point, 
LP&L's zealousness backfired. An inexperienced manager, 
hoping to get a jump on the co-op, tied up a large section 
of woodlands in Washington Parish. The woodlands, it 
turned out, belonged to the Crown-Zellerbach Company and 





Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
"We called them races at the time," says Killingsworth, 
recalling the competition with LP&L, "we'd work at nights 
at times. We would have large areas staked and on contract, 
and if they could beat us into these areas, they would.
We beat them into a big part of the area, but," he added, 
"they also beat us into large areas.
Today, of course, this kind of activity is a thing of 
the past, partly because of the lack of such potentially 
productive areas and partly because of various laws passed 
in the Sixties that more accurately defined spheres of 
control. These laws have been important in the conflict 
between the co-ops and the investor-owned utilities ; they 
are worth a separate discussion later.
Today, Washington-St. Tammany serves over 21,000 
consumers, the third largest in the state. And this number 
can be expected to climb rapidly throughout the 1980s.
The growth of St. Tammany Parish, and to some extent 
Tangipahoa Parish, is the most distinctive characteristic 
of the Washington-St. Tammany co-op. The co-op, of course, 
has had to match that growth, keeping up, expanding as the 
population expands. Washington-St. Tammany's guiding light, 
Lyle Killingsworth, has directed that expansion through 
the years, while upholding an undying faith in the coopera­
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Like many other leaders in the Louisiana co-op move­
ment, Killingsworth will soon relinquish his role to a 
younger man. If he and those other founders on the verge 
of retirement take with them their philosophy, if the 
idea of member-ownership dies with them, the movement it­
self might lose its purpose.
Claiborne Electric Cooperative 
Homer, Louisiana
Claiborne Electric began much as did the other co-ops 
in the state. Local leaders needed electricity, and they 
wanted others to have it. They organized, contacted 
Washington, and collected memberships. The only difference 
is that at Claiborne Electric there is no one still living 
who can recall these events. Only a few official records 
and some secondhand information hold the story.
It is hard to tell who brought it all together, who 
that one person was who conceived the idea, contacted the 
other leaders, and threw his weight behind the program from 
the start. There was one man, though, whose name seems to 
stand above the rest in those early years, who served as 
the co-op's first employee, and then as the first manager : 
William M. Rainach. Willie Rainach, as he was more commonly 
known, went on from his interest at the Claiborne co-op to 
advance (some might say "regress") into the hotbed of 
Louisiana politics at a time when it was at its hottest.
Rainach may have done a lot to bring electricity to
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the rural people of north central Louisiana, but he was 
not one of Louisiana's most venerable political stars.
During his time in the State Senate, 1940-1959, he organ­
ized and chaired the Joint Legislative Committee on 
Segregation, whose job it was to circumvent desegregation 
and outlaw the NAACP.^^^ He also formed Louisiana's first 
White Citizen's Council in Claiborne Parish in 1955. With­
in four years, he had advanced to the head of a statewide 
White Citizens Council which he had also organized. The 
purpose of these groups was to unofficially resist desegre­
gation. In 1959, Rainach ran for governor on a wholly 
racist ticket, addressing his campaign to little else.
Earl Long had said that a gubernatorial candidate in 
Louisiana could not win an election using race as an issue, 
and he was right; Rainach finished a poor third behind 
Jimmy Davis and deLesseps Morrison in the Democratic primary 
After the election, Rainach faded from the public eye, but 
while he was there, he and his friend, Judge Leander Perez, 
kept Louisiana's disreputable segregationist politics in 
the national press.
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1977), 231. 
Ibid., 235.
Perry Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana 
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1971),
340; Calhoun, Louisiana Almanac, 348.
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But as far as Claiborne Electric was concerned,
Rainach played an important role in its organization. He 
was an early leader whose energy breathed life into a co-op 
that otherwise might have died. On January 10, 1939, four 
months after the organizational meeting, the board of 
directors met for the first time with W. 0. Coe, an REA 
representative from Washington. The directors had not 
been informed of the 2.5 meters-per-mile rule and were 
told by Coe that REA would not support the program unless 
more members were enrolled. The board then turned to the 
person they felt had the ability to sign up enough new 
members to make the program work: Rainach. "After a full 
discussion, it was decided that it was to the best inter­
est of the corporation that Mr. Wm. Rainach, who had 
heretofore been devoting considerable amount of time, be 
engaged to spend more time and use his best efforts to 
secure a sufficient number of members. . . . "  Rainach 
was to be paid $250 per month to marshal his "best efforts," 
and get the co-op off the ground.
Apparently Rainach was successful. On June 3, 1939, 
a loan contract was drawn up between Claiborne Electric 
and REA for $175,000, and Rainach was hired as the first 
manager. On December 16, 1939, it was proudly entered 
into the minutes : "Be it resolved: The lines of Claiborne
Claiborne Electric Co-op, "Minutes," January 10,
1939.
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Electric have been energized. . . .
On that same day, Rainach announced to the board that 
he intended to be a candidate for the State Senate and 
offered his resignation to be effective as soon as a suit­
able replacement could be found. The board was concerned 
that they "should prevent anyone from using the cooperative 
as a political stepping stone," but entered into the record 
their satisfaction that Rainach had not done that. But 
contact with a good portion of the Thirty-Sixth Senatorial 
District certainly did not hurt his campaign. On May 4, 
1940, Rainach resigned and headed down the bumpy road of 
Louisiana politics, and out of the history of Claiborne 
Electric.
The co-op was organized at its first meeting,
September 14, 1939, at the law offices of Meadors and
years, then rented office space in Homer until building 
its current offices in 1948.^^^ As is usually the case, 
those present at the meeting became the board of directors.
Ibid., December 16, 1939.
Ibid., May 4, 1940.
Ibid. , September 14, 1939.
Interview with Elmer Poss, April 1, 1983; Homer, 
Louisiana. The Current building has been expanded six 
times. Ibid.
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At the next meeting, five days later, L. Almond was elected 
as first president. Almond was a farmer from near Minden.
The vice-president, J. Burnett, was from near Haynesville 
in north Claiborne Parish. J. H. Odom, also from near 
Haynesville, signed as the first secretary. He was a 
prominent farmer and merchant. Also on the first board 
was R. L. Hays from near Athens, S. P. Meadors from near 
Homer, and Rainach from Summerville.
When those first 131 miles of line were energized in 
December, 1939, parts of three parishes received electricity: 
Claiborne, Webster, and Bienville. Today, Claiborne Elec­
tric serves those three parishes in addition to Union, 
Lincoln, and a small part of Ouachita. The areas served by 
the first lines were out of Homer north toward Camp and 
Colquitt, northwest to Blackburn, Leton, Shongaloo, and 
then north to Old Shongaloo on the Arkansas b o r d e r . A t  
one point in late 1940, Claiborne tried to expand into 
southern Arkansas. But Arkansas Power and Light objected 
so strenuously that expansion had to be called off, and 
the co-op had to refund a large amount of collected member­
ship fees to the southern Arkansas residents
September 14, 1939. Rainach was a butane appliance sales­
man in Summerville— interview with Poss, April 1, 1983.
Interview with Poss, April 1, 1983; Claiborne 
Electric Co-op, "Minutes," May 25, 1939.
Claiborne Electric Co-op, "Minutes," August 17,
1940.
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On January 20, 1940, Almond stepped down as president, 
and Mrs. M. D. Wren was elected, Almond himself nominated 
her and continued to serve on the board, so there was no 
power s t r u g g l e . I t  was very unusual for a woman to 
serve as president of a co-op in Louisiana. Often women 
served as board members in the early years, but they were 
usually home demonstration experts who traveled in the 
areas explaining the various uses of kitchen appliances.
Mrs. Wren must have been exceptionally competent to be 
elected to such an important position at a time when women 
were seldom allowed to achieve such status.
Wren remained president for just over a year and was 
then replaced by Odom. He served as president until 1954, 
when he and several of the directors were dressed out of 
office by an irate group of misinformed members. They felt 
that the board was doing a poor job because after fifteen 
years, the co-op was still not paid off. Odom, in turn, 
refused to defend himself and the co-op. A group formed 
in opposition, and, with a misconceived notion of the nature 
of the co-op system, sent the founders packing. Almond, it 
seems, was wise enough to see it all coming and resigned 
before he was asked to.
Rainach was succeeded as manager by Albert Aymond,
Ibid., January 20, 1940.
Ibid., February 12, 1941; interview with Poss,
April 1, T9BJ.
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who served only until October, 1940.^^^ Thomas Stevenson 
took the job until September, 1954, when he became a 
casualty of the incident of that year which removed the 
original board of directors. Orval Crouch followed him.
In 1973, the current manager, Elmer Poss, took over the 
position. Poss has an unusual background for a Louisiana 
co-op manager. First of all, he is from Kansas. Secondly, 
his background is in accounting, and not electrical engineer­
ing. After he completed a two-year business college curricu­
lum in Lawrence, Kansas, he went to work for the War 
Department in Washington. After one year there, he trans­
ferred to REA, spent four years in the service during the 
war, and then returned to REA, where he remained until 1949. 
His job was to audit the co-ops in the four-state area of 
Arkansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Louisiana. He had not 
had the occasion to audit Claiborne Electric before he came 
to work there in 1949 as office manager. "I'd never even 
heard of Homer. I accepted the job by telephone." From 
office manager he advanced to assistant manager in 1965, 
and finally to manager in 1973.^^^
The area served by Claiborne Electric has a few dis­
tinctions worth mentioning. Row crop farming has been
137
139
Claiborne Electric Co-op, "Minutes," May 4, 1940.
Interview with Poss, April 1, 1983.
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replaced by cattle and broiler raising and dairy farming.
An occasional ice storm has wrought havoc to the co-op 
over the years, much as the occasional hurricane keeps the 
co-ops in south Louisiana from letting their guard down.
The population of the area has decreased dramatically over 
the past few years, as the young people have heated a path 
to Houston, New Orleans, and other urban centers where 
jobs are more plentiful than on the north Louisiana prairie. 
This has left a large population of low-income elderly 
people in the Claiborne service area, most of whom use 
very little electricity. The average residential consump­
tion of electricity is the second lowest in the state. 
Consequently, the Claiborne management must count every 
penny.
Bossier Rural Electric Membership Co-op 
Bossier City, Louisiana
The most distinctive characteristic of Bossier Rural 
Electric membership Co-op (BREMCO) is its independence, 
even isolation, from the other co-ops in the state. This 
is partly because BREMCO is situated at the opposite end 
of the state from Baton Rouge, the power center for the 
state's co-op system. Of course, with today's rapid
Ibid. The average monthly consumption of kilo­
watt hours in the Claiborne area is 787. Only Pointe 
Coupee Co-op is lower with 757. The average monthly con­
sumption of kilowatt hours throughout the state is 988. 
REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1980, 58-70.
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transportation and communications, contacts with the Baton 
Rouge offices are virtually around the corner compared to 
just a few years ago. But over the past decades, when 
transportation and communication systems were less conveni­
ent, BREMCO developed independently of the others. Also, 
during the battles of the Sixties and Seventies for the 
right to generate power, BREMCO was not quite as interested 
as were the other co-ops. They had had few problems with 
the investor-owned utility in their service area, their 
rates were low, and, to them, generation did not seem a 
real necessity. BREMCO had been purchasing power from the 
Southwestern Electric Power Company (SWEPCO) since the 
beginning of its operation in 1939. SWEPCO is located in 
Shreveport, but its main service area is Texas and Arkansas. 
It has, over the years, had very few dealings with the 
other Louisiana investor-owned companies. In fact, even 
today, SWEPCO is not interconnected with the Louisiana power 
pool. When all the fighting was being waged between the 
co-ops and the other companies in the state, SWEPCO stayed 
out and, to some extent, so did BREMCO. Today, all of the 
state's power is dumped into one large pool in the state.
All the groups draw from it for their own needs, including 
the investor-owned utilities, the co-ops, and most munici­
pal systems--but not SWEPCO and BREMCO. Because SWEPCO 
is not tied in to this pool, BREMCO must still buy most of 
its power, about eighty-five percent, from SWEPCO; it is
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the only co-op in Louisiana to do so. Both BREMCO and 
SWEPCO are, to some extent then, independent of the rest 
of the state. The old Louisiana adage that the northwest 
part of the state is more a part of Texas than Louisiana 
holds true, at least in this c a s e . T h e r e  is, though, 
a significant exception to this. Charles Roemer, the 
chairman of the BREMCO board from the mid-Sixties until 
the early Eighties, was a leader in the statewide movement 
and in the G&T project. In fact, he was one of the most 
important leaders in both programs. In that position, he 
was able to close the gap between BREMCO and the other 
co-ops, but, despite his influence, BREMCO has maintained 
an independent attitude due mainly to the SWEPCO connec­
tion and its isolation in northwest Louisiana from the 
other co-ops.
Despite this independence, though, BREMCO is a member 
of the G&T association, and, as such, is obligated to charge 
its members the same rates charged by the other distribu­
tion co-ops in the state. BREMCO's rates over the past 
few years have been as high as two and one-half times 
SWEPCO's rates, a disparity greater than the other co-ops 
have had to endure compared to the investor-owned utilities 
in their a r e a s . T h e  result has been a consumer revolt
141
Louisiana, October 3, 1983.
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Interview with Robert Southworth, Bossier City, 
,
Ibid.
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that began at BREMCO and spread throughout the state. It 
has even most recently led to legislation to regulate the 
co-ops. All of this started at BREMCO in February, 1981.
It was in that month that the SWEPCO-BREMCO rate dis­
parity made the fateful jump to 250 percent. Elaine 
McLemore, one of BREMCO's member services officers, went 
to Elm Grove, a small town in south Bossier Parish, to 
answer a complaint from what she thought was one or two 
members. She was met by an angry mob of twenty. Several 
days later, she and other BREMCO employees met a crowd 
200-strong--the Concerned Consumers Committee. At this 
meeting Foster Campbell, a state senator from the Thirty- 
Sixth District, Elm Grove citizen, and BREMCO member, 
fanned these fires of discontent all the way to Baton 
Rouge. By the 1983 legislative session, he had turned this 
local restlessness into a movement, and eventually into a 
bill to place the co-ops under the regulative umbrella of 
the Public Service Commission. Locally, the group organized, 
raised money, and hired lawyers and auditors. In the sum­
mer of 1981, they voted to replace three of the nine board 
members, and, in addition, were able to recall two others 
for re-election, including Charles Roemer. Roemer had been 
one of the co-op's principal leaders since the early Fif­
ties, and had gone on to manage Edwin Edward's 1975 cam­
paign for governor, and then to become Edward's Commissioner 
of Administration. In 1981, when the demonstration occured 
at BREMCO, Roemer was falling from his position as the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
state's second most powerful person to one of its least 
powerful. He was indicted and eventually convicted in the 
FBI's "BRILAB" investigations that landed him in prison, 
along with New Orleans mafia figure Carlos Marcello, for 
accepting insurance kickbacks. Busy fighting this charge, 
Roemer stepped down rather than face defeat. The other 
board member brought up for election by this recall peti­
tion was able to escape defeat, but in 1982 he chose not 
to push his luck, and resigned. The manager, D. L. Knight, 
took a job with the National Rural Electric Cooperative 
Association in Bangladesh. Apparently, he wanted to get 
as far away as possible from BREMCO consumers. According 
to McLemore, "he'd had all he could take.
The revolt has subsided considerably in the last few 
months, according to the present manager, Robert Southworth, 
and McLemore. SWEPCO's rates have begun to rise, and today 
they are only about forty percent below BREMCO's. The 
future for the co-op, according to its employees, is that 
prices will be higher than SWEPCO's until the turn of the 
century, but that about 1990, the gap will begin to close.
By 1995, the two will be less than one cent per kilowatt 
hour apart.
This consumer fight is interesting, but the co-op does
Interview with Elaine McLemore, October 3, 1983. 
Ibid.; interview with Robert Southworth, October
3, 1983.
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have a past, as well as a present and a future. The co-op 
began with its first meeting at the parish courthouse, at 
the Bossier Parish seat in Benton, on June 10, 1939. It 
was called by J. H. Messer, who was elected chairman and 
then president. The secretary-treasurer was Mrs. S. W. 
Martin. There were eleven board members, most of them 
from Bossier Parish. Four of the group represented Plain 
Dealing, Louisiana, a small town in the hills of north 
Bossier P a r i s h . A t  the second meeting, a year later, 
they selected a manager, B. H. Allen, and agreed to borrow 
$104,000 from REA for 113 miles of line. Allen traveled 
to Valley Electric in Natchitoches to get some tips on how 
to get the project m o v i n g . B y  August, Allen had the 
entire 113 miles staked and ready for c o n s t r u c t i o n . B y  
December 8, 1939, he had announced that a few miles of 
line had been energized, and that all the lines would be 
on within a week.^^^
Smith stayed on until 1941, but it is nearly impossible 
to determine from the minutes the succession of managers 
after that. The secretaries, over the years, simply referred 
to the managers in the minutes as "the supervisor," and they
June 10, 1938.
Ibid., May 30, 1939. 
Ibid., August 25, 1939. 
Ibid., December 8, 1939.
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never recorded changes from one manager to the next. But 
in Rural Louisiana, beginning in 1952, the managers of the 
co-ops are listed each month. In that year, Ralph Gravelle 
was manager at B R E M C O . H e  was replaced in 1956 by
followed by D. L. Knight in 1964.^^^ In December, 1981, 
the current manager, Robert Southworth, took over the 
position.
BREMCO's service area is all of Bossier Parish, and 
parts of Webster, Bienville, and Red River parishes. Its 
office is located just across the Red River from Shreveport 
in Bossier City, the fastest growing area in North Louisiana. 
Bossier City itself has a twenty-seven percent growth rate, 
compared to Shreveport which is growing at seventeen per­
cent. Of course, BREMCO does not serve Bossier City, 
but that city's growth reflects the co-op's growth. The 
average growth rate for the four-parish service area is a
healthy 5.2 p e r c e n t . T h e  co-op itself has had an 84.7
percent consumer growth rate since 1960.
Rural Louisiana, January, 1952, n.p.
Ibid., January, 1956, n.p.
cal Abstract of Louisiana (7th ed., T98%T, 4-5. 
155
1960, 77.
REA, Annual Statistical Report. 1980, 69; ibid.,
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BREMCO’s future can only improve over its immediate 
past. The new bill that might place BREMCO and the other 
state co-ops under the PSC would be, according to BREMCO 
officials, a welcomed relief. All the blame for high 
rates could then be placed on the shoulders of the PSC, 
and that would take much of the pressure off BREMCO. It 
is obvious that the revolt took its toll. "It’s not some­
thing I’d like to live through again," states McLemore.
There are even some hard feelings between BREMCO and the 
Baton Rouge office. According to Southworth and McLemore, 
had the G&T group been willing to allow BREMCO to lower 
its rates, establishing parity with SWEPCO at least for 
a short time, this entire problem could have been killed 
at b i r t h . T h e  pressure would have been eased on BREMCO, 
and the uprising would not have spread and ended in state 
rate regulation.
BREMCO is not particularly proud of its position as 
the place where a statewide, anti-co-op, consumer revolt 
began, but, as BREMCO personnel see it, the rate gap be­
tween themselves and SWEPCO made such a conflict inevitable. 
They even hold a great deal of sympathy for their consumers.
Interview with McLemore, October 3, 1983.
Ibid.; interview with Southworth, October 3, 1983.
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Pointe Coupee Electric Co-op 
New Roads, Louisiana
It is difficult to examine the thirteen co-ops in 
the state and find something distinctive for each. But 
for Pointe Coupee, the job is easy. First of all. Pointe 
Coupee is very small. Two other co-ops in the state serve 
fewer consumers, Teche Electric and Jeff Davis, but none 
sells less electricity. Pointe Coupee's megawatt sales 
for 1980 was only 93,621. By comparison at the other end 
of the scale, SLEMCO, the largest in the state, sold 
nearly eleven times that in 1980. Dixie Electric, just 
across the river, sold nearly seven times as much.^^®
Pointe Coupee also has one of the state's lowest consumer 
growth rates, at only ninety percent since 1960.^^^ All 
of this, of course, is not to say that the people at Pointe 
Coupee are not doing their jobs. The three parishes served 
by Pointe Coupee— West Baton Rouge, Pointe Coupee, and 
part of Iberville--are small, although there is some growth. 
West Baton Rouge Parish is growing at a rate of 7.6 percent, 
while Pointe Coupee is growing at a 3.2 percent rate. 
Iberville Parish, though, is stable.
Another significant statistic is that Pointe Coupee 
serves nearly ten consumers per mile. Only SLECA and
REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1980, 68.
Ibid., 68.
UNO, 1981 Statistical Abstract, 4-5.
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In all three co-ops, it is 
not the case that the rural population is numerous, but 
that it is condensed. Over the years, settlements have 
sprung up along the high ground on either side of the 
bayous, and between the swamplands. In Pointe Coupee, 
much of the population is along the Mississippi River in 
small towns such as Brusley. Bayou Goula, and Addis. Many 
of these towns existed in another age as river towns, 
making their livelihood from the river's commerce. Today, 
the towns remain in existence, but the river commerce has 
vanished.
It might seem that of the three parishes served by 
Pointe Coupee, West Baton Rouge would have the largest 
population, since it is an industrial suburb of Baton 
Rouge, the fastest growing city in the state. But West 
Baton Rouge Parish has a small population; it is, in fact, 
the smallest of the three, Iberville Parish has nearly 
twice the population of West Baton Rouge P a r i s h . T h e  
problem, if it is a problem, is that Port Allen, the 
principal town on the west side of the river, has never 
become a bona fide middle-class suburb of Baton Rouge, as 
Algiers or Gretna have become of New Orleans ; and hence 
the suburban growth across the river has just never begun.
REA, Annual Statistical Report, 1980, 64. 
UNO, 1981 Statistical Abstract, 4-5.
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Furthermore, West Baton Rouge Parish has become industrial, 
and that seldom sets the stage for growth in suburban 
living. Also, the industry that has come into West Baton 
Rouge, principally the chemical industry, is chiefly 
capital intensive, hiring only a few engineers here and 
there, most of whom are more comfortable commuting from 
the East Baton Rouge Parish suburbs, east of the city.
Most visitors to the Pointe Coupee service area will 
recall sugar cane. It covers the fields throughout the 
summer, and it seems to be the main activity at November 
harvest time when travel is difficult because of slow- 
moving sugar cane wagons. But recently, sugar cane has 
moved far down the list in agricultural production in 
this area. As with most sugar producing areas in the 
state, soybeans have taken over as a better provider, while 
sugar has gone to the wayside. In fact, in Pointe Coupee 
Parish, sugar ranks third behind soybeans and cattle.
But sugar milling still remains the chief industry
One unique characteristic of Pointe Coupee is its 
manager, A. A. Robinson, best known as "Bubba." In 1937 
he was elected to the co-op's first board of directors, at 
age twenty-two. Two years later, the manager that 
Robinson had helped hire as a board member was killed in 
an electrical accident. Robinson agreed to take over the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
position. It was 1939, and he was twenty-four. He is 
still there today. No one in the nation, he says, has 
been a manager longer— forty-four years.
Robinson was born and raised in Jackson, Mississippi, 
and attended Millsaps College there before moving to 
Pointe Coupee Parish in the mid-Thirties. He moved on to
2,000 acres of family-owned property there ; most of it 
was shared out to about twenty-five tenant families. He 
had just been married, and one of his chief concerns was 
that he and his wife would have to contend with an unelec­
trified farm.
Robinson was on the co-op's first board of directors 
that met in June, 1938, in the town of Lettsworth on the 
Texas and Pacific Railroad line in northern Pointe Coupee 
Parish. The organizer was A. B. Curet, the county agent 
for the parish. He called together the most prominent 
local citizens, nine in all, and Robinson was one. Ap­
parently, the group saw some eagerness in this young man 
and elected him chairman at the first meeting. He then went 
on to become manager, an unusual move for a board member.
The first loan was for $124,000 for 125 miles of line.
Interview with A. A. Robinson, New Roads, Louisiana, 
September 11, 1980; Rural Louisiana, May, 1960, 9; ibid., 
November, 1959, 7.
Interview with Robinson, September 11, 1980 ; Rural 
Louisiana, May, 1960, 8.
Ibid.
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serving 504 consumers.
If there is any co-op in the state that has been 
dominated by one man, it is Pointe Coupee. Robinson has 
a dynamic, forceful personality that has, over the years, 
allowed him to govern not only Pointe Coupee but, to a 
great extent, both the statewide and the G&T program in 
Louisiana. He is considered a big thinker, unconcerned 
with details, strong-willed, and even a bit dictatorial.^^® 
Certainly without him, the statewide organization and the 
G&T program would never have gotten off the ground. In 
1959, he was elected to the presidency of the statewide, 
and that job led to the presidency of the G&T federation 
His terms in various offices have not been without con­
troversy, but his influence, over the years, has been 
substantial. Bubba Robinson has been Pointe Coupee, and, 
to a lesser extent, he has been one of the principal 
leaders in the Louisiana co-op movement.
Rural Louisiana, May, 1960, 8.
Interview with McVea, July 13, 1982; interview 
with Robbins, August 9, 1982.
Rural Louisiana, November, 1959, 7.
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Beauregard Electric Co-op 
DeRldder, Louisiana
Several co-ops in the state, over the last two 
decades, have been growing very fast, particularly Dixie 
Electric with a 213 percent rate of consumer growth since 
1960, and SLECA, with 204 p e r c e n t . B o t h  of these co-ops 
are growing for obvious reasons. Dixie is expanding with 
Baton Rouge, while SLECA is benefiting from the industry 
that has developed around the oil and gas fields near 
Houma. Beauregard Electric is the third fastest growing 
co-op in the state with a 164 percent rate of growth since 
1960.^^^ But at Beauregard, the reason for the growth is 
not as obvious. Of course, the area is growing. Beauregard 
Parish is the fourth fastest growing parish in the state, 
and Calcasieu Parish is also growing rapidly. The other 
parishes, though, in the Beauregard service area are grow­
ing more slowly, some are even losing p o p u l a t i o n . S o ,  
why are Beauregard and Calcasieu parishes growing so rapidly? 
The answer for Calcasieu is simple: Lake Charles is growing, 
and Beauregard serves the outskirts to the north of the 
city. This growth is rapid, particularly along U.S. High­
way 171 north of the Calcasieu River toward Gillis. But 
it is not so simple to analyze Beauregard Parish. With
REA, Annual Statistical Report, 78; ibid., 1980, 70.
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the exception of DeRldder and a few smaller towns, the 
parish is rural. DeRldder, in fact, is the only town over
5,000 in the parish. The answer might be Fort Polk, al­
though it is located to the north in Vernon Parish, but 
many of the fort's military and civilian personnel live in 
and around DeRldder, and, with its large payroll. Fort 
Polk certainly has an impact on the parish and the entire 
co-op service area. Also, the Vietnam War brought Fort 
Polk to life in the late sixties and early seventies, and 
that would help account for the area's growth statistics 
for the last two decades. Possibly as many as one million 
soldiers passed through the barracks at Fort Polk during 
that period. A second reason for the rapid growth in 
Beauregard Parish is the lumber industry. Boise-Southern 
has built one of the largest papermills in the country in 
Beauregard P a r i s h . I t  is, in fact, the largest such 
plant to have been constructed in one stage. And like any 
large industry, it has attracted support activity, has 
hired people, and has generally fed the local economy.
This activity has brought development to Beauregard and 
Calcasieu parishes, therefore, to Beauregard Electric.
But ironically, the co-op does not serve Lake Charles,
Fort Polk, or Boise-Southern, the three catalysts of the 
growth in the area.
Interview with Horace Wingate, DeRidder, Louisiana, 
September 30, 1983.
Ibid.
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The other parishes served by Beauregard Electric are 
parts of Vernon, Allen, Rapides, Evangeline, and Jeff 
Davis. All of the service area is generally agricultural, 
with emphasis on soybeans, timber, cattle, and rice, in 
that order. The topography ranges from low-lying and 
swampy in the south, to rolling hills in the north. In 
between lie the flat Louisiana prairie lands.
The Beauregard Electric Co-op was one of the last in 
the state to organize and get on line. The first meeting 
was held in the police jury room at the parish courthouse 
on First Street in DeRidder on March 8, 1939. But it was 
nearly a year and a half later that the area's first 
lights were turned on. The minutes do not reveal an 
organizer, the one person responsible for getting the 
thing started. But the present manager, Horace Wingate, 
who came to the program in 1946, speculates that it was 
Rugus Morris. Morris was a member of the police jury and 
a prominent local figure, and since the first meetings were 
held in the police jury room at the DeRidder Courthouse, 
he may have organized the program. But if he was the 
organizer, he was not the first board president. That 
distinction went to C. F. Hennigan.^^^
Beauregard Electric Co-op, "Minutes," March 8,
1939.
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At the second meeting, held in late November, Hennigan 
resigned his post, along with two other board members: J. E. 
Cockran, and L. C. Cole. Their reasons for leaving will 
disappoint those who perceive the nation's co-op movement 
to be an idealistic, unselfish endeavor led by those with 
a will to help others. They left because the first lines 
would not connect their h o u s e s . P o s s i b l y  the program 
at Beauregard developed those idealistic standards without 
them.
The first manager at Beauregard was R. I. Davis, an 
instructor in electronics at Northwestern State College in 
Natchitoches. He left that post to pioneer the program 
at Beauregard in 1940. His connection to the new co-op 
was his cousin, W. D. West, who had succeeded Hannigan as 
president of the board. Wingate began at Beauregard under 
Davis and recalls that he was a "strongheaded, hardheaded 
builder, with a knack to put things together." But in 
October, 1941, Davis decided that the project would never 
get off the ground; he felt he would be better off back 
teaching in Natchitoches, so he quit--but his influence 
was far from ended at B e a u r e g a r d . T h e  second manager 
was R. B. Miller. The by-laws required three nominations
Ibid., November 21, 1939.
Interview with Wingate, Se,
Beauregard Electric Co-op, "Minutes," October 21, 1941.
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for manager's position, so the secretary entered three 
choices into the minutes :
1. R. B. Miller
2. R. B. Miller
3. R. B. Miller
He got the job.^^^ Nine months later, the program had
apparently turned around. According to Wingate, West 
worked hard and long to make the program work. He paid 
many five dollar fees from his own pocket, and even super­
vised construction. In July, he called his cousin to 
come back; the program would work.
On July 3, 1942, Davis returned. He quibbled with 
the board a bit over his salary, but it is clear in the 
minutes that they were delighted to have him back. He 
stayed on until 1955.^^^ According to Wingate, it is 
Davis who deserves the credit for putting Beauregard 
Electric together.
The first lines were built south along U.S. Highway 
171 toward Lake Charles. The first loan was for $106,000 
to serve some 432 Louisianians. A line was also built to 
the Methodist Church in Sugartown, where the first meter
1941.
Interview with Wingate, September 30, 1973. 
Beauregard Electric Co-op. "Minutes," July 3,
1942.
Interview with Wingate, September 30, 1983.
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was installed. The church's bill for the first year was 
eighteen dollars. The co-op received its electricity 
from the old Longbell Lumber mill in DeRidder until about 
1948 when expansion required more power than the mill 
could provide, Beauregard then connected to the Crosby 
Chemical Company, and for several years received power 
from both companies. It was not until the early Fifties 
that they began buying power from the state's investor- 
owned companies, principally LP&L.^^^
Wingate worked his way up the ladder at Beauregard,
He came in 1946, Before that, he managed German prisoners- 
of-war at Fort Polk, where he supervised some electrical 
work. He began at Beauregard as a clerk, then became 
line supervisor, then purchasing agent, and finally assist­
ant manager, Davis left in 1955, and was succeeded by 
John Sim, Sim remained on for ten years, followed by 
Wingate in 1966,^®^
Today, the co-op has grown to be the fourth largest 
in the state, with the third most rapid rate of growth,
Beauregard Electric Co-op, "Minutes," January 9, 
1940; interview with Wingate, September 30, 1983,
Interview with Wingate, September 30, 1983; inter­
view with Almond Cole, DeRidder, Louisiana, September 30, 
1983,
Interview with Wingate, September 30, 1983,
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To those outside that part of the state, the Beauregard 
Electric service area may not appear to be the state's 
most dynamic economic sector, but it is growing rapidly and 
for several reasons may sustain future growth.
Dixie Electric Co-op 
Greenwell Springs, Louisiana
Rapid growth has characterized several Louisiana co­
ops, but no co-op in Louisiana is growing as rapidly as 
Dixie Electric. In 1960, Dixie served 12,552 consumers.
By 1980, it had grown to serve nearly 40,000--a growth of 
nearly 220 percent. Several co-ops come in close behind, 
such as SLECA with just over 204 percent and Beauregard 
with 164 p e r c e n t , D i x i e ' s  rapid growth is, of course, 
due to the growth of the area it serves : East Baton Rouge 
Parish, East and West Feliciana, Livingston, St. Helena, 
and Ascension Parishes. Of those parishes, Livingston is 
the fastest growing, and the second fastest growing in 
the state, with a growth rate of 38.6 percent since 1970.^^^ 
Livingston Parish is receiving the brunt of the Baton 
Rouge overflow and suburban rush, as Baton Rouge grows 
eastward along Interstate Twelve toward such rapidly grow­
ing towns as Denham Springs, Walker and Livingston. At 
the same time. Baton Rouge is also spreading southward.
188 UNO, 1981 Statistical Abstract, 4-5.
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into Ascension Parish, also a rapidly growing parish with 
a population increase of over twenty-one percent since 
1 9 7 0 . Much of this growth can be attributed to popula­
tion movements along Interstate 10, toward Gonzales. All 
of this is not to exclude the growth of East Baton Rouge 
Parish itself. Although the population there has begun 
to level off in the last decade (and, in fact, is moving 
outside the parish borders to the east and south), East 
Baton Rouge Parish was, in the two post-war decades, the 
fastest growing parish in the state, by far. The 
other parishes in Dixie's service area, those to the north 
of Baton Rouge, are losing population--possibly to the 
three rapidly growing parishes to the s o u t h . I t  may 
seem that these no-growth areas distort Dixie's growth 
statistics by dragging down the statistics of the rapidly 
growing areas, but it is parishes of this type that co-ops 
like Dixie exist to serve. If it were not for Dixie, areas 
such as St. Helena, East Feliciana, and West Feliciana 
might not have lights today, or at least they would have 
received them later than they did. At the same time, it 
is the rapidly growing areas of East Baton Rouge, Livingston 
and Ascension parishes, with their high density and rural
UNO, 1981 Statistical Abstract, 4-5. 
Calhoun, Louisiana Almanac, 125.
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industrial loads, that allow Dixie to serve the three 
northern parishes in its service area,
Dixie's beginning was not much different from the 
beginnings of the other co-ops. It did most of the same 
things at about the same time. Irving Heath was the 
county agent for East Baton Rouge Parish in 1938. He 
contacted three wealthy area farmers on the East Baton 
Rouge Parish Police Jury: Willie Wicher, Philander Smith, 
and Frank Milican. They agreed to organize a co-op if the 
area showed an interest. These three men called a meeting 
at Central High School in Baton Rouge: 350 attended.
Several weeks later, they all met there again. More 
interested people showed up, and many came ready to pay 
their $5.00 membership fee. From that, the first meet­
ing of the "incorporators and directors" was at the law 
office of Fred G. Benton at the Louisiana National Bank 
building in Baton Rouge on August 9, 1938. Philander 
Smith chaired the first meeting, and Leander Hopper took 
the minutes. Other "incorporators" that attended were 
Mrs. Joe W. Annison, S. S. Lipscomb, Mrs. James E. Robinson, 
and Milican and Wicker. These members were to go out among 
the people in their areas and solicit the $5.00 membership 
fee.^^^ Over the winter, the group apparently was success­
ful. They met again on March 13, 1939 and pooled their
Rural Louisiana, November, 1967.
Dixie Electric Co-op, "Minutes," August 9, 1938.
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collection of $2,500. Although it had been nine months 
after their first meeting, they had apparently met un­
officially within that time (or possibly minutes had not 
been kept for intervening meetings), because they had by 
then made their first loan application and decided where 
the lines would be built. The first loan was for $309,000 
at a 2.73 percent interest rate to build 362 miles of line 
in East Baton Rouge, Livingston, and West Feliciana par­
ishes . It was board member Willie Wicker who took a 
train to Washington to see REA Administrator John Carmody 
about the loan. The meeting was arranged by the young 
Louisiana Congressman, Jimmy M o r r i s o n . A l s o  at this 
March meeting, Emanuel Morgan was named the first manager. 
Morgan, like his counterparts at many of the other co-ops, 
was not an engineer, but rather a contractor whose job 
was to build the system and get it on line as quickly as 
possible. Just two months later, the Dixie board, deciding 
it needed an engineer rather than simply a contractor, 
abruptly fired Morgan and hired Lynn Cook. Ten days later 
they accepted bids for the project and construction began.
But just two months later. Cook resigned, and was 
replaced by his chief engineer, E. B. Kasiske.^^^ In just
Dixie Electric Co-op, "Minutes," March 13, 1939; 
ibid., June 9, 1939.
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three months, he r e s i g n e d , a n d  was replaced by Ellis B, 
T h o m p s o n . T h i s  is an example of what became Dixie's 
most distinctive characteristic: a high turnover of managers. 
Over the years, Dixie has had as many as ten managers. 
Compared to some co-ops such as Teche, Jeff Davis, SLEMCO, 
and Washington-St. Tammany that have had only one or two 
managers in some forty-five years, it is obvious that there 
is something different about Dixie. The minutes reveal a 
very powerful board of directors. It is a group that has 
been in control from the beginning, has hired all employees, 
and has made all the decisions. Ths is a characteristic 
of Dixie to this day. Today, the President of the Board, 
Scott McVea, feels that managers are generally not reliable, 
that "there's more stability on the board than there is in 
the manager. They move for one reason or another, or 
they're forced to leave. . . . But the managers [are] not 
as good as the members of the b o a r d . M c V e a  has observed 
as many as eight of those ten managers of the last forty 
years, and his statement is an obvious reaction to that 
high turnover.
Finally, about one month after Thompson was hired as 
the fourth manager at Dixie, the first lines were energized
199
Interview with McVea, July 13, 1982.
Ibid.
200
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on December 20, 1939. 
other co-ops around the state, the lights were on for 
those rural residents by Christmas.
There have been two real leaders at Dixie over the 
years; McVea has been one. He came to Dixie in 1942 as a 
board member, and has been there ever since, serving as 
Vice President, then as President, and also as one of the 
principal leaders at the statewide organization and in the 
G&T program. McVea does not fit the mold of many of the 
state's other board members. He does not have a farming 
background; in fact, he does not even have a rural back­
ground. When McVea came to the Dixie board in 1942, he 
was a school teacher and coach at Zachary High School.
From there he went on to Baton Rouge High School, and then 
to Istrouma High School before quitting— to become a 
farmer. But, ironically for a leader in a rural program, 
he decided that farming was not his calling, and he returned 
to school for a masters degree in 1949. He then went back 
to teach at Zachary, and retired from there as principal.
He was elected President of the Board at Dixie in 1957 and 
continues to serve in that position today.
The other important figure in Dixie's history has been 
J. E. McAdam. He came to Dixie in 1947, and was the
Rural Louisiana, May, 1960, 8. 
Interview with McVea, July 13, 1982.
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exception to Dixie's manager turnover problems; he remained 
at his position for twenty years. He was also an exception 
in that he was apparently at least as powerful as his board 
members. He had a reputation for being difficult to get 
along with, hardheaded, and independent. At the same 
time, he brought Dixie through its greatest growth period, 
and it might be said, built the Dixie that is Dixie today. 
To most co-op leaders he is best remembered for several 
times pulling out of the newspaper, by not allowing the 
statewide organization to send the paper to his co-op 
members. His usual reason was that he disagreed with the 
content. Finally, in 1967, he butted heads with his board 
and was fired.
Today, Dixie is managed by Bob Harbor. He is new at 
the job, and might prove to be one of the first of a new 
generation of younger men and women in the Louisiana co-op 
system. He was preceded by C. J. Watson, and then by Paul 
Wood, who came to Dixie in 1977. Wood has gone on to the 
manager's position at the statewide organization. He was 
preceded by Harold Sicard, who followed McAdam.
Dixie has recently moved to new headquarters near 
Greenwell Springs, Louisiana, just east of Baton Rouge.
view with Robbins, August 9, 1982.
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The first Dixie office was on North Street in Baton Rouge. 
From there they moved to Airline Highway, remaining until
1 Q Q O  206
The importance of the individual co-ops cannot be 
understated. It was there, on the local level, that the 
movement began in Louisiana. No amount of federal legisla­
tion, or even federal money could have gotten these local 
programs off the ground; it took local organizers, local 
leaders, and local interests. In these thirteen little 
histories of the state's co-ops, there are a lot of names, 
and each of them is important in relation to the beginning, 
growth, and development of the co-ops. Of course, most of 
the co-ops' recent political activity in Louisiana has 
centered around the statewide association, but the local 
groups started it all. The statewide organization is the 
creation of the local groups and would not have come into 
existence without them. They were the ones who organized 
the program and made it work, and it is the local groups 
today that are still the heart of the whole system.
Rural Louisiana, June, 1973, 16.
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BEGINNINGS OF THE STATEWIDE ASSOCIATION; 
INCEPTION TO 1960
The statewide organization, the Association of 
Louisiana Electric Cooperatives, had its birth on October 
28, 1941.  ̂ That official name, though, was not adopted 
until 1960. Until then, it was known simply as the manag­
er's association, or the statewide association. It began 
as a meeting of the minds of the state's managers, and 
would remain that until 1950 when the board presidents 
were invited to a.ttend. There were many reasons to meet. 
All the managers dealt with many of the same problems at 
their local co-ops, and a coordination of thought and 
effort would make those problems easier to solve. But the 
first objective was to obtain copper. The private utili­
ties, the managers felt, were getting more than their fair 
share of the precious metal, and the managers hoped to 
unite and lobby for what they considered their quota of 
copper not being used in the war effort.^
Acquisition of copper was the association's immediate
 ̂Manager's Association, "Minutes," October 28, 1941. 
 ̂Ibid., October 28, 1941.
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purpose, though lobbying soon became more Important, In 
their organizational statement, after copper, the members 
wrote that it was "necessary to maintain normal growth to 
all REA's throughout Louisiana and generally by representa­
tion with our Senators and Representatives in Washington 
and to obtain such benefits and advantages that are our 
just dues. That statement, although probably never read 
again, was the beginning of a lobbying campaign that would 
attain full stride in the mid-Sixties and never slow down.
The first president and organizer of the association 
was Robert Holladay, manager at Northeast in Winnsboro.
The monthly meetings were first held at various co-op of­
fices around the state, but the group finally settled down 
in a two-room office in Opelousas in 1 9 5 3 The presidency, 
over the years, passed from one manager to the next in a 
kind of rotation that kept everyone involved.
The first lobbyist was Mike Scanlon from SLEMCO. In 
1946, he lobbied to keep the Louisiana co-ops from being 
regulated by the state's Public Service Commission. He 
was successful; the bill was defeated.^ This, the 
group's first attempt at persuading legislators, was their 
first success. There were many fights ahead, but few would
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
be as hard fought as PSC regulation. The first shots were 
fired in 1946. A similar fight continues today.
On the floor of the legislature, it was Willie Rainach 
who did the co-op's bidding in the early years. Rainach 
was one of the organizers of Claiborne Electric and later 
a candidate for governor. In 1940, he worked to keep the 
co-op's lines tax exempt, and later he led the fight on 
the Senate floor to keep the co-ops from under the regula­
tory thumb of the PSC.^
Lobbying was important, but for the first five years 
of the organization's life, the members more often than 
not simply collaborated on mutual needs. They discussed 
a group purchase of trucks ; they set up a training center 
for employees; they generally discussed common problems, 
common interests, and common situations. "We'd meet and 
carry on statewide business," Shubal Robbins remembers,
"and exchange ideas [on] statewide publicity and an adver­
tising program. We'd discuss technical things, improve­
ments in lines, and that sort. . . .
But in 1946, the direction of the organization changed.
Ibid. Included in the "Minutes" for this month is 
a handwritten appreciation to Rainach for aiding in the 
passage of Act 376 of 1940 which excempted co-op lines from 
taxation, and "For advice and labors in securing the defeat 
of legislation . . . designed to place electric cooperatives 
under the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission."
August 9, 1982.
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In that year, the members decided to generate their own 
electricity. It was concluded at the November 15th meeting 
"that this organization apply to REA for a loan for the 
purpose of erecting a generating and transmission system 
[for] the purpose of getting a definite source of power 
for the cooperatives in L o u i s i a n a . T h e  group aspired, 
for the first time, to be sellers of electricity instead 
of buyers. The reason was the cost of wholesale power-- 
what the utilities were threatening to charge the co-ops 
for power. It is difficult to verify a proposed rate in­
crease, but those who were there recall that the private 
utilities wanted an increase of approximately two-thirds, 
from an 8.8 rate to about 14.5 mills per kilowatt hour.̂  
The plans progressed. In 1947, a fund was set up to
Manager's Association, "Minutes," November 15, 1946.
1969, 2. These are general histories of the early G&T 
proposals. See also, "Statement of J. S. Robbins before 
the Joint Committees of Interior and Insular Affairs and 
Public Works Committee," undated, unpublished copy in ALEC 
files. Baton Rouge. Robbins states here that the price was 
8.25 mills. "Statement of Charles Roemer Before Bureau of 
Reclamation and Interior Power Marketing Agencies Subcom­
mittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee," (undated, 
unpublished copy in ALEC files. Baton Rouge), 5. Roemer, 
here, states 9.0 mills. Also, interview with Robbins, 
August 9, 1982; interview with U. J. Gajan, Lafayette, 
Louisiana, November 16, 1981.
Manager's Association, "Minutes," January 15-16,
1947.
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the Kiljian Corporation of Philadelphia was retained as 
engineers, and in 1949, a plan was made to build a plant 
in Beauregard Parish.^^
At the same time these plans were being drawn, the 
managers were trying to buy power from the Southwest Power 
Authority, a Department of the Interior division that 
builds dams and generates hydro-electric power in the 
Southwest much as TVA does in the Tennessee Valley. The 
Louisiana co-ops hoped to purchase this power through a 
super-cooperative known as Tex-La. This group was made 
up of several cooperatives throughout Louisiana, Texas, 
and Arkansas whose sole purpose was to buy blocks of power 
from SPA dams at a lower price than could be offered by 
the private utilities. This power would then be wheeled 
(moved for a charge) over private utility transmission 
lines (the small co-ops had only distribution lines) to 
the co-ops and small municipal systems in the state.
The Louisiana co-ops seemed to be moving into the 
world of self-sufficiency. A G&T plant was on the drawing 
board, and a connection was about to be made to cheap 
hydro-power. But these plans were all scrapped. In 1951, 
the cost of power from the utilities dropped to 5.5 mills. 
By 1955, the average co-op in the state was paying only
11 Ibid., June 24, 1948; ibid., January 11-14, 1949.
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proposed rate was amazing. If the co-ops were bluffing, 
the bluff worked. They got what they wanted: cheap power, 
which, in the late Forties and early Fifties, was all 
they wanted. Later, when a second plan for a G&T was 
drawn up, the objective would be somewhat different.
But for the moment, the objective was achieved.
Each time the companies raise rates, there is a lot 
of fingerpointing by the co-op officials, accusing the 
companies of trying to put the co-ops out of business.
Of course, the higher the cost of fuel to the co-op, the 
higher the cost of electricity to the consumer. High 
utility bills make for a rebellious membership, one that 
might even vote to sell out the entire co-op system to 
the private utilities in exchange for promised lower rates. 
Co-op leaders have always claimed that this scheme was the
tical Report, 1955 (Washington, USGPO, 1955), 74-76. Here­
after cited as ASR. See also. Rural Louisiana, February, 
1963, 2; ibid., February, 1962, 2.
Examples of such claims are: Rural Louisiana,
March, 1963, 11. "In recent years the companies have 
arbitrarily increased wholesale power rates to the co-ops 
. . . designed to put the co-ops out of business. Manager's 
Association, "Minutes," October 5, 1954. "Mr. Holladay ad­
vised that the power companies are step-by-step, one way or 
another, increasing power costs to the cooperatives." This 
fear was not limited to the early years. In 1973, Gene 
Taylor, manager at Concordia Electric, feared that LP&L 
might try to take over his co-op. As late as 1976, Mark 
Bonner, the manager of the statewide, spoke before that
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this proposed rate increase of over sixty percent was cer­
tainly excessive in a period of lowering fuel costs and 
increased revenues in the post-war expansion years. The 
threat of a G&T (the possibility of losing their biggest 
customers) seemed to have forced the utilities to drop 
their prices drastically. The 1954 rate decrease to be­
tween 4.5 and 5.0 mills is essentially the same rate at 
which the co-ops could have bought power from SPA had that 
hookup been p u r s u e d . A l s o ,  the percent of income used 
to buy electricity dropped from thirty-seven in 1947 to 
twenty-three in 1953.^^ So, with usage up, there had ap­
parently not been a need for any price increase, and cer­
tainly not one as drastic as sixty percent. Also at about 
this time, the utilities made at least one attempt to buy 
out a co-op at Houma, The attempt was blatant and outright 
to the point of the utilities' drawing up contracts and
group : "The ultimate goal of Middle South Utilities [the 
holding company for CLECO and LP&L] is to take every bit 
of electric utility service in Louisiana . . . with the 
possible exception of GSU."
Rural Louisiana, February, 1963, 2; ibid., April, 
1956; Manager's Association, "Minutes," January 8, 1952; 
ibid., October 25, 1951.
February 14, 1983.
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Probably the best reason the utilities had to try to 
acquire the co-ops (if in fact they were) was that the 
co-ops were becoming prosperous. Post-war rural growth 
was certainly far beyond anything the utilities must have 
imagined. Between 1945 and 1950, Louisiana co-ops con­
nected over 55,000 consumers, and by 1950, they had re­
corded a margin of profit of nearly $600,000.^^ The private 
utilities had been shortsighted in the Thirties and Forties. 
Rural electrification had quickly become lucrative. Possi­
bly the utilities hoped to make up for their shortsighted­
ness by making life so difficult for the co-ops that they 
would sell out. Whether or not the utilities were trying 
to take over the co-ops is unclear ; what is clear, though, 
is that the co-op leaders thought they were and reacted 
accordingly, and that is the important point to be made 
here.
By 1950, the thirteen co-ops had successfully fended 
off a crippling price hike by standing together against 
the investor-owned utilities. It was a lesson that had 
been learned well and would not be forgotten : united they 
could stand, individually they could not. But they also 
learned that the investor-owned utilities were the enemy, 
that they were under their thumb, that a severe price hike, 
justified or not, could force the members to sell out their 
co-ops in order to bring prices down. The private companies
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had a monopoly on power, and the only way the thirteen 
co-ops could force them to withdraw was to threaten the 
monopoly with self-generation, a situation that, in 1950, 
would have cost the private utilities over eighty-six 
million kilowatt hours in purchased power, nearly $700,000 
in revenue, a loss they were not willing to sustain.
Victory had been sweet, lessons had been learned, but 
the results were not all good. The two groups squared off 
into the armed camps preparing for a battle that would 
eventually come. The utility-as-enemy attitude would re­
main with these young leaders for many years, making future 
compromises with the investor-owned utilities almost 
impossible.
Meanwhile, the manager's group settled down to lobby 
for its cause in the state legislature, and promoting the 
Louisiana electric co-ops. For eight years, 1950 to 1958, 
their world was calm. The price they paid for electricity 
was low, allowing most co-ops in the state to progressively 
lower prices to their members, and prosper. They were the 
men in the white hats, one Gulf States Utilities official 
r e c a l l s . I t  was a period of quiet growth and prosperity.
The main endeavor of the statewide organization in 
this period was to begin publication of the statewide
1983.
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newspaper, REA News. The editor was Wayne Martin, and the 
first issue went out on March 20, 1950. The feature article 
was the first article of its kind defining the paper's 
purpose. Articles like it would appear over and over again; 
"Just What is an REA Co-op?" Other stories in the first 
issue included one on E. E. Taylor, manager at Concordia 
Electric, who made use of "up to date radio equipment" to 
keep in contact with his trucks during a flood; and one on 
most of the state leaders making a trip to the annual NRECA 
meeting in Chicago. There was a cartoon of a smiling Uncle 
Sam lending money with one hand from the U.S. Treasury to 
a grateful REA borrower while gratefully receiving a loan 
payment from another REA borrower with the other. The 
message: "REA loans are not 'grants.'" There was a report 
from the statewide president. Several co-op members were 
praised for their good works. And there was a "Woman's 
Page" in which the editor's wife, Alice Martin, assembled 
such "womanly" things as dress patterns, recipes for hot 
bean salad, and one article that might have been a sign of 
the times to come, entitled, "No Second Fiddle," in which 
was stated that farm women were tired of playing second 
fiddle to farm animals. The message, of course, was that 
if the farms had electricity the farm wife's role might be 
raised to a point somewhere above that of cattle,
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After only about two years as editor, Wayne Martin 
left the group under strained circumstances. In his 
resignation speech, he spoke of the immediate cause; "For 
a period of several months, I have felt the affairs of the 
state association and Louisiana REA News were being hindered 
through my services. Several attempts have been made--and 
they have failed--to solve the major personal differences 
between me and one Co-op manager. For that reason, and 
that reason only, I would like to resign.
Whatever personal conflict drove Martin out of the 
association, there were other reasons, as well, for his 
resignation. Martin's position was not only designated as 
"editor," but also as "manager," manager of the statewide 
organization. This, he apparently felt, put him above the 
local managers, or at least he aspired to such powers.
Martin had come from Arkansas where the statewide associa­
tion was strong, where the statewide manager often delegated 
authority down to the managers. According to Martin's suc­
cessor, Mark Bonner, Martin wanted "to sell the concept 
somewhat like they had [in Arkansas] where you would have 
a state association manager who would initiate things and 
that didn't go over well with the old managers. They were 
all kings of the mountain and they could just see somebody
Manager's Association, "Minutes," October 17, 1952.
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When Martin stepped out, Bonner stepped in. But Bonner 
wisely stepped lightly where the position of manager was 
concerned, immersing himself instead in the publication of 
the paper to the point of near exhaustion.Later, when 
politics, propaganda, and public relations became key factors 
in the association's growth, Bonner would become a powerful 
figure in the organization.
Bonner came to REA News from the Franklin Sun where 
he had worked as associate editor from 1948 to 1952. During 
that time, the Sun had become Louisiana's top award-winning 
news p a p e r , B o n n e r  himself had gained some notariety for 
a 1950 editorial in which he supported the right of blacks 
to serve on Louisiana juries. But the editor of the Sun, 
despite his award-winning ways, had allowed the paper to 
fall apart under the weight of his drinking problem. Facing 
a bleak future, Bonner decided to run for clerk of court in 
Franklin Parish. When he lost the bid by thirty-two votes, 
he suddenly found himself out of work unable to support 
his wife and child. His sister, Fannie Bonner, was employed 
as Bob Holladay's secretary at Northeast in Winnsboro, and
Interview with Mark Bonner, Baton Rouge, August 29,
1980.
24
Rural Louisiana, June, 1977, 4.
Ibid.
25
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through that connection he was hired as associate editor 
under Martin for the two months prior to Martin's resigna­
tion in October, 1953. He then moved into Martin's 
position.
Over the years, the title of that position has changed 
drastically. Bonner was hired as editor, instead of 
manager. Obviously, the members of the association did not 
want to make the mistake with Bonner that they had with 
Martin by giving him a title equal to theirs. In 1959, his 
title was changed to Director of Public Information, then 
to Executive Secretary to the Board, and in 1965, to 
General Manager, and finally to Vice-President and General 
Manager in 1977.^^ Bonner insists that these outlandish 
title changes occurred because of a recognized need by the 
board to bestow a title that would put him on an equal foot­
ing with the private utility lobbyists in Baton Rouge and 
W a s h i n g t o n . H e  often states the policies and clout of 
the statewide association to important people throughout 
the country, having taken the cause of Louisiana's co-ops 
to everyone from John McKeithen to Hubert Humphrey. It was 
necessary that his title reflect his importance.
Interview with Mark Bonner, August 29, 1980; inter­
view with Fannie Bonner, Winnsboro, March 28, 1983; Rural 
Louisiana, June, 1977, 4.
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The title changes also show Bonner's growing power 
within the organization. By the 1970s, Bonner led what 
Edwin Edwards called one of the strongest special interest 
groups in the s t a t e , I t  is difficult to overemphasize 
his role in the growth and development of the statewide 
organization. In the early years, each manager was the 
king of his own little kingdom, and the relinquishment of 
any power was anathema to them all. One manager has said 
it was like thirteen prima donnas trying to get into one 
buggy— they all wanted to sit in the front s e a t B u t  
when it came to such unfamiliar things as lobbying, public 
information, politics, negotiations, these engineer-types 
found themselves at a loss. And over the years, as these 
functions became more and more a part of the everyday life 
of the statewide association, even important to the very 
survival of the distribution co-ops themselves, Bonner's 
position and power grew in importance, and so did his title.
Bonner furthered the cause of Louisiana's electric 
co-ops in many ways over the years, but his greatest legacy 
will be his articles in the statewide publication. Through­
out much of the newspaper's thirty-year existence, Bonner 
has written nearly everything appearing in it. He has even 
taken most of the photographs. Today there are photographers,
Interview with Edwin Edwards, Baton Rouge, June 3,
1982.
Interview with A. A. Robinson, Baton Rouge, May 19,
1982.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
assistants, and associates, but in the Fifties and Sixties, 
it was nearly a one-man s h o w . H i s  editorial, "Mark My 
Word," later changed to "One Small Voice," has been a 
monthly tirade on everything from the evils of desegration 
in the Fifties and Sixties, to longhairs and drugs in the 
Sixties and Seventies. His editorials reached every co-op 
member in the state, and his influence touched every corner 
of society and politics. His themes have always emphasized 
conservatism, the sanctity of the family, religion, and 
patriotism. His writing, simple, appealing, and often 
emotional, is aimed at the rural South. He has always felt 
a need to attack viciously wild-eyed liberals, give-away 
politicians and their programs, socialists, and communists, 
probably because his critics have always tried to associate 
him, and REA in general, with those sorts. He is the per­
fect example of that American enigma, the southern conserva­
tive Democrat. Like this type of southerner, he had the 
foresight to see the necessity of government assistance, 
but only as far as those being helped can begin to help 
themselves. To him, a.handout is as disgusting as it is 
debilitating: "You don't help people by giving them things.
I guess you just about defeat your p u r p o s e . T h i s  theme, 
often used by Bonner, is, of course, directed at those who
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would accuse REA of being a government give-away program. 
David Hamil, the Republican REA Administrator under 
Eisenhower, and then again under Nixon, visited Louisiana 
for the first time in 1959. He listened to a few speeches, 
talked to a few of the state's co-op leaders. Bonner, as 
he tells it, was finally approached by Hamil: "I'm puzzled,' 
he said to Bonner. "You damn people are more Republican 
than I am. You just don't know it. So, Bonner, a 
southern Democrat who is more conservative than many north­
ern Republicans, must defend himself against those who 
would call him a socialist.
Bonner's early life prepared him for a life as a 
writer, crusader, and idealist. It may also have given 
him the unique ability to view both halves of society. He 
had the all too common experience of seeing his father go 
from wealth to destitution in the Depression. "I grew up 
in one of the nicest homes in that part of the country, 
but we lost everything in the Depression. We were in a 
situation where we went from the top of a little society 
right down to the bottom, right down with the blacks and 
everything else."^^
In 1971, and again in 1977, Bonner wrote the story of 
"A Symbolic Boy," who he later identified as himself. The
Ibid., Baton Rouge, July 29, 1982; interview with 
David Hamil, Sterling, Colorado, May 31, 1983.
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following is an excerpt:
Stark poverty— the kind that warps bodies and 
minds --s talked the cotton fields, towns and 
villages of the South in 1933.
Here in the South, long a victim of a feudal 
cotton economy and oppressive policies, few 
families were fortunate enough to eat well.
Still, less ate a balanced diet, witnessed by 
the boils and constant sores on the mouths of 
children--bloated stomachs, bowed legs and 
rotten teeth.
Symbolic of millions of youngsters, a barefoot 
boy, sporting a belly blown up with pinto beans 
and sour milk, followed an old mule up and down 
the endless cotton rows. He was now the son of 
a sharecropper.
The family farm, a pride and joy since early 
American history, had been lost the year before 
in the early gulps of the Great Depression. His 
family now lived in a shack among the lowest of 
the low--Southern sharecroppers.
One day, the lad left the poor mule standing in 
the middle of the field to pursue the American 
dream. He hitch-hiked to college, got a job, 
numerous jobs--cleaning toilets, dug ditches, 
waited on tables.
Then, he marched off to war for four long years 
to protect the American dream for all mankind.
He and the millions of his kind, proud, patriotic, 
burned no flag, did not demonstrate against the 
draft, or run off to Canada. They did not drown 
their senses with pot or LSD.
They came home determined to build a world for 
their children. These poverty-reared youngsters, 
from Maine to California, to Louisiana did build 
a new society through law and order— through due 
process in the American tradition.
The lad from behind the mule and his millions of 
cohorts in poverty and depression created the 
most affluent society the world has ever known.
The article goes on, some 1600 words, to tell that
these once poverty-stricken youths created a society that
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did its job too well, making life too easy.
The crime, rebellion, dope, and disorder threaten­
ing our American heritage— the American dream-- 
came not from poverty.
They are the bitter fruits of an easy life.
We failed to create a better world. We have og
given too much and demanded too little in return.
Bonner graduated from LSU in 1938, and then entered 
law school there, but with only one semester remaining to 
graduation he answered a call to arms and entered the Army
Air Corps in 1941. He was immediately packed off to India
(the military thoughtfully supplied him with winter gear), 
where he seemed to have been more involved in adventures 
such as mountain climbing and tiger hunting than furthering 
the war effort. After the war, he returned to his hometown 
of Franklin where he landed his first job with the Sun.
In 1982, Bonner received the prestigious Clyde T.
Ellis Award from the members of NRECA "in recognition of 
outstanding accomplishment and service to electric coopera­
tives and for increasing their i m p o r t a n c e I t  is a 
fitting conclusion to an extraordinary career.
Rural Louisiana, July, 1977, 2.
Interview with Mark Bonner, August 29, 1980; inter­
view with Fannie Bonner, March 28, 1983; interview with 
Edgar Chaney, Jeanrette, Louisiana, July 28, 1982; Rural 
Louisiana, June, 1977, 4.
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 
People— Their Power; The Rural Electric Fact Book (n.p. 
Washington, 1980), 107; Rural Louisiana, March, 1982, 9.
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But Bonner was still at the beginning of his career 
in the late Fifties when the history of the co-op system 
in Louisiana began to change, when the companies again 
would try to hike prices. But this time, the co-ops would 
do more than threaten to build a generation and transmission 
system. This time, the cause would be something other than 
low prices. The thirteen co-ops would this time break away 
for the sole purpose of independence.
The first rumblings of what the future held came in 
1954 when Gulf States Utilities modified its rates to in­
clude a fuel adjustment provision.This, of course, tied 
the rate base to the price of natural gas purchased by GSU. 
In October of that year, Holladay expressed his fear of what 
could come: "The power companies are step-by-step, one way 
or another, increasing power costs to the cooperatives by 
adding power factor clauses, fuel cost clauses and any 
other means whereby they may increase rates.
The fuel adjustment was apparently no cause for im­
mediate alarm because the cost of power increased only
Norman M. Clapp, "Information Relating to the 'A' 
Loan Application of Louisiana Electric Cooperative, Inc. 
of New Roads, Louisiana," September 12, 1964 (unpublished 
copy, ALEC Files, Baton Rouge). This is a report from 
Clapp (REA Administrator under Lyndon Johnson) to Carl 
Hayden, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, providing in­
formation concerning the loan. Hereafter cited as "Informa­
tion Relating to the A Loan."
40 Manager's Association, "Minutes," October 5, 1954.
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slightly in the following years, but it was reason enough, 
in the minds of the statewide members, to reform the G&T 
c o m m i t t e e . I t  was not high prices but the anticipation 
of high prices that again set the co-op leaders to thinking 
about the G&T,
Between 1957 and 1959, GSU fired the first shots of 
the new war by demanding a dual rate. There would now be 
two charges for wholesale power, one for residential use, 
and one for industrial. The residential base rate would 
be an exorbitant nine mills, and the industrial rate was 
in the vicinity of eight m i l l s . T h i s  would, of course, 
cause rates to skyrocket for the individual consumer on 
the co-op lines, but, more importantly, it practically put 
the co-ops out of business when it came to serving industrial 
loads. GSU, with lower prices than the co-ops, could now 
move into the fast-growing, industrial, rural areas of 
south Louisiana and serve the new plants there without any 
competition from the co-ops. Several co-ops, such as Jeff 
Davis and SLECA, needed those industrial loads to keep
Bonner reported in 1969 that the dual rate demand 
was made in 1957. Rural Louisiana, February, 1969, 2. 
Norman Clapp, in his report to Carl Hayden, stated that the 
dual rate was demanded in either 1958 or 1959. Clapp, 
"Information Relating to the A Loan," In a letter to Allen 
Ellender, January 5, 1963, the co-op leaders cited the dual 
rate as 1958. Robinson, McVea, et al. to Allen Ellender, 
January 5, 1963, Ellender Papers, Box 268-D Allen Ellender 
Library, Nichols State University, Thibodaux, Louisiana.
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them financially above water. GSU's dual rate proposal 
could hurt them terribly, and they might even sink.^^
GSU, though, argued that they could not allow the co-ops 
to undercut their industrial prices with GSU electricity-- 
electricity they had generated. They also saw the co-ops 
as essentially a rural farm supplier, and felt that when­
ever the co-ops wandered into the industrial or urban 
market, they had stepped beyond their intended purpose 
and into competition with the private utilities.
In 1956, LP&L entered into a new ten-year contract 
with the co-ops that contained satisfactory terms, but, in 
1958 they called a meeting of co-op leaders at the LP&L 
offices and introduced a new higher rate schedule for 1959 
similar to the GSU rate increase based on estimated fuel
cularly true of SLECA, with industrial revenues of 42% of 
total revenues in 1957. Jeff Davis' was at 32%. ASR, 1957, 
74-76.
Such arguments are made in several private utility 
publications. See particularly. Gulf States Utilities, "The 
Changing REA Picture," undated [1958?], ALEC files. Baton 
Rouge. This pamphlet states that co-ops "are seeking to 
get state legislation that will permit them to serve customers 
inside the corporate limits of town. . . . "  In probably the 
most famous anti-REA publication, "The Deviation of REA," 
the author, Edward Vennard, states the private utility argu­
ment on this point: "no one imagined that cooperatives would 
buy electricity at a special discount and then try to sell 
it, at prices less than the companies' standard prices, to 
aluminum plants or pipelines or oil refineries. But that 
is what some of them did." Edward Venard, "The Deviation 
of REA," (Edison Electric Institute, Washington, DC, n.d. 
[1962?]), 39.
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costs. This was understood by the co-op leaders to be a 
take-lt-or-leave-lt proposition with no room for discussion 
or compromise. Although their opinion was apparently not 
asked for, the co-ops rejected the demand and retreated 
under fire to begin building their defenses.
With that, the G&T plan was shifted into high gear.
The situation was similar to the post-war G&T threat that 
had been so successful in getting rates down. But this 
time, with that experience under their belts, the co-op 
leaders emerged for the fight with a different attitude.
The cause this time was independence, not merely lower rates. 
Even if a second G&T threat worked, and the utilities dropped 
their rates to a reasonable level, the co-ops would continue 
to strive to be out from under the thumb of the utilities.
The time to break away was at hand. In 1967, Charles Roemer, 
a co-op leader through this period, told a subcommittee of 
the Senate Appropriations Committee : "For the sake of con­
jecture, let us assume the companies offered our Co-ops an 
unprecedented 4-mill rate. Would it be 'reasonable', if 
after five years these hostile companies, dedicated to our 
distribution, could come back and demand eight mills, or
Clapp, "Information Relating to the A Loan;" Charles 
Roemer, before a Senate Subcommittee stated: "In 1958, the 
companies summoned us to the office of Louisiana Power and 
Light Company , . . and handed us a take-it-or-leave-it 
projection." "Statement of Charles Roemer Before the 
Bureau of Reclamation," 5.
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even 15 mills in the absence of a G&T? We think not.
And later in the same statement Roemer declared: "We are 
not engaged in a crusade against private companies. We 
merely wish to be let along to develop rural areas we 
p i o n e e r e d . T h e  cost of power was no longer a factor; 
independence was the cause. But first, a loan had to be 
approved.
The co-ops were confident that REA would approve the 
loan for several reasons. First of all, they were well 
organized: the statewide association had developed into 
a strong lobby that was quickly becoming familiar with the 
workings of government, and with the weight of several 
thousand rural constituents behind it, and an effective 
newspaper to publicize its opinion, the Louisiana co-op 
group was a force to be heard and contended with. Also, 
they had already run the gamut of applying for a loan.
They knew whom to contact, whom to work around, what to do. 
This experience would certainly speed up the process.
"Statement of Charles Roemer before the Bureau of 
Reclamation," 19. A. A. Robinson made a similar statement 
before a House subcommittee in 1966. "It would avail us 
nothing to receive temporarily 'reasonable' wholesale 
rates and service conditions with them in the absence of 
our G&T and adequate G&T loan funds. "Statement of A. A. 
Robinson on behalf of Louisiana Electric Cooperative, Inc. 
before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations, Department 
of Agriculture and Related Agencies," March 28, 1966 (un­
published copy in ALEC files. Baton Rouge), 5.
Ibid., 17.
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Lastly, they had a good argument for needing the loan. 
Without any other source of electricity available, the 
co-ops were at the mercy of private utilities that were 
using their monopoly to gouge prices, and, in the some 
instances, to try to take over the co-ops. REA could cer­
tainly be sympathetic, particularly if the co-ops could 
show that they could produce electricity more cheaply than 
they could buy it from the utilities.
Moreover, on the horizon was the possibility of a 
changing political scene that gave the co-op leaders even 
greater confidence that the loan would be approved. The 
1960 election brought with it the hope of a sympathetic 
Democratic administration. For eight years, REA had fought 
an administration that had not understood its problems or 
needs, an administration that had established the hostile 
Hoover Commission to raise the interest rates on REA loans, 
an administration whose secretary of agriculture had come 
out foursquare against small farms, an administration that 
vetoed the Humphrey-Price Bill, the most important piece 
of REA legislation since FDR created the whole thing. If 
the new administration were a Democratic one, certainly it 
would be more sympathetic to the G&T application than the 
Republicans had been.
So, in Louisiana, these conservative southern Democrats 
looked forward to the end of the Eisenhower years with an 
even greater hope of obtaining a G&T loan than ever before.
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They were delighted when, just before the election, Truman, 
speaking in Abbeville, said that the "present administration 
. . . has tried every way it could to hamstring the Rural 
Electrification Administration."^® Also, the co-ops could 
look forward to aid from Allen Ellender, Louisiana's very 
influential senior senator. Ellender had on many occasions 
expressed his support for REA and for the local programs 
in Louisiana. In 1956, Bonner quoted him on the topic of 
the Hoover Commission: "Don't worry about Mr. Hoover and 
his recommendations to abolish REA. We will take care of 
that and see that nothing happens to hamper this finest of 
farm programs.
It was 1962 before the co-ops were able to complete a 
feasibility study, work out the details, and mail their 
loan application to Norman Clapp, Kennedy's new REA adminis­
trator. In the four or five years between the companies' 
proposed rate hikes and the application, a type of unde­
clared war was fought between the two groups. The utilities 
stepped up advances into unclaimed territories, duplication 
of co-op lines, and the building of spite lines. There 
were several reports of aggressive actions by LP&L in the
Rural Louisiana, November, 1960, 11.
Ibid., January, 1956, 8. See also, a letter from 
Ellender to Bonner in 1955 : "If the advice of the Hoover 
Commission were followed the net effect would be to price 
REA loan funds out of the reach of our farmer cooperatives. 
We must not permit this to happen." Ellender to Bonner, 
April 21, 1955, Ellender Papers, Box 278-D&M..
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prospect of a co-op G&T during half-time of LSU football 
g a m e s . T h e r e  were duplications at Bossier Electric, 
Pointe C o u p e e , D i x i e , B e a u r e g a r d , a n d  numerous spite 
lines throughout the state.
The co-ops did not sit idly by and watch their terri­
tories be gobbled up. They also stepped up their building 
programs, they complained to Ellender, and they tried to 
expose the utilities' actions in the media, but they were 
no match for the strength of the private utilities.
By 1960, it seemed that the co-ops were in a crossfire 
between the unsympathetic Eisenhower Administration and the 
increasingly aggressive private utilities. The response 
was, of course, for the statewide organization to try and
50 Rural Louisiana, October, 1963, 15; ibid., April,
1960, 1; P. R. Hall (Manager at SLECA) to Richard Richter 
(REA Regional Director for Southwest United States), Octo­
ber 11, 1963, ALEC files. Baton Rouge; Rural Louisiaha, 
October, 1958, 2; ibid., September 5, 1958, 2.
Bonner requested several times that the radio sta­
tion stop broadcasting such material. The station complied 
in fall, 1964. Rural Louisiana, October, 1964, 5. See 
also, Bonner to John Hunter (President of LSU) September 
21, 1964, ALEC files. Baton Rouge.
Rural Louisiana, November, 1964, 4.
Ibid., August, 1958, 2.
Horace Wingate, manager at Beauregard Electric, 
stated at the manager's meeting that there was an "invasion 
into his area by CLECO." September 5, 1958. See also.
Rural Louisiana, July 1956, 4.
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shore up its ranks, become stronger in the face of adversity, 
meet the challenge head on. After the 1960 Presidential 
election, things should have changed for the better, but 
they did not. Internal strife and court action nearly 
ground the G&T project to a halt.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 6
INDEPENDENCE AND THE GENERATION OF POWER
The G&T plan was not the only plan being devised to 
bring power, other than wholesale power, to the co-ops.
In an unusual piece of cooperation, Tex-La, the super-co-op 
made up of distribution co-ops in Texas, Arkansas, and 
Louisiana, worked out an agreement with the power companies 
(principally GSU) whereby it would buy peaking power (power 
that the dams can provide only when the water level allows 
it) from the Southwest Power Authority dams in Texas and 
sell it to GSU in exchange for firm power (power that can 
be provided consistently) from the GSU generators. This 
power would be wheeled by GSU from the dams to their genera­
tors and then to those few Louisiana co-ops that could bene­
fit from the operation.^ The amount of power that was 
finally exchanged was so small that it was hardly worth 
noticing, but the deal had its significance. The negotia­
tions, for the most part, were carried on between U. J. 
Gajan, president of Tex-La and manager at SLEMCO, and GSU 
representatives. As manager of the largest co-op in the
^ Telephone interview with U. J. Gajan, July 11, 1983. 
See also. Rural Louisiana, August, 1958, 3.
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state, Gajan had always been able to deal with the utili­
ties on an equal footing; consequently his relationship 
with GSU (the utility in SLEMCO's service area and the 
principal supplier of SLEMCO's wholesale power) had always 
been better than the relationships of the other managers 
to their wholesale suppliers. The Tex-La agreement of 
1958 was the culmination of years of cooperation between 
these two utility giants. It was an agreement that Gajan
had sought for a number of years and something he would
not easily turn his back on. This contract was the sort 
of wheeling agreement that would, in the 1970s, be negotia­
ted between the co-ops and the private companies settling 
most disputes and finally bring the two sides together 
under a peaceful, integrated system whereby the private 
companies would wheel co-op-generated power to the distribu­
tion co-ops in the state. This cooperative endeavor between 
SLEMCO and GSU was an advancement, a step into the future
for both. But in 1962, as soon as the state's co-ops made
it clear that they planned to generate their own electricity, 
attitudes went quickly from compromising to antagonistic.
And as the G&T plans got underway, and the fights with the 
private utilities went from warm to hot, the first casualty 
of the war was SLEMCO. After years of cooperation and 
working in harmony with GSU, culminating in the Tex-La 
agreement, Gajan, backed wholly by his board of directors.
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Preservation of the cooperative attitude with GSU 
was only one of several reasons SLEMCO and Gajan left what 
had by now become the Association of Louisiana Electric 
Cooperatives. The letter of resignation from the SLEMCO 
board to ALEC cited such "a lack of understanding and 
mutual cooperation among the Louisiana electric coopera­
tives as to render the association ineffective."^
Gajan, though, had his own reasons. In a letter to 
his very powerful friend, Allen Ellender, he stated: "A 
recent study, undertaken by the Association of Louisiana 
Electric Cooperatives performed by the H. E. Boyay Engineer­
ing firm of Houston, Texas, appears to be unrealistic and 
extremely low. . . .̂  That is, he did not feel that ALEC 
could build the plant for what Bovay said it could be 
built for. In another letter to Ellender, dated January 
29, 1963, Gajan further explained his situation and 
decisions :
U. J. Gajan to Allen Ellender, January 29, 1963,
ALEC files. Baton Rouge; H. F. Young (President of SLEMCO's 
Board of Directors) to Orval Couch (President of ALEC Board), 
April 2, 1962, ALEC files. Baton Rouge. SLEMCO first left 
in May 1961, and then again (and finally) eleven months 
later. Ibid.
 ̂ Ibid.
^ Gajan to Ellender, January 29, 1963, ALEC files,
Baton Rouge.
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. . . SLEMCO agreed to participate in a prelimi­
nary generation and transmission study "only" 
. . . .  A thorough and complete analysis of this 
preliminary study by us, and by SLEMCO's independ­
ent engineers, did not convince SLEMCO's board or 
its management of its feasibility.5
Though Gajan did not agree with the study made by the 
engineers, the decisive factor was money. Gajan focused 
on only one objective: getting the lowest possible rates 
he could from GSU and gaining for his membership the lowest 
possible prices. The G&T threat initiated through ALEC, 
together with the rapport he had developed with GSU (exem­
plified by the Tex-La agreement), allowed Gajan to obtain 
his objective. He squeezed an exceptional contract from 
GSU. As one of ALEC s leaders claimed, he pulled out a 
plum.^
On August 31, 1961, the three utilities offered the 
co-ops what was referred to as the Tex-La Contract, sup-
 ̂Gajan to Ellender, January 29, 1963, ALEC files. 
Baton Rouge.
 ̂Interview with A. A. Robinson, Baton Rouge, May 19,1982.
of a one-page, unpublished rate sheet titled: "Proposed 
Rate Offered to Tex-La." It contained the new rate for 
each of the thirteen Louisiana co-ops and two Texas co-ops, 
and indicated how much each co-op could save by accepting 
the new proposal. August 31, 1961, Ellender Papers, Box 
268-D. See also, Norman Clapp, "Information Relating to 
the 'A' Loan Application of Louisiana Electric Cooperative, 
Inc. of New Roads, Louisiana," September 12, 1964 (unpub­
lished copy, ALEC files. Baton Rouge).
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Contract because its enactment was contingent upon the 
companies receiving peaking power from the Texas dams.
It was generally understood that this offer was intended 
to be low enough to halt all G&T plans. The companies had 
lost and were going to give in just as they had done in 
1952. The average rate was 6.5 mills without a fuel escala­
tion provision. The cooperatives refused the offer; SLEMCO 
took it. In his January 29th letter to Ellender, Gajan 
explained how the G&T study had helped the co-ops get a 
better rate, although only SLEMCO signed the contract.
The study did provide very tangible benefits and assisted 
in negotiating a lower rate that would save the electric 
co-ops in Louisiana $1,201,691.00 on a very conservative 
estimate. . . This figure is what the private utilities 
estimated all the co-ops in Louisiana would save if they 
accepted the new rate over an earlier offer computed over 
a five-year period at a ten percent growth rate.̂  SLEMCO 
stood to save more than one-half million dollars in the 
five-year period. In 1962 alone, SLEMCO saved over 
$34,000. The new contract was for ten years, from 1962 to 
1972. "The new rate schedule incorporated a 6.5 mill rate 
. . . with no restrictions, no fuel costs and all the power
Gajan to Ellender, January 29, 1963, ALEC files. 
Baton Rouge.
9 Ibid.
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He also told the senator that he feared that "SLEMCO would 
lose its identity and independence" if it stayed in the 
G&T program, and that he "felt a deep and severe obliga­
tion to SELMCO's . . . member consumers, to obtain the 
best possible contract at the lowest possible guaranteed 
rate, for a ten-year period, with no restrictions, no es­
calations, or binding long term obligations."^^ He got it.
There are those, though, who have said Gajan left 
ALEC for other reasons. In the late Fifties and early 
Sixties, there was a power struggle between Gajan and A. A.
Robinson, the manager at Pointe Coupee, for the right to
run the statewide organization, and, therefore, the G&T 
program. It is hard to imagine either man being in any 
manner power hungry, but probably much of their youthful 
fire has been extinguished by age. All the members of the
board in this period were witnesses to this conflict, and
all have an opinion, but J. S. Robbins and Mark Bonner 
seemed closer to the situation than the others. Robbins 
had good, friendly and professional relationships with 
both men. He sees Gajan as a good friend; "I got along 
with U. J. better than any." But at the same time, Robbins 
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control it, he didn't much want to be in it." At the 
same time, he characterizes Robinson as "very dictatorial."^^ 
Robbins also feels that GSU was using Gajan by giving 
SLEMCO low rates, drawing SLEMCO out of the group, and 
ultimately weakening ALEC's united effort. Robbins had 
no difficulty in locating his loyalty. Forced to go with 
Gajan and leave, or support Robinson and stay, the decision 
was easy: "That isn't the way to win a battle--to quit. I 
never quit I
Bonner also did not support Gajan. In fact, he says, 
"I've fought with him as hard as a n y o n e . H e  sees the 
problem that developed between Gajan and Robinson as related 
to ego. Like Robbins, Bonner feels simply that both wanted 
control of the program. "He and Bubba [Robinson] were a 
whole lot alike. They were strong personalities, and both 
capable people in their way of doing things, but they had 
their egos. Everybody can't be the top man.
Gajan left ALEC for at least two reasons ; to maintain 
the rapport with GSU that he had worked to attain since the 
early Forties, and secondly, to obtain the lowest possible
Interview with J. S. Robbins, Jennings, Louisiana, 
August 9, 1982.
Interview with Mark Bonner, Baton Rouge, July 29,
1982.
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rates for his eustomer-members. But he also may have lost 
the fight for control of the program, and, with the colos­
sal SLEMCO at his side, he left. In his letter to Ellender 
of January 29, 1963, Gajan had said he feared a loss of 
SLEMCO's identity and independence if it remained a part 
of ALEC. But of all the things that can be said about 
Gajan's departure from the organization, it is obvious that 
he missed the point. The objective of building the G&T 
had never been money, nor had it been individual independence. 
The objective was independence from the private utilities.
As Roemer would later state before the congressional com­
mittee, the co-ops only wanted to be left alone to serve 
the territories they had pioneered. And even if the utili­
ties offered an unprecedented low rate, Roemer continued, 
and the co-ops again put aside their G&T plans, there would 
be, in the future, another rate hike, and then another.
The co-ops had only one objective, and that was independence 
--with or without SLEMCO. SLEMCO had its own ideal of in­
dependence, though. Gajan wanted independence to deal with 
GSU on an equal footing, and independence to give his cus­
tomers low prices. They each went their own way.
SLEMCO's withdrawal from ALEC had several repercussions. 
The most immediate was that Robinson's victory over Gajan 
was complete. Shortly after SLEMCO's final withdrawal in 
April, 1962, Robinson was named to head the newly formed
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The new
corporation (made up of essentially the same people as 
ALEC) was to handle only G&T matters. ALEC would return 
to its original role of focusing on public relations and 
lobbying. This is not to say that ALEC was out of the G&T 
picture. As had been its responsibility since the G&T 
inception in the late Fifties, ALEC, with Bonner in the 
lead, would spend most of its time defending and lobbying 
for LEC. But the point to be made here is that SLEMCO's 
withdrawal allowed Robinson to consolidate his power, and 
it also allowed for the formation of LEC. Also, the members 
of LEC knew, of course, that a loan application to REA for 
a G&T project would not be approved to a fragmented group.
It was necessary for SLEMCO either to join or leave before 
an application could be made. Finally, on August 18, with­
out a dissenting vote, the application was sent to Washington.^^ 
The most important result of SLEMCO's withdrawal was 
the effect it had on Allen Ellender, an effect that nearly 
killed the program altogether. It is difficult to convey 
the importance of Ellender to the G&T movement. As chair­
man of the Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee, he 
was a pro-tempore member of each agricultural subcommittee.
He headed the Subcommittee on Appropriations which decided
Louisiana Electric Cooperative, Annual Report (n.p., 
n.d.), unnumbered page.
Ibid., unnumbered page.
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how much money the Department of Agriculture should receive 
and for what purpose. He also served on the Power Market­
ing Agencies Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Com­
mittee, and was chairman of the Senate Public Works Committee. 
If Ellender did not want a G&T built in Louisiana, he had 
the power to stop it.
Ellender and Gajan were good friends. Both came from 
the same part of the state, Gajan from New Iberia (although, 
of course, he lived in Lafayette) and Ellender from Houma.
It may be of some significance that they both had the same 
Cajun background. In any case, they thought alike when it 
came to rural electrification and G&T development.
Ellender had always supported REA. As early as 1949, 
in a letter to "Managers and Directors of all Rural Electric 
Systems, NRECA Directors, State Presidents, secretaries. 
Managers, and Editors," he wrote of "our right to generate 
our own energy [as] our only bargaining p o w e r . I n  the 
mid-Fifties, he did all he could to clog the workings of 
the Hoover Commission. "If the advice of the Hoover Commis­
sion were followed the net effect would be to price REA 
loan funds out of the reach of our farmer cooperatives," 
he wrote Bonner in 1955. "We must not permit this to happen," 
he continued. "As long as private enterprise finds itself
Ellender to "Managers and Directors of All Rural 
Electric Systems, NRECA Directors, State Presidents, secre­
taries, Managers, and Editors," July 18, 1949, Ellender 
Papers, Box 9.
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unable to do the job, REA must remain strong enough to 
permit our farm families to help themselves. Ellender 
was also a big supporter of hydro-electric power in the 
mid-Fifties. Gajan recalls that Ellender and Sam Rayburn 
worked the hardest to supply the money for the southwest
issued a resolution thanking Ellender for his assistance 
in funding various hydro-electric projects
In April, 1962, the same month that SLEMCO withdrew 
from ALEC, Ellender went on record for the first time op­
posing the G&T. The Daily Iberian (New Iberia), just nine 
days after SLEMCO left, reported Ellender's remark: "[In] 
my opinion, the REA is moving away from its original goal. 
Every effort should be made by the Co-ops to obtain their 
power and transmission needs from privately-owned companies 
if at all p o s s i b l e . I n  an Alexandria paper, he accused 
REA of "Trying to build an empire at public expense" by 




Ellender to Bonner, April 21, 1955, Ellender Papers, 
Box  D-M.
Interview with U. J. Gajan, Lafayette, Louisiana, 
November 16, 1981.
Manager's Association, "Minutes," August 7, 1957, 
ALEC files. Baton Rouge.
Daily Iberian, April 10, 1963, photostatic copy in 
Ellender Papers, Box 268-D.
Alexandria Daily Town Talk, April 8, 1963, ibid.
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Charles constituent, again in April, he was his most trench­
ant: "As you know, I was an original supporter of the Rural 
Electrification Administration because, in my mind, it ful­
filled a necessity. It brought power to rural people who 
had not been served by private industry. However, I must 
say that I do not believe that Federal-supported REA co-ops 
should be allowed to compete with private industry. This 
is beyond the purview of REA, and it was never meant to 
b e . T h i s  change in attitude, from ardent supporter to 
powerful obstructionist, prompted a huge letter-writing 
campaign from both sides. The boards of directors of the 
private utilities, now with a new and powerful ally, wrote 
Ellender that "such a system is not needed. . . . The tax­
payer's money will be wasted if such a loan is approved.
All data thus far presented by the cooperatives indicate 
they cannot match the companies' rates even with 2% money 
and tax s u b s i d y . C o - o p  leaders from all over Louisiana 
wrote letters, and had their members write letters. In 
October, 1963, possibly fed up with the agitation to get 
the loan approved, Ellender wrote Robinson a hot letter:
"I do not want any two percent money to be loaned out to 
any cooperative, or any group of cooperatives unless the
Ellender to Frank Hazmuka, April 9, 1963, Ellender
Papers, Box 106-L.
Morrison, ( ^
September 12, 1962, Ellender Papers, Box 268.
Coughlin, Scott, et al. to Ellender,
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private utilities cannot supply their demands, or, unless 
the price charged for the electricity purchased is higher 
than could be produced by the construction of cooperative 
G&T facilities. In other words, I want the law, as I 
understand it, to be followed.
Ellender soon became a roadblock to the loan. To try 
and remove it, Robinson, Bonner, Roemer, and most of the 
other co-op leaders in the state had gone to Washington a 
number of times to speak to Ellender, to persuade him to 
release his grip on the loan, but to no avail. Finally, 
Robinson decided that if individual visits by various local 
co-op people would not do the trick, a visit by the entire 
group— all at once--might succeed. What followed was a 
very unorthodox lobby campaign.
One day in June, 1963, Robinson and Roemer chartered 
a DC-6 in New Orleans, loaded it down with two cases of 
whiskey, and began hopping around the state picking up co-op 
people: first to Baton Rouge, then to Alexandria, and on 
to Shreveport. The plane left Alexandria with ninty-four 
co-op leaders and two stewardesses (a DC-6 had a legal 
limit of ninty-nine). The plane arrived in Shreveport to 
pick up the last of the group, including Roemer. The plane 
had only room enough for three more, but Roemer had shown 
up with five, including himself. The solution was simple,
Ellender to 
Papers, Box 268-D.
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Four hours and two cases of whiskey later, Robinson 
and friends landed in Washington. Without time enough for 
lunch, they rushed to a one o'clock appointment with 
Ellender, "If you can imagine," Robinson recalls, "ninty- 
nine men, and about half of them drunk, going down this 
long corridor to Ellender's office." Ellender walked to 
the door to meet the group, apparently expecting the usual 
two or three representatives. "[When] they started coming 
in, he backed up to his door and they kept coming, backing 
him up to his desk, and they kept coming." Ellender was a 
very small man, now faced with a solid wall of hungry, 
slightly intoxicated co-op leaders moving toward him. 
Somehow he gathered the strength to climb to the top of 
his desk. From there he addressed the group, but they ap­
parently had not come to listen. "They really laid it on 
him," Robinson remembers : "they told him that they didn't 
want to make anymore trips" to Washington. The group's 
solidarity and determination must have impressed Ellender, 
but he remained unmoved from his position. The co-op 
leaders, though, must certainly have received a boost in 
morale from such a solid show of power. The trip finally 
ended when Robinson returned the last group to New Orleans
27 Interview with A. A. Robinson, New Roads, Louisiana,
September 11, 1980.
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eighteen hours later.
Beginning in July, 1962, serious negotiations began 
between the two groups with Norman Clapp, the REA adminis­
trator, in the middle. The loan application was made 
August 18, 1962, but just prior to that, GSU, LP&L, and 
CLECO tried to stop it by offering even better proposals 
than the Tex-La contract of the year before. The private 
utilities also agreed not to stand in the way of the G&T 
loan if LEC would agree to sell the entire output of the 
generation facility to the companies for their use and 
resale to the distribution co-ops. Clapp later wrote 
that it was during this period in the negotiations that 
"the basic concept of an independent G&T system began to 
emerge as the most logical alternative power supply plan. 
Apparently he felt that the utility requests were unreason­
able. But by May, 1963, the companies were again ready to 
lower their rates, this time to 6.25 mills. LEC refused. 
From July to December, Clapp later recalled, "there were 
communications between the parties," but "no significant 
development occurred. . . .
Included here are photographs and a report of the incident. 
No date is given.
29
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Clapp, "Information Relating to the A Loan." 
Ibid.
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On April 6, 1964, Clapp met with the representatives 
of the private utilities, and then, two days later, with 
the leaders of LEC. The outcome of these meetings was 
that LEC would not consider as "reasonable" the companies' 
contract proposals unless some sort of territorial protec­
tion (the right to serve all loads within the co-op service 
area) was given to the co-ops by the utilities, On April 
17, the companies stated that if they agreed to territorial 
protection the co-ops must agree to three stipulations :
One, that the co-ops would agree to complete regulation by 
the Louisiana Public Service Commission; two, that they 
would pay what the companies deemed normal interest rates; 
and three, that the co-ops would pay all local, parish, 
state, and federal t a x e s . T h e  co-ops, of course, had 
since the inception of REA been allowed two percent loans, 
plus tax exempt status and subsidies for bringing elec­
tricity to highly unprofitable areas of the country.
Territorial protection is something that co-op leaders 
in Louisiana had wanted since the late Fifties, but the 
private utilities vigorously opposed it. It is a compli­
cated topic and will be looked at in detail later. Its 
bearing on these negotiations is that the companies con­
tinued to fight it, and that Clapp (later) stated that he 
had been annoyed by the companies' refusal to allow it. I
33
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"regret that the companies had not made a greater effort 
to reach a mutually satisfactory solution to territorial 
p r o t e c t i o n . C l a p p , perhaps believing that the companies 
were not negotiating in good faith, as demonstrated by 
their unwillingness to compromise, ultimately ruled against 
them by approving the loan to LEC.
On May 14, 1964, lawyers representing the two groups 
met at the Monteleone Hotel in New Orleans. D. J. Anders, 
Theo Cangelosi, Claude Duval, and W. L. Faulkenwald told 
the representatives of the companies that they wanted 
territorial protection. The companies' attornies reiterated 
that "they would not be a party to such a program whether 
by legislation or private agreement." The companies in 
turn asked "that the Cooperatives would immediately with­
draw their G&T loan application," and "that the Cooperatives 
would immediately execute ten year supply contracts with 
the Companies." The co-op lawyers then "suimnarily stated 
that the offer . . . was entirely unacceptable."^^ If 
this is in any way representative of the negotiations, it
Ibid. Clapp's interaction with the private companies 
was often antagonistic. "Your failure to accept the area 
protection concept and territorial allocation is likewise 
inconsistent with the recognition of the rights of the coop­
eratives to serve all loads in their service areas regardless 
of charâctéT or Size." Norman Clapp to G. C. Rawls, F. H. 
Coughlin, J. J. Morrison, May 28, 1964, Ellender Papers,
Box 207-D.
"Minutes" of meeting between lawyers of co-ops and 
lawyers of companies. May 14, 1964, Ellender Papers, Box 
292-D; Rural Louisiana, June, 1964, 2.
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is no wonder that no agreements were reached. In a letter 
several days later explaining to Clapp why they had not 
accepted the co-op leader's demands for territorial protec­
tion, the company leaders wrote : It is "purely a matter of 
law and beyond the scope of a power agreement between the 
Companies and the Cooperatives. . . .
The co-ops worked out a prerequisite agreement for 
standby power (power that can be provided in the case of 
an emergency or maintenance situation) with the Southwest 
Power A u t h o r i t y , A n d  on September 13, 1964, Clapp wrote 
to the President of the Senate: "I inform you that I have 
today approved a loan to Louisiana Electric Cooperatives 
. . .  in the amount of $56,521,000 for the financing of 
certain generation and transmission facilities.
The loan was to be broken down for the following needs : 
Two 100 megawatt gas fired steam units at an estimated cost 
of $27,079,200, and 627 miles of 161 KV line and related 
substations and switches for $13,747,000. Included here
F. H. Coughlin, J. J. Morrison and G. C. Rawls to 
Clapp, May 22, 1964, Ellender Papers, Box 292, D.
Clapp, "Information Relating to the A Loan." State­
ment of Charles Roemer Before Bureau of Reclamation and 
Interior Power Marketing Agencies Subcommittee of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee," (undated, unpublished copy in 
ALEC files. Baton Rouge), 6-22.
Norman Clapp to Carl Hayden, September 12, 1964,
ALEC files. Baton Rouge.
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were eighty-two miles of 161 KV lines into Arkansas to 
allow for the interconnection to SPA.^^
Two weeks after the loan was approved, Clapp received 
a strongly worded letter from Ellender. His first concern 
was that Clapp had refused to discuss rates unless the 
utilities agreed to settle the problem of territorial juris­
diction. "I doubt the REA Act gives you that authority," 
he write. His second concern was stated in the strongest 
language. "I want it clearly understood that the Federal 
government will not be called upon to ball out any of the 
cooperatives for any debts or arrangements for the purchase 
of power [from the proposed G&T] made by them." Ellender's 
third concern was in response to an eleventh-hour offer 
from the private utilities of a base charge of 6.04.^^
In his letter to the President of the Senate, Clapp 
estimated that this rate would convert to about 7.16 mills, 
once such expenses as interest, amortization, insurance, 
taxes, operating and maintenance costs were added. Clapp 
then compared this 7.16 to the 6.8 mills that LEC had 
computed as their produced-power rate. In a letter to 
Ellender, some seven months after the loan to LEC was
Agriculture and Rural Electrification Administration, 
September 16, 1964, Ellender Papers, 400-D; Clapp, "Informa­
tion Relating to the A Loan."
Ellender to Clapp, September 28, 1964, Ellender 
Papers, Box 268-D.
Clapp, "Information Relating to the A Loan."
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approved by Clapp, the three presidents of Louisiana's 
private utilities stated that such additions to the base 
rate were incorrect. "When those costs were estimated and 
added to the rates of the companies, the cost of purchased 
power becomes 6.15 mills/kwh--not 7.16 mills/kwh as the 
Administrator has s t a t e d . T h e  figures supplied to 
Ellender corroborate this. The total cost of power (ad­
justed to 7 1/2 percent of the annual bill for interest, 
amortization, insurance, taxes, and estimated station 
costs) to the ninety-four distribution co-op delivery 
points throughout Louisiana was $2,983,504 for the 1964 
fiscal year. This figure, divided by the total annual 
consumption of 485,044,000 kilowatt hours by all twelve 
co-ops for the same period, is 6.1509. This would have 
been the average cost of electricity to Louisiana's distribu­
tion co-ops had they chosen to take it— that is, had they 
not built the G&T plant. It also represents the lowest 
possible rate that the utilities could have offered, having 
been based on the previous fiscal year's consumption.
These figures are generally equal to figures published in 
the REA Annual Statistical Report for 1964, but REA's 
fiscal period is based on the calendar year rather than 
the June-fiscal period used by the private companies, which
F. H. Coughlin, J. J. Morrison, G. C. Rawls to 
Ellender, April 29, 1965, ALEC files, Baton Rouge. Their 
emphasis.
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Ellender's information, or at least what he chose to 
believe, was quite different from the information that 
Clapp had received. In his letter to Clapp, Ellender 
stated that the G&T could not produce electricity for any­
thing under 7.25 to 7.50 mills. He then cited the 6.04 
mill base rate offered by the companies— a considerable 
difference of as much as 1.21 m i l l s . C l a p p ,  though, 
stated in his letter to the President of the Senate that 
LEC could produce electricity for as little as 6.8 mills, 
while the companies would not sett it for anything less 
than 7.16, a difference (the other way, of course) of 
.36 mills.
It is impossible to say what were the correct statis­
tics. Clapp's assumption that the companies' last offer 
of 6.04 somehow converted to 7.16 is certainly incorrect.
He either miscalculated or was misinformed of the statistics. 
He may have realized that because of company belligérance 
(in not giving territorial protection) and the monopoly 
situation in Louisiana, cooperative independence was neces­
sary to protect the co-ops. The companies' tactic of
Ibid. United States Department of Agriculture 
Rural Electrification Administration, Annual Statistical 
Report 1964, (Washington, USGPO, 1964), l07-llO.
Ellender to Clapp, September 28, 1964, Ellender
Papers, Box 268-D.
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waiting until the last moment to offer their lowest rate 
seems to suggest that they were not negotiating in good 
faith. Furthermore, Ellender's insistence that the G&T 
could not produce electricity for less than 7.25 to 7.50 
mills also seems out of line. These figures may have come 
from the SLEMCO G&T study that was certainly made available 
to Ellender.
But of all the factors here, the price of electricity 
was the least important. The co-op leaders quite possibly 
knew that the companies had the power to lower their rates 
enough finally to undercut what the co-ops had estimated 
to be their produced-power rate, just as a large powerful 
company can afford to lower its prices finally to put a 
smaller, less profitable company out of business. The 
price of electricity was not the issue here as it had been 
in the first G&T plan in the early Fifties— at least it was 
not the immediate issue. Obviously, once the plant was 
built, and electricity was being distributed, the co-ops 
would work to bring prices down. But immediately, the 
co-ops had to get out from Under the private utilities 
because they were being smothered, indeed, Were being 
monopolized. As long as there was only one place that the 
co-ops could buy electricity, prices would be higher than 
they had to be. The eleventh hour price drop had proven 
that. And that the co-ops did not take the lower rates 
also shows that they were moving for their independence, 
not for lower rates.
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The approval of the loan on September 12, 1964, though, 
was a long way from granting the loan. Ellender had no 
real power over loan approvals from REA (the REA adminis­
trator is a Presidential appointment), but he could stand 
in the way of the release of the money. The private utili­
ties were unsuccessful in stopping the loan approval through 
negotiations, but now they marshaled their efforts toward 
court maneuverings to keep the funds from being granted.
Ellender and Gajan both, of course, felt they were 
doing the right things for those people they represented.
The object for both was cheap electricity. But in the pro­
cess, they had managed to throw a monkey wrench into the 
workings of LEC. Ellender had tried to use his influence 
and power to stop the approval of the loan, and certainly 
Clapp was reluctant to approve a loan so ardently opposed 
by the state's senior senator. Gajan's effect was to sour 
Ellender, but, in the end, his exit allowed LEC to get on 
with its business without being hampered by a dissenting
What appeared to be a large hurdle crossed (the final 
approval of the loan) was simply the beginning of a tremen­
dous series of barriers that would have to be crossed.
For the next five years, until the groundbreaking ceremony 
on June 23, 1969, the road would be rough.
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CHAPTER 7
TERRITORIAL PROTECTION AND JOHN MCKEITHEN
Territorial protection has been mentioned as one of 
many points of controversy between the co-ops and the 
private companies over the G&T loan approval. But the 
question of territorial protection had been around for some 
time. It is, in some ways, a part of the G&T controversy 
because the question was finally solved as part of a com­
promise that released the loan. But because its beginnings 
were different, and the battle for it was fought on the 
state level rather than the federal level where the G&T 
was fought, territorial protection will be treated here as 
a separate topic.
What the co-ops wanted in territorial protection was 
simply to prohibit any utility (investor-owned or consumer- 
owned) from duplicating lines already built or from moving 
into an area already being served. The most commonly 
favored protection legislation was the 300-foot rule which 
gave the owner of an existing line protection against 
encroachment for 300 feet on either side of that line. An 
area already occupied (cordoned off by lines) was virtually 
guaranteed for the future. The rule was designed to bring
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stability to a haphazard situation that had allowed utili­
ties to serve anyone anywhere. It would also end needless 
and expensive duplication of existing lines. Furthermore, 
an agreement of this sort would be a big step in the direc­
tion of mutual understanding and compromise between the 
co-ops and the investor-owned utilities.
The need for a territorial protection rule began late 
in the 1950's when the private utilities began moving into 
areas historically served by the co-ops. In 1956, Bonner, 
for the first time, mentioned private utility "pirating" 
and line duplication of co-op facilities, citing a takeover 
by CLECO of the Scheutz subdivision in DeRidder. In his 
article, Bonner added photographs of spitelines (electrical 
lines not electrified, used simply to control an area for 
future development rather than to serve it) and duplication 
of existing co-op lines.̂  Problems of this sort escalated 
in the Sixties, and Bonner continued to report them.^ The 
co-ops were too small and too weak to take a strong stand 
against these aggressive, high-pressure tactics. But by 
introducing legislation, they hoped to protect their
 ̂Rural Louisiana, July, 1956, 4.
^ ^bid. October 1958, 3; ibid. , January, 1959, 4; 
ibid., November, 1960, 4; ibid., April, 1964, 10; ibid., 
September, 1963, 14; ibid., August, 1963, 12; ibid., 
October, 1958; ibid., April, 1960, 11; ibid., October,
1963, 3; ibid., April, 1964, 17; ibid., August, 1958, 2;
P. R. Hall "(manager at SLECA to Richard Richter (Director 
of the Southwest for REA), October 11, 1963, ALEC files. 
Baton Rouge; Manager's Association, "Minutes," September 5, 
1958.
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territorial integrity and the areas that they had histori­
cally served.
In 1962, ALEC introduced House Bill 425 into the 
legislature. It was designed to eliminate all these prob­
lems with the private companies. Once the legal jargon 
is eliminated, the bill is simple:
No electric public utility, electric cooperative 
or other supplier of electricity service shall 
construct or extend its facilities . . .  to any 
, premises, which . . . are being served by, or 
which are not being served or are located within 
three hundred feet of the distribution lines of 
another supplier. . . . 3
Bonner and ALEC rallied with a publicity drive and 
lobby campaign. Roemer was given the role of leader, and 
the bill was optimistically dubbed the "Fair Play Bill" 
in Rural Louisiana.̂
The bill was dropped in the legislative hopper in mid- 
May and placed in Judiciary A committee, which was led by 
John Schwegmann of Orleans Parish. Schwegmann was running 
against Hale Boggs in a U.S. Congressional race and had 
turned more than one Judiciary A committee meeting into an 
anti-communist forum. In the early Sixties, voters 
responded favorably to politicians who found communists 
where they were not supposed to be. According to Bonner, 
Schwegmann found communism lurking in Louisiana's co-ops.
^ H.R. 425 is published in its entirity in Rural 
Louisiana, May, 1962, 4.
^ Ibid., May, 1962, 2.
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Bonner wrote: In his zeal to defeat the Electric Co-ops' 
territorial integrity Bill [Schwegmann] linked the Co-ops 
and their supporters to Russian communistic experiments 
and spoke loudly in terms of 'Americanism, ' preserving 
free enterprise, and 'marching socialism.' No records 
were kept of committee meetings in the early Sixties, so 
it is impossible to know just what Schwegmann said, but he 
was notorious for such actions, and co-ops were well-known 
targets.
On May 30, the bill was reported unfavorably from the 
committee.^ The next day, the committee's minority resolu­
tion to allow the bill to be debated on the floor was voted 
down by the House in a vote of sixty to twenty-five.̂  
Probably the most interesting thing about the bill was that 
of its twenty-five sponsors, thirteen turned around and 
voted to kill the bill, leading Bonner, even today, to 
ponder the possibility of foul play.® If not that, the 
private utility lobby had certainly earned its money. Just 
after Memorial Day, 1962, the Fair Play Bill, despite its
1962 Legislative Calendar of the State of Louisiana, 
25th session, 1962, 100.
 ̂Official Journal of the Proceedings of the House of 
Representatives of the State of Louisiana, 25th session, 
3ÏÏ2:
® Interview with Mark Bonner, Baton Rouge, August 20,
1980.
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good name, was killed--easily. "They just beat our butts 
off," recalls Bonner, "They beat the hell out of us on 
that simple t h i n g . B u t  there;would be another day.
Two years later, in the midst of the G&T discussions, 
the two groups tried to come to some sort of agreement 
over territoriality as a part of these discussions. On 
May 7, 1964, the lawyers of the two groups met at the 
Monteleone Hotel in New Orleans to debate, among other 
things, territorial protection. One week later they met 
again, and the co-op lawyers stated their need for an "area 
concept," with disputes to "be worked out by agreement 
between the Companies and the Cooperatives rather than [by] 
Legislation." The response was predictable. "The Company 
attorneys again stated that they would not be a party to 
any such program, whether by Legislation or private agree­
ment."^^ Eight days later, the company representatives 
wrote to Norman Clapp to explain their interpretation of 
the meeting. They made it clear to Clapp that they would 
not be a part of any territorial agreement unless the 
co-ops would come under the Louisiana Public Service 
C o m m i s s i o n . I n  June, Bonner wrote that at these meetings
 ̂Ibid.
Rural Louisiana, June, 1964, 2; "Minutes" of meet­
ing between lawyers ofco-ops and lawyers of companies,
May 14, 1964, Ellender Papers, Box 292-D, Allen Ellender 
Library, Nichols State University, Thibodaux, Louisiana.
F. H. Coughlin, J. J. Morrison, G. C. Rawls to 
Norman Clapp, May 22, 1964, ibid.
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the co-op leaders had not objected to the PSC as arbitrator 
of disputes, that, in fact, they welcomed a powerful and, 
supposedly, unbiased umpire. But the companies refused 
to agree to any territorial integrity rule such as the 300- 
foot rule that the co-ops wanted. They would simply have 
the PSC deal with disputes as they arose. This would give 
no legislative basis for the decisions made by the PSC, 
and should the members of the PSC change, as, of course, 
they would over the years, the attitude of the commission 
could just as easily change--possibly to the detriment of 
the co-ops. With that stumbling block thrown in the way, 
and with the deadline fast approaching for filing bills 
in the legislature, negotiations terminated. Both groups 
would submit bills and let the legislature d e c i d e . I t  
looked again as though the co-ops would get the short end.
The utilities' refusal to allow territoriality may 
have caused Clapp to approve the G&T loan to LEC. It cer­
tainly demonstrated to him that the utilities were not 
negotiating in good faith. In his letter of explanation 
for approving the loan, he stated, among other reasons for 
approval, his "regret" that the companies had not made a 
greater effort to reach a mutually satisfactory solution 
to territorial protection.
Rural Louisiana, June, 1964, 2,
Norman Clapp, "Information Relating to the 'A'
Loan Application of Louisiana Electric Cooperative, Inc. 
of New Roads, Louisiana," September 12, 1964 (unpublished 
copy, ALEC files. Baton Rouge).
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On May 28, the co-ops filed three bills: HR 811, HR 
812, and HR 813, Of the three, HR 813 is the most impor­
tant. It would grant the PSC jurisdiction over the co-ops 
where disputes had occurred between the co-ops and the 
private utilities. But it would exempt the co-ops from 
PSC jurisdiction in relationships between the co-ops and 
REA, and between the co-ops and their own membership. The 
bill would also allow the PSC to allocate territory among 
the co-ops and the private utilities. This allocation 
was to be granted to the utility which first served an 
area and which served the largest number of consumers there. 
This type of territorial guarantee was apparently more 
desirable to the co-ops than the 300-foot rule. Bills 
811 and 812 were simply clarifications of PSC jurisdiction 
over the co-ops.
The companies' bill, the Munson-Womack Bill, was filed 
two days earlier. Its purpose was "to remove statutory 
exemptions of co-ops from jurisdiction of the Public Service 
Commission"— that is, to put the co-ops entirely under the 
jurisdiction of the PSC.^^
The co-op bills were read May 18, passed to Judiciary 
B on May 31, reported unfavorably on June 9, and killed the 
the next day. They were handled so swiftly and so roughly
Bill printed in its entirety in Rural Louisiana, 
June, 1964, 3.
Legislative Calendar, 27th session, 158.
Ibid., 158.
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that the co-op organizers barely had enough time to bring 
their influence to bear. They did not have a chance.
For the companies' bill, though, it was a different 
story. It was also sent to Judiciary B, but three days 
before the co-op bill. By the time the co-op's plan was 
considered, the utilities had had plenty of time to state 
their case to the same committee members. On June 9, the 
same day that the co-op bills were reported unfavorably, 
the Munson-Womack Bill received a favorable report. Timing, 
it seemed, was everything— at least in this case. On 
June 11, the bill passed the House with a respectable 
eighty-two to eighteen vote, and was passed on to the 
Senate. It was reported favorably from committee there on 
June 18 and adopted five days later, again with a respectable 
vote of thirty-one to seven. The next day, the House ap­
proved a few Senate amendments, and the bill slid its way 
on to the governor's desk where, after such resounding 
legislative support, no opposition was expected.
In the final hours of the ten-day veto deadline, Bonner 
visited Governor John McKeithen in a last-ditch effort to 
stop the bill from becoming law. But the governor was not 
seeing anyone ; he had, of all things, the mumps. Bonner 
resorted to speaking with Gus Weil, a McKeithen aide.
"And here came Big John," Bonner recalls, "stumbling out
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of the office in his pajamas." His bearlike growl startled
Bonner: "Boy, quit your damn worrying. Let the sons-a-
bitches pass the bill. I'll veto the damn thing." And,
as Bonner remembers, "that's exactly what he d i d . O n
July 6, his veto message was read in the legislature :
Having been a member of the Public Service Com­
mission for approximately ten years, I am 
thoroughly familiar with the problems of both 
the electrical cooperatives and other utility 
companies and the conflicts which develop between 
them from time to time. - Base# upon this know­
ledge, I feel that this bill goes too far and 
that it would be unwise to place all phases of 
the activities of cooperatives under the Louisiana 
Public Service Commission. Some portions of 
their activities undoubtedly should be regulated, 
and, if at some future legislative session a less 
comprehensive bill is passed, I will be happy to 
sign it.
And with that, the ordeal ended. On the day the veto was 
read, it was sustained, eighty-one to fourteen.
Bonner stated that it took a lot of courage for 
McKeithen to veto that bill. The sponsors, Lantz Womack 
and Robert Munson, were McKeithen floor leaders. The bill 
passed both houses quickly, and with strong support. But 
McKeithen, still in the early months of his administration, 
had a strong grip on the legislature, shown by the lopsided 
vote to override.
Interview with Mark Bonner, Baton Rouge, August 28,
1980.
Legislative_Calendar, 27th session, 158. The veto 
was dated July 4, 1964. It is printed in Officiai Journal 
of the Proceedings of the House of Représentatives, 27th 
session, 1, 532. It is also printed in Rural Louisiana, 
July, 1964, 2.
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Bonner's reaction to all this was to let the rural 
people of the state know what the governor had done for 
them. He placed an eight-by-ten photograph of McKeithen 
on the front page of Rural Louisiana with the headline : 
"Governor Protects Rural F o l k s A l s o  in the issue,
Bonner published photographs of the legislators who voted 
against the company b i l l . B u t  he then went one step 
further by publishing the names of those who voted for 
the company bill. They were shackled with the headline : 
"These are the Legislators Who Voted Against Your Coopera­
tive."^^ This.sort of publicity is one of the worst things 
that can happen to a politician, and certainly many of 
them remembered it later when co-op bills came up for con­
sideration. It is worth mentioning, parenthetically, that 
a young senator from Acadia Parish, Edwin Edwards, was 
listed among those "Who Voted Against Your Cooperative."
He never would again.
Bonner's power must have gotten a real shot in the 
arm from this incident. Legislators did not want them­
selves blacklisted in a newspaper that hit every rural 
doorstep in Louisiana each month. Also, he had (or at
Rural Louisiana, July, 1964, 1.
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least it seemed he had) enlisted the support of a powerful 
ally in McKeithen against the armies of two great enemies : 
the hostile legislature, and their all-powerful allies, 
the utilities. At the end of his article praising McKeithen, 
and raising him to a level somewhere between an American 
hero and a demigod, Bonner writes : "Thanks, Governor, for 
our reprieve to fight another day. And, of course, they 
would. Bonner and ALEC were poised to take on Washington 
in their fight to release the G&T money.
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CHAPTER 8 
FOUR YEARS OF FIGHTING: 1964-1968
Bonner announced the approval of the loan in Rural 
Louisiana in September 1964. He was jubilant. He wrote 
that construction would take place in fifty parishes in 
Louisiana, and that the plant itself would be located 
somewhere near New Roads. The issue also included an 
artist's conception of the new plant.^ Four years later, 
at an LEC meeting in Houma, Norman Clapp (now in his last 
six months in office) stated, "No where has the controversy 
over an REA loan been more bitter than here in Louisiana 
over this loan for your generation and major transmission. 
In the years between these two announcements the private 
utilities dragged LEC and REA into every possible nook 
and cranny of the state and federal court system. By the 
time Clapp made that statement in 1968, LEC had spent 
nearly one million dollars in legal fees, and the cost of 
building the plant had risen to where the fifty-six million
Remarks of Norman Clapp before the annual meeting of 
the Association of Louisiana Electric Cooperatives, Houma, 
Louisiana, May 10, 1968, Allen Ellender Papers, Box 207-D, 
Ellender Library, Nichols State University, Thibodaux, 
Louisiana. Also quoted in Rural Louisiana. June, 1968, 3.
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originally loaned in 1964 was not adequate to do the job 
in 1968. The private companies had effectively turned 
the legal system into a legal quagmire that had stopped 
LEC dead in its tracks.
The loan was approved on September 14, 1964. Within 
one month, the private utilities had made two, almost 
simultaneous moves to block the granting of the loan. On 
October 26, they went before the United States District 
Court in Shreveport to ask for an injunction to stop the 
loan.^ Before Judge Benjamin C. Dawkins, they "claimed 
that the result of consummation of the loan will be illegal 
competition. . . . "  They also complained that the "Adminis­
trator [Norman Clapp] conspired with the super cooperative 
[LEC] to create an unregulated monopoly and to deprive 
plaintiff of its property and income." They went on to 
accuse Clapp, who was also named in the suit, of attempting 
"to coerce plaintiff . . .  to agree to so-called 'territorial 
integrity.'" This apparently was enough to persuade Judge 
Dawkins to issue the injunction on November 18, 1964, put­
ting the brakes on the entire effort.̂  It was only the 
beginning of the battle in federal courts, where only half 
the war was fought.
Central Louisiana Electric Company, Inc., v. Rural 
Electrification Administration, Norman Clapp, and Orville 
Freeman" Federal Supplement, Vol 236 (West Publishing 
Company, St. Paul Minnesota, 1965), 273.
^ Ibid., 271-280.
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At the same time the private companies were shedding 
tears before Dawkins, they appealed to the Louisiana Public 
Service Commission in a less successful attempt to double 
their case against LEC. They went before the Commission 
on September 30, 1964, just sixteen days after the loan 
was approved. Their argument was that "the proposed 
generating station will not be in the . . . best interests 
of cooperatives' members, in that [the private utilities] 
allege the cooperative defendant cannot produce power as 
economically . . .  as its customers now receive. . . . "  
the companies went on to complain that if the G&T plant 
were built, it "would constitute the stealing of existing 
customers. . . .
The PSC ruled, on March 29, 1965, that the co-op 
members were not customers but consumers, and, therefore, 
the companies had incorrectly stated their case.^ In other 
words, the case was dismissed on a technicality. The 
companies countered by filing suit against the PSC in 
Nineteenth District Court in Baton Rouge, asking that the 
PSC be forced to hear the case on its merits. The court 
agreed and the case was sent back to the PSC on April 26,
Louisiana Public Service Commission, Forty-fifth 
Annual Report of the Louisiana Public Service Commission 
(n.p ., December 31, 1965), 100-101.
Ibid., 101.
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1965/
Meanwhile, on the federal level, LEC had appealed 
the Dawkins decision to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
There, in an unanimous décision, the court overturned the 
injunction, stating that "making a loan for the construc­
tion of competitive facilities is not a deprivation of 
property rights. . . . "  The judges also stated that "the 
new cooperative has a right to compete," and that "those 
who have heretofore purchased electric power from the 
complaining companies certainly have the right, if they 
wish, to buy from the new establishment [LEC]." Further­
more, the companies "are to completely lose customers which 
heretofore they alone had, but this is not an unusual 
product of competition." Finally, after some twenty pages 
of opinion, the judges decided: "We are nevertheless con­
strained to the opinion that appelles [the private utilities] 
did not have the requisite standing to bring this action 
and neither do the courts have jurisdiction to review the 
granting or denial of loans by the Rural Electrification 
Administration. The Judgement must be reversed." But
Central Louisiana Electric Company, et al. v. 
Louisiana Public Service Commission, Casie # 122,693, Nine- 
teenth District Court, Clerk of Court Records, East Baton 
Rouge Parish, Courthouse, Baton Rouge. On March 29, 1968, 
Judge Luther Cole, in deciding the last case in these 
series of cases, wrote this short history of the cases that 
came before the PSC and the Nineteenth District Court be­
tween the companies and the co-ops from 1964 to 1968.
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the judges, provoking what must have been a colossal dis­
appointment to LEC people, added an appendix to the opinion 
stating that since the case will go before the Supreme 
Court it would not allow the loan money to be released 
until that higher court made its decision.®
On the state level, in April, 1955, the case had been 
sent back to the PSC to be heard on its merits. There, 
on June 28, 1967, the PSC ruled that it had no jurisdiction.^ 
On July 7, the companies persisted by petitioning for a 
rehearing, and six days later than was d e n i e d . T h e  com­
panies were nearing the end of their legal rope on the 
state level. They again went before the Nineteenth Judicial 
Court in Baton Rouge to force the PSC into a discussion.
Judge Luther Cole agreed that the PSC had no jurisdiction 
over the case. And in December, the State Supreme Court 
a g r e e d . T h e  private companies had lost the state fight.
On the federal level, things were also coming to a 
close. Before the Supreme Court, the utilities' appeal
Rural Electrification Administration et al. v. 
Central Louisiana Electric Company, Inc., et al., Federal 
Reporter, Vol. 854, Federal Second Series (Nest Publishing 
Company, St. Paul, Minnesota, 1969), 859-868. Their 
emphasis.
 ̂Louisiana PSC, Forty-seventh Annual Report (December 
31, 1967), 77.
Ibid., 87-88.
Case Number 122,593, Nineteenth Judicial Court, 
Clerk of Court Records, East Baton Rouge Parish, Courthouse, 
Baton Rouge.
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was denied on October 10, 1966.^^ One year later, their 
petition for a rehearing was d e n i e d . T h i s  decision not 
to decide lifted the injunction on the release of the 
money placed by the Fifth Circuit Court.
On December 13, 1958, with these legal road blocks 
removed, REA announced that it would release the loan. 
Between that date and Christmas Day, the companies would 
try to again marshal their legal forces to stop the loan, 
while at the same time Robinson would go through a series 
of cloak and dagger maneuvers to consummate the loan--spend 
some of the money. But while all this legal rigmarole 
was taking place, LEC was having other problems that also 
jeopardized the loan's release.
On September 2, 1964, just a few days before the 
initial approval of the loan, Douglas Wright, the Adminis­
trator of the Southwest Power Administration, agreed to 
provide 75,000 KW of standby power for the LEC plant.
This agreement was necessary for the loan approval. No
Supreme Court Reporter : Cases Argued and Determined 
in the Supreme Court of the United States, 385 US 8l5, Vol. 
"87, October term, 1966, (West Publishing Company, St. Paul, 
Minnesota, 1968), 34.
Ibid., 388.
Reclamation and Interior Power Marketing Agencies Subcom­
mittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee (undated 
[1967?], unpublished copy in ALEC files. Baton Rouge), 6.
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electrical system could operate without some sort of 
standby power. This 75,000 KW was the amount of power 
that would be available to LEC should the plant have to 
be shut down for any reason. In exchange, LEC agreed to 
supply ten percent of its capacity to SPA, which SPA could 
then sell at its own discretion. The result would be that 
SPA would make considerable profit from the sale while 
providing LEC with all the standby power it n e e d e d . A l l  
of this was to be a part of a larger plan to connect 
several SPA-built dams in Arkansas and Oklahoma. The 
money to do it all was to come from the Department of the 
Interior except for the connection from Louisiana to the 
system that was to be paid for by LEC. The connection was 
to be made through eighty-two miles of 161 KV line to 
the hookup at Prescott, Arkansas.
All of that was satisfactory until Dawkins' injunction, 
on October 26, 1964, which, among other things, did not 
allow LEC to move forward in any way with the G&T plan; it 
forbade them to draw up and sign the contract with SPA.
But the SPA "agreement," which had been unofficially
of Louisiana Electric Cooperative before the Subcommittee 
on Public Works, Senate Committee on Appropriations (May 3, 
1966, unpublished copy in ALEC files. Baton Rouge), 5.
Ibid., 1; Rural Louisiana, April, 1966, 3; Norman 
Clapp, "Information Relating to the 'A' Loan Application of 
Louisiana Electric Cooperative, Inc. of New Roads, Louisiana, 
September 12, 1964 (unpublished copy, ALEC files. Baton 
Rouge).
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initialed by Wright, still stood, and in 1965, Wright went 
before the Senate Appropriations Committee to ask for the 
money to get the job s t a r t e d . B u t  then there was a 
change of heart. Sometime in early 1966, Wright decided 
to deal with Louisiana's private utilities instead. He 
had the money held over to connect the SPA dams until 1967, 
pending an agreement with the private utilities to wheel 
SPA power between the dams on their transmission lines, 
thereby saving the government most of the $4,500,000 it 
would take to build new lines connecting the dams. The 
problem was that the agreement between SPA and the utili­
ties left out the LEC hookup at Prescott, and the loan 
release was predicated on that hook up.
The LEC members were astonished and caught off guard. 
They met with Wright at his office in Tulsa on March 22.
As Roemer told the House Committee on Appropriations in 
May, "Amazingly, Mr. Wright told us, and I was in the group, 
that he had no obligation to the Louisiana G&T.
Statement of Roemer before Bureau of Reclamation, 7.
Ibid., 3, 6, 8, 14; Testimony of J. J. Morrison 
before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations for De­
partment of Agriculture and Related Agencies, May 11, 1967 
(unpublished copy in ALEC files. Baton Rouge), 15; State­
ment of Charles E. Roemer II on Behalf of Louisiana Elec­
tric Cooperative, Inc. and the Association of Louisiana 
Electric Cooperatives, Inc. before the U.S. House of Repre­
sentatives, Committee on Appropriations, Public Works Sub­
committee, May 2, 1966 (unpublished copy, ALEC files.
Baton Rouge), 2, 11.
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Furthermore, he said that his . . . agreement was 'no more 
than a scrap of paper--an offer at most.' And that he 
had made no attempt to negotiate with the companies to 
help a G&T he 'never believed in in the first place.
Four days later, the LEC group met with Kenneth Holum, 
Assistant Secretary of the Interior, and, following that,
LEC members testified repeatedly before various Congressional 
subcommittees--all to no a v a i l . T h e  SPA agreement was 
dead.
There is no evidence that the utilities conspired with 
Wright in order to place another road block in front of 
LEC, but since that agreement excluded any consideration 
of LEC, and since the companies had not shown any interest 
in any of it until after it looked as though they would 
lose the Federal Court battle, there is good reason to be­
lieve they did. Roemer (and probably most LEC officials) 
believed that. In a statement before a Senate Appropriations 
Subcommittee in 1967, Roemer stated; "The companies had 
never shown the slightest inclination to negotiate a con­
tract with Mr. Wright until after our standby arrangement 
came into the picture, and until after we had won a major 
victory in federal c o u r t s . T h e  companies argued that
I M .  , 11-12.
Statement of Roemer before Bureau of Reclamation, 
10. Roemer's emphasis.
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the SPA connection to LEC was a further subsidy of the 
entire program--a program that they did not believe in, 
and apparently were willing to go to any extent to kill.
It was Bonner's opinion, though, that Wright wanted so 
badly to work out the agreement with the private utilities 
that he was more than willing to forsake LEC to do it upon 
request from the utilities.
Without the SPA arrangement, LEG could lose the loan. 
They had to look for a possible alternate standby power 
source. Consequently, Robinson, who had some connections 
with Dow Chemical executives, found that Dow was one of 
the biggest generators of private power in the country and 
fully capable of providing standby power for LEC. Further­
more, Dow was unhappy with its relationship with GSU, which 
had been supplying it with standby. To add to the capacity 
of this proposed LEC-Dow pool, Robinson sought to bring into 
the arrangement one or two municipalities. He was success­
ful in selling the arrangement to the city of Lafayette, 
and, finally, after some contributions to a few political 
campaigns, the town of Plaquemine. The agreement was struck. 
It was the first time, anywhere, that public, private, and
Morrison before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropria­
tions, 15. J. J. Morrison was Chairman of the Board at GSU 
in 1966. By 1967, he was given the position of Director and 
Consultant at GSU.
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municipal power had come together in a pooling arrangement.^^ 
The way the proposed plan would work was that trans­
mission lines would be constructed between the four parts 
(Dow, Plaquemines, Lafayette, and LEC); LEC was willing to 
do that in order to obtain the standby power it needed.
But the plan annoyed the private utilities. These lines 
built from the LEC plant near New Roads, west to Lafayette, 
would pre-empt, or control, the areas they covered. The 
result would be that utilities would lose control of a lot 
of territory that included many budding businesses in south 
Louisiana--from chemical plants to independent shrimping 
operations. The plan would also sidestep the SPA road 
block that the companies had thrown down, and, at least on 
the question of standby power, it would move LEC closer to 
the release of the loan. The companies, beginning to lose 
the fight, complained to Ellender: "Under the proposed 
arrangement, Dow Chemical, a major national industrial 
company, would benefit from tax free power. The use of TL 
funds to build transmission lines and generating facilities 
to benefit large industries like Dow was never intended by 
Congress."
Interview with A. A. Robinson, New Roads, Louisiana, 
September 11, 1980; Interview with A. A. Robinson, Baton 
Rouge, May 19, 1982.
Ibid.
Norman Lee to Ellender, August 26, 1969, Ellender 
Papers, Box 207-D. Lee was Chairman of the Board at LP&L. 
See a similar letter one month later. Lee to Ellender, 
October 2, 1968, ibid.
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At about the time of the formation of the Dow Pool, 
it had become increasingly clear to LEC officials that 
higher construction costs, higher fuel costs, and infla­
tion had all taken their toll on the fifty-six million 
dollars originally approved. Building a generating plant, 
and then building transmission lines and substations to 
twelve co-ops would be impossible at that price. A new, 
temporary, even inadequate, system would have to be worked 
out. The new plan was announced as part of the Dow Pool, 
and would provide power to only four of the twelve co-ops, 
the four in the southernmost part of the state, those 
nearest to the plant: SLECA in Houma, Washington-St. Tammany 
in Franklinton, Dixie in Baton Rouge, and Pointe Coupee in 
New R o a d s . T h e  building of transmission lines to these 
four rather than to all twelve would save LEC a consider­
able amount of money. The only drawback was that the other 
eight co-ops would have to pool their power costs with the 
four receiving LEC power to produce an average for all 
twelve. The eight "outs" would, of course, have to continue 
buying their power from the private u t i l i t i e s . B u t  the 
plan, as imperfect as it was, was to be only temporary; they
planation of this system is Statement of Floyd W. Lewis 
before the Department of Agriculture and Related Agencies 
Subcommittee on Senate Appropriations, April 17, 1969 (un­
published copy in ALEC files. Baton Rouge), 2-3.
Ibid., 5.
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would soon enough produce all the power needed to connect 
the other eight.
To no one's surprise, Ellender did not like this new 
proposal. In a letter to all rural electric members, pub­
lished in Rural Louisiana, and paraphrased by Bonner, 
Ellender wrote that the "new arrangement with Dow and 
Plaquemine and Lafayette made him think twice before jump­
ing on the bandwagon for the loan. He is concerned because 
the G&T will only serve 4 of the 12 co-ops yet it would 
obligate the other eight to pool their costs, yet it would 
create a tie-in for standby power not with the Southwest 
Power Administration, as had been originally planned, but 
with Dow and two other cities." Bonner concluded Ellender's 
message with a quote : "In all honesty, I cannot see why I 
should be tarred and feathered for being concerned over 
this peculiar set of facts and circumstances.
In the middle of all these controversies, Robinson 
found himself stuck with the problem of buying property 
for the plant. He was in Washington testifying before one 
of several subcommittees when, as he remembers, he was 
asked: "Well, do you have a place to put this plant, and 
I said, Richard Glenn's place, and we just cut eighty acres 
out of the heart of his farm. He was selling land and 
didn't know it." As it turned out, the purchase was for
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some 117 acres and the price was $97,450 for the tract.
Glen, who was Robinson's board chairman at Point Coupee, 
was more than willing to sell a large portion of his 
Hermitage Plantation in Ventress, just east of New Roads, 
for that p r i c e . A l l  of this may well have happened just 
as Robinson said it did, but it is no coincidence that the 
plant was finally built near New Roads. As even Edwin 
Edwards agrees, Robinson is a local leader ; he takes care 
of his people. The LEC plant meant jobs, prestige, and an 
economic upsurge for his area.^^ The location of the plant 
also reflected Robinson's growing power as President of LEC.
By late 1968, the legal problem, both state and local, 
had been overcome, the difficulty with standby power had 
been resolved, and a site was chosen, but the loan was 
still pending. In Washington, the private utilities had 
persuaded Orville Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture under 
the outgoing Johnson Administration, to hold off on the 
loan. It is Bonner's contention that Freeman was playing 
politics with the loan, agreeing not to release it in 
exchange for financial support from the utilities for 
Hubert Humphrey's presidential c a m p a i g n . T h i s  is a strong
Interview with Robinson, September 11, 1980.
Interview with Edwin Edwards, Baton Rouge, June 3,
1982.
Interview with Mark Bonner, Baton Rouge, August 20,
1980.
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accusation and difficult to prove, but it is important 
because Bonner believed it and reacted accordingly, and 
also because he was able to make Hubert Humphrey believe 
it.
Humphrey was the biggest fish in a sea of Washington 
Democrats in these late months of 1968. The presidential 
campaign was at full tilt, and to many observers Humphrey 
appeared on his way to a November victory. To Bonner and 
Robinson he was the man powerful enough to release the 
loan from its political shackles. So they went to Washington 
hoping to present their case to him. It was not easy to see 
a man as powerful as Humphrey. They called in political 
favors and made their most important contacts. Finally, 
through the assistance of a sympathetic Hale Boggs and Edwin 
Edwards (by then Seventh District Congressman) they wormed 
their way i n . " I  just took it upon myself to go up 
there . . . and see what could be done," recalls Bonner.
"It was the last desperate effort you might say. Before 
they entered Humphrey's office, before they confronted this 
seat of power, Robinson and Bonner had discussed who was 
going to say what, and it was decided that Robinson, as 
President of the group, had the best title and that he would 
do most of the t a l k i n g . " S o ,  we went in," Bonner
Interview with Robinson, September 11, 1980; Inter­
view with Bonner, August 20, 1980.
Ibid.
38 Ibid.
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recollects, "and he asked us what he could do. And I guess 
for the first time in his life, Bubba [Robinson] turned to 
me and said, 'Mark, you tell him our problem. '" Bonner's 
speech, as well as he remembers, went something like the 
following: "Well, Mr. Vice President, the power companies 
are running around here telling everybody all the great 
things that they're going to do down in Louisiana and else­
where to help you politically and, apparently, they've 
convinced Secretary Freeman that he should not authorize 
Clapp to make this loan . . , and I think if you know the 
power companies as well as I do, no matter what they're 
saying, . . . they will not be for Hubert Humphrey."
Humphrey's response to an allegation that a supposedly non­
political government agency might be using funds to further 
his campaign was violent. Bonner recalls" "Man, I thought 
he was going to hit me. He jumped up and hit the table, 
and said, 'Mark, goddamn it,' and I mean he was eussin'; 
let's get one goddamn thing straight, a contract is a con­
tract, and politics is politics, and if Orville Freeman, 
goddamn it, doesn't have sense enough to know it, I can 
goddamn sure tell him. ' And he picked up the phone and 
called him and told him: 'I want that damn loan released 
this afternoon.' And that's the way it happened. I must 
have used the right tactic, [because] it sure made him mad."
Ibid. See also, interview with Mark Bonner, Baton
Rouge, August 29, 1980.
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Robinson recalls the conversation between Humphrey and
Freeman as "rough." "What he told that man, grandma's
soap couldn't get off him."^®
All of this, despite its light drama, still did not
get the job done. The telephone call from Humphrey
caused Freeman to wash his hands of the loan, but Clapp
(out of respect for Louisiana's senior Senator) would
still not release his grip without Ellender's approval.
But Ellender was on a political junket in Asia and nearly
impossible to reach. Bonner had repeatedly sent urgent
cablegrams and telegrams to Ellender all over the East.
The Senator had not replied.
The key to Ellender, at this point in his life, was
Edwin Edwards. Ever since Edwards was elected to the
House in 1965, Ellender had looked upon him as his protégé,
and the young protégé had the Senator's ear on many topics.
Edwards remembers :
I was very young, idealistic. I had a lot of 
time on my hands as a freshman Congressman; he 
was getting on in years and very busy and very 
preoccupied with national and international af­
fairs . . . so I used my energy and my relation­
ship with him to make use of the power he had in 
Congress for the benefit of the concepts and 
ideas that I was interested i n . . .  And with
Interview with Robinson, September 11, 1980.
Interview with Mark Bonner, August 20, 1980. See 
also Rural Louisiana, January, 1962, 2.
Ibid., 2.
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his knowledge, and without being anything but 
the most admiring disciple of his, I sometimes 
kidded him, or cajoled him into positions that 
he did not want to [support], but he would do
it kind of as an accommodation to me.43
This power that was magically transferred from Ellender 
to Edwards was the obvious connection needed to bring 
Ellender around on the loan issue. Bonner and Robinson 
approached him sometime around December 13, 1968, and asked
him to influence Ellender to bring the loan issue to an end.
Edwards agreed.
Edwards called Ellender in Taipei, Taiwan at midnight.
"I deliberately waited until about midnight his time so I 
could catch him in a deep sleep," Edwards remembers. I 
"kind of half-way laughed and apologized, and said I didn't 
realize, and I really did, and he knew I was lying, because 
he knew I knew better.
Edwards recalls their "father-son" conversation (in 
French);
Ellender: "What the devil do you want?"
Edwards : "I got a serious problem."
Ellender: "You gotta wake me up in the middle of 
the night?"
Edwards : "Yeah, goddamn it; you can sleep tomor- .
row. You [are] over there enjoying 
yourself, having a good time and acting 
like an important American, and I'm 
over here taking care of your business."
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Ellender: "Well, what is it?"
("And so I then told him about the problem," of the need 
for his approval for the loan to be released.)
Edwards : "Look, I don't have much time to talk,
this is a long distance phone call,
and I'm going to tell the Secretary 
[of Agriculture] tomorrow that you 
authorized me to do it."
Ellender: "Well, I'm not sure."
Edwards: "I'm not going to get you in any kind
of trouble. If it creates any problem, 
you can always say later that it's not 
so. "
Ellender: "Well, I don't know about that."
Edwards: "Well, okay. I'll see you soon, now
take care, have a good trip, call me 
when you get back."
"And I hung up. The next day I told the Secretary that I
had called him in Taipei and that he had said that it was
all right for me to go ahead and do it." When Ellender
returned in January, Edwards recalls the following
conversation:
Edwards : "I want to tell you what . . . ."
Ellender: "I know what you did. You took advantage 
of the old man."
Edwards : "Oh, no, I would never take advantage
of you. I might fool you in your own
interests, because what I'm doing to 
you here is going to help the state 
and help our area, and help people that 
we both serve. I just thought that I 
would impose upon our relationship by 
going ahead and doing what I know is 
in your best in te r e s t ."45
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There is no reason to believe Ellender was in any way 
duped or misled, but he was certainly forced into a deci­
sion by Edwards that he did not want to make. Bonner refers 
to "static on the line" in the overseas transmission between 
Ellender and Edwards, implying that Ellender was not quite 
certain what was going on, but Bonner, of course, was not 
t h e r e.Edwards,  as the only living member of the two- 
party conversation, must be relied upon: "I would have never 
done anything at all to abuse our friendship, or to take 
advantage of him or do something behind his back, or mis­
represent h i m . I t  also might be added that to abuse 
Ellender would have jeopardized his powerful relationship 
with Ellender to have a simple REA loan approved.
There was another factor that contributed to the re­
lease of the loan in these last days of 1968. The adminis­
tration was lameduck; the November election had cast out 
of office many of those who had the power to keep the door 
closed on the loan, such as Freeman and Clapp. But, of 
course, they had to maintain the government until the Nixon 
Administration officially took the reins of power. Possibly 
Clapp wanted finally to complete a project that he had ap­
proved four years earlier, and fought for since then, before 
he left his post. No one wanted to leave the work undone.
The position of REA Administrator is for ten years, 
but only David Hamil out of ten administrators has served
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and there was a good chance that the Nixon Administration 
would be more sympathetic to the wishes and desire of the 
private utilities than to the co-ops.
Even though the courts agreed that the loan should 
be released, even though Humphrey, Freeman, Clapp, and 
Ellender had all given their approval, and even though a 
check for $226,000 was about to be released from REA, 
there was still a possibility that the companies could ob­
tain a stop order or an injunction before the loan could 
be consummated, that is, before Robinson could spend some 
of the money. Robinson thought (and he turned out to be 
correct) that if he could actually spend money, any request 
for a stop order or injunction by the private utilities 
would be less likely to be granted by the courts because 
the contract had been f u l f i l l e d . S o  it was important 
for Robinson to get the money from Washington to a bank in 
New Roads, write a check, and consummate the loan, moving 
the whole thing into a new phase and, he hoped, out of the 
reach of the private companies. What followed was what 
Bonner called in the January issue of Rural Louisiana,
"A series of ’cloak and dagger' type activities . . . "
out his term in that office. The point to be made here is 
that the position of REA Administrator is political.
Interview with Robinson, September 11, 1980; inter­
view with Robinson, May 19, 1982.
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On December 13, 1968, after Ellender's approval, Clapp 
announced that he would release the loan. The next day, 
the utilities again obtained an injunction from the Federal 
District Court in Shreveport to stop the release of the 
money. This was overruled by the Fifth Circuit Court, 
and the companies, along a route which they had traveled 
before, appealed to the Supreme Court.
On December 24, Robinson (hoping to have the injunc­
tion lifted) made a telephone call to the Department of 
Justice. A rotating Justice remains on duty there all day, 
every day, to review emergency cases. It might not be true 
that this case qualified as an emergency, but, nevertheless, 
a Justice was available on Christmas Eve to hear the case. 
Joseph Swindler, the Chairman of the Federal Power Commission 
in the Johnson Administration, represented the LEC and REA. 
Since a similar case was brought before the Supreme Court 
in 1966 and dismissed, the final injunction against the re­
lease of the loan was quickly lifted. S w i n d l e r  went to 
REA where, despite the holiday, he was able to have a check
Rural Louisiana, January, 1969, 3.
Rural Louisiana, February, 1969, 2; Testimony of 
Charles Roemer before the U.S. Senate Appropriations Com­
mittee, Subcommittee on Agriculture and Related Agencies, 
April 17, 1969 (unpublished copy in Ellender Papers, Box 
356-D), 2.
Interview with Robinson, September 11, 1980; Roemer 
before U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, 2.
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made out for $226,000 to LEC. The problem was that the 
check was in Washington and the bank was in New Roads. 
Robinson feared that the utilities would have another in­
junction brought against the loan before he could deposit 
the money in the bank in New Roads, and spend the money 
and thus consummate the contract. With no way to elec­
tronically transfer funds on Christmas Eve, Robinson's 
only alternative was to physically move the check from 
Washington to New Roads as quickly as possible. Robinson's 
son, who lived in Jackson, Mississippi, agreed to fly to 
Washington, meet Swindler at the airport there, pick up 
the check, and fly back to New Roads. By then it was 
Christmas morning. Robinson met his son at the Baton Rouge 
airport, took the check to New Roads, where Robinson used 
his influence to have the bank opened. He deposited the 
money and wrote a check to a contractor for a fence and a 
temporary road that had been built on the plant site.
The fight for the release of the loan was over. The loan 
was consummated; the contract was fulfilled.
It is difficult to characterize this four-year period 
from September 12, 1964 to December 24, 1968. The co-ops 
and their leaders stopped being purchasers of power, moving 
into the different world of producers, and even sellers, of 
power. But more than that, the four-year period produced
Interview with Robinson, S 
view with Robinson, May 19, 1982.
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a change in attitude from small-time thinkers and small­
time politics to something quite different. Robinson,
Bonner, and Roemer, particularly, had been forced out of 
their little spheres of influence into a larger realm.
Making a trip to Washington to testify before a powerful 
subcommittee, stand before the United States Supreme Court, 
speak poignantly to a powerful Senator or even the Vice 
President would not be something to shy away from in the 
future. Some of today's critics of the generation system 
have said that it was at this point that the LEC leaders 
moved out of their realm and got too big for their britches. 
One state Senator has commented: "Farmers can't run a multi­
million dollar business. That comment may or may not 
be true, but it is certain that this four-year period was 
a watershed in the life of Louisiana's Cooperatives. As 
of December 24, 1968, they were a big operation, with big 
money and big headaches. They had overcome a major obstacle, 
but the road ahead would not be smooth.
27, 1983.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 9
COMPROMISE AND THE RETURN OF DAVID HAMIL
By the mid-Sixties, co-ops all over the nation were 
beginning to move into their own G&T systems and out from 
under the private utilities. It was no secret that the 
federal government would not be able to appropriate the 
money needed to handle such expansion. At the same time, 
opposition was growing in Congress to the lending of two 
percent money from the federal treasury to fuel this 
growth. One-time rural leaders such as Ellender had begun 
to see G&T development as "empire building," and more than 
one group had, since the Eisenhower years, suggested that 
either interest rates to REA be raised to at least four 
percent, or that REA simply be pushed out of the government 
realm altogether and be forced to borrow in the private 
sector. As opposition to two percent money mounted, and 
as it became clear that future Republican administrations 
would be out to alter drastically, or even kill, REA's 
finance program, REA officials began to consider putting 
together some sort of alternative finance program. It was 
a good idea, and an even better one was to try to beat the 
Republicans to the punch. Yet for many of these same
242
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reasons the whole idea had been proposed years earlier by 
David Hamil, the REA Administrator under Eisenhower.
In the summer of 1958, Ezra Taft Benson, Eisenhower's 
Secretary of Agriculture, drafted a bill to force REA to 
borrow in the private sector. As Bonner reported, it 
"would force the co-ops to go to hostile Wall Street 
financiers [who realize] that few co-ops have enough equity 
in their systems to obtain such credit. . . . But, ac­
cording to Bonner, Hamil went out on a limb, against 
administration policy, to block this bill, knowing that 
it would retard the future of REA. As a second option 
Hamil suggested alternative financing, whereby REA would 
set up its own banking system, something akin to the suc­
cessful Farm Credit system. But to most REA leaders this 
was just another Republican scheme to deny them something 
they considered a right--two percent money. Hamil traveled 
the nation meeting with top local co-op leaders, trying to 
drum up support for his plan, but he was, for the most 
part, received as an administration whipping boy sent by 
the evil Benson. Bonner wrote that Hamil had "been coldly 
received by rural electric leaders who think they see a 
power company motivated scheme. . . .
But Bonner liked the idea. Like Hamil, he was enough
 ̂Rural Louisiana, December, 1958, 4.
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of a seer to realize that two-percent money would not hold 
out forever, particularly under future Republican adminis­
trait ions, and that REA had better come up with a program 
before someone else did. And Hamil's idea was the best he 
had heard--it was certainly superior to anything Benson 
had in mind.^ Bonner's notion was well-founded, but, as 
it turned out, he was about the only rural electric leader 
anywhere who supported the idea. The result was banish­
ment. Hamil: "I told them that they needed something be­
sides annual appropriations from Congress. They took 
exception to me immediately. One person who didn't was 
Mark Bonner. And they gave him h e l l . B o n n e r  supported 
Hamil in an editorial in Rural Louisiana in which he stated
meeting in Estes Park, Colorado, Bonner gave further support 
to Hamil.^ Also, simply by refusing to malign Hamil and 
his program in his editorials, Bonner gave a sort of silent 
support that was as important as anything else. To Bonner, 
the controversy was tinged with a slight degree of regret.
^ Telephone interview with Mark Bonner, August 29, 1983.
^ Interview with David Hamil, Sterling, Colorado, May 
31, 1983. The only other national leader to agree with Hamil 
was J. K. Smith, President of the Kentucky statewide organi­
zation. Ibid.
Telephone interview with David Hamil, August 29, 1983.
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He recalls that Hamil "came up with this concept of a 
co-op-owned bank. . . . Well, even [to] the head of NRECA 
and most of our people, that two-percent money was a kind 
of religion . . . and a right in their minds, I didn't 
have any better sense, being a kind of newcomer in the 
field . . .  I wrote a big editorial convincing them to 
make this a future study and idea, and old Clyde Ellis 
[President of NRECA] didn't speak to me for two years 
after that . . .  he felt so strongly about it." But 
Bonner's problems were not only with the national people. 
"And even here in this state, only Lil Killingsworth . . . 
agreed with me. Everyone else said it was one time I 
should have kept my damn mouth shut. Gene Taylor, 
manager at Concordia Electric, would not support him, "and 
Gene has always been on my side." Ironically, only a few 
years later Taylor was on the committee that devised a 
cooperative banking system that was very similar to Hamil's 
1958 proposal.^
By the time other REA and local co-op leaders saw the 
need for something like Hamil's proposal, he was out of 
office with the 1960 Democratic victory ; the push to make 
the cooperative bank a success came between Hamil's terms 
as administrator. Norman Clapp, Hamil's successor, did
 ̂Telephone interview with Mark Bonner, August 29, 1983.
 ̂Interview with E. E. Taylor, Ferriday, Louisiana, 
December 14, 1981.
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not, for some reason, choose to carry the ball. The 
force behind the cooperative bank was Clyde Ellis and 
NRECA.
By 1963, NRECA began looking at Hamil's ideas. They 
contracted a financial consulting firm to explore the 
possibility of a system similar to the Farm Credit system, 
whereby the federal government would lend the bank its 
beginning capital, all of which would be paid back. The 
consulting firm reported in July, 1965, that such a system 
would work, although interest rates would be higher.̂
NRECA and REA combined their efforts to send a bill 
to Congress the next year. The Johnson Administration, 
apparently convinced it had a better idea, drew up a 
similar bill. The administration's bill would have capital­
ized the rural electric bank for $750 million with an inter­
est rate of four percent. The REA bill would set initial 
capitalization at one billion dollars with an interest 
of three p e r c e n t . N e i t h e r  bill was well sponsored or 
supported; consequently both died in committee.
The next year, the bill was reintroduced, this time 
with proper sponsorship. In fact, the bill was connected 
with some of the Senate's most prominent Democrats: Church,
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association,
People— Their Power, The Rural Electric Fact Book (n.p.,
vmrTTT.---------
For a synopsis of the bill, see. Congressional 
Record, 89 Cong., 2 sess., Vol. 122, pt. 22, 1185 (Index); 
ibid., pt. 8, 9785. See also. Rural Louisiana, May, 1966, 2.
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Bayh, Mondale, Cooper, Hart, Hartke, McCarthy, Montoya, 
Muskie, and Symington were just a few of the bill's spon­
sors. But, as NRECA later reported, the bill was amended 
"to the extent that it became totally unacceptable to the 
rural electric systems." NRECA asked that the bill be 
killed.
The next step was to set up a committee to look again 
at the whole matter. In early 1967, the "Parity of Rates" 
committee was organized; the name was later changed to 
the "Long Range Study Committee." This is important to 
Louisiana because Gene Taylor served on this committee.
In March, 1969, after twenty-two meetings with co-op people 
around the country, this group was ready to report its 
findings to the REA administrator— who now was David Hamil. 
For by that time, Nixon was in the White House, and Hamil 
was back in the saddle at REA.
What the committee reported to Hamil in March, 1969, 
was not exactly what he wanted to hear. The group had 
decided that his original ideas could be bettered by a plan 
that would completely circumvent Congress. Their co-op 
bank would be totally free of federal funding from the
For a synopsis of the 1967 bill, see. Congressional 
Record, 90 Cong., 1 sess.. Vol. 113, pt. 28, 1556 (Index); 
ibid., 1624. See also, NRECA, People— Their Power, 75.
Interview with Taylor.
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beginning, financed directly through the resources of the 
nation's co-ops, Hamil remembers his response to the com­
mittee's report: "This isn't the plan I wanted, but if 
this is what you want, I'll do all I can to make it work. 
I'll use every ounce of influence I have. . . . "  "And I
did," he recalls, "and we made it work.
The system is complicated, but generally it is a 
revolving-fund-type plan in which each of the co-ops pay 
a certain amount to capitalize the bank. Then, as members, 
they are able to borrow from the bank using their equity 
as collateral. Congress continued to appropriate some 
two-percent money for those areas where a sparse popula­
tion made service impossible without some sort of government
assistance. The obvious drawback to the program was that 
it was several years after capitalization before the system 
was on its feet and workable. Besides, not all co-ops 
joined.^^
The official name of the bank became National Rural 
Utilities Cooperative Finance Corporation, better known as 
CFC. It was officially incorporated April, 1969, with 
J. K. Smith, the President of the Kentucky statewide and 
leader of the Long Range Study Committee, at its head.
Rural Louisiana, April, 1970, 2. 
NRECA, People--Their Power, 80.
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The CFC opened new doors for rural electric coopera­
tives all over the country, but it had a special signifi­
cance in Louisiana beyond the contributions of Taylor and 
Bonner. CFC, just like the G&T movement in the state, was 
part of a larger mentality among Louisiana's co-op leaders 
to achieve independence ; more exactly, it was a movement 
to become self-sustaining. After years of being charac­
terized as recipients of the federal government's chief 
giveaway program, Louisiana co-op leaders (and very probably 
co-op leaders in other parts of the country) were as de­
lighted to be out from under the thumb of the federal
government as out from under the thumb of the utilities.
This move for independence is apparent in other ways.
Throughout the early Sixties, Bonner published numerous 
articles on the theme of "we are not the REA." He pounded 
and pounded the point that REA was merely a lending agency, 
a government-backed bank, and that the co-ops were simply 
private borrowers--privately owned c ompan i e s . " L i k e  
millions of FHA and VA homeowners," he wrote, "REA borrowers 
must replay their loan[s] on strict schedules, plus interest
For a few of dozens of examples, see, Rural Louisiana, 
December, 1968, 2; ibid., July, 1960, 2; ibid., March, 1960,
2; ibid., November, 1961, 2; ibid., July, 1961, 2; ibid., 
November, 1962, 2; ibid., September, 1962, 2; ibid., July, 
1962, 2; ibid., January, 1963, 2; ibid., May, 1961, 2; ibid., 
April, 1961, 2; ibid.. February, 1961, 2; ibid.. June, 1966,
2; ibid. . July, 1966, 2; ibid., December, 1965, 2; ibid.,; 
August, 1965, 2.
Ibid., April, 1961, 2.
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"Ours never was a giveaway program. REA is a prudent 
banker. It does not own a foot of line in Louisiana or 
e l s e w h e r e . I n  1959, in a small but significant showing 
of independence, Bonner suggested strongly that Louisiana 
co-ops remove their REA signs from their buildings and 
stop answering the telephone, " R E A . I n  1961, he wrote, 
"Some cooperatives . . . answer their phone with a cheery, 
REA. Others are so proud of their independence [that] 
they wouldn't be caught dead with anything marked REA.
To the conservative Bonner, it was important that Louisiana' 
co-ops be independent private enterprises--not extensions 
of a government agency, and not regulated by any group.
This need was also reflected in the various Public Service 
Commission fights over the years. PSC regulation was 
anathema to the co-op leaders. Freedom and independence 
from all regulation was the conventional wisdom of LEC and 
ALEC officials in the Sixties and Seventies, and Bonner 
was the main leader and spokesman of that wisdom.
It is significant to note that SLEMCO, the only co-op 
not to join LEC and thereby support LEC's independence in 
that way, did not join CFC. If CFC and LEC were cries for 
independence from the rest of the group, then SLEMCO and 
Gajan, in their stalwart insistence in not joining, showed.
Ibid., May, 1961, 2.
Ibid., February, 1961, 2.
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if not dependence, an inability to look to the future, 
and to the inevitability and need for coining growth.
When Hamil again took the reins of power in 1969, 
there were two looming problems left over from Clapp's 
administration, one in Indiana, the other in Louisiana.
Both problems were virtually the same. Loans had been 
made to G&T groups in each state to build a generating 
plant and transmission lines from the plant to the various 
distribution cooperatives in the state. In Indiana, the 
transmission lines alone would cost some $20 million.
In Louisiana, the bill would run close to $30 million.
Hamil came to office with a plan for these two systems 
that would initially not be popular in either state. Why, 
he asked, should the federal government lend a total of 
$50 million to Indiana and Louisiana to build transmission 
systems when transmission systems already existed?^^ Over 
the years, the private utilities in both states had, of 
course, built transmission lines from their plants to the 
distribution co-ops. It would be a simple matter to con­
nect the new co-op plants to the transmission system of the 
private companies--to integrate the systems. As Hamil saw
Norman Clapp, "Information Relating to the 'A' Loan 
Application of Louisiana Electric Cooperative, Inc. of New 
Roads, Louisiana" (September 12, 1964, unpublished copy in 
ALEC files, Baton Rouge).
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it, the inability of the two groups (the co-op people and 
the private utility people) to see eye-to-eye on how 
things should be done was no reason for the federal govern­
ment to pay out $50 million in loans. "We weren't going 
to loan a hell of a lot of money to build a system when 
there was already a system t h e r e . S o  he set out on an 
odyssey to force the lion to lie down with the lamb, as 
Bonner refers to it. Or, as Robinson says, it was "time 
for us to get into bed together. "When I wasn't in 
Indianapolis, I was in New Orleans or Baton Rouge," Hamil 
remembers. "I spent my whole first year arbitrating these 
damn things.
So Hamil forced the warring groups to the peace table. 
But in reality, LEC was coming to the end of its rope and 
needed a few concessions from the companies to make its 
plan work. LEC had enjoyed some important victories, but 
the companies were simply too strong to fight toe-to-toe. 
Soon, LEC would need approval from the state legislature 
to borrow from CFC, and in the past, the companies' legis­
lative influence had skyrocketed the cost of construction 




Rural Louisiana, May, 1972, 2-A.
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build it, let alone pay for additional transmission con­
struction— even the down-seated standby scheme of trans­
mission lines to Dow, Plaquemine, and L a f a y e t t e . T o  
add to their problems, it appeared that the companies 
were about to marshal their legal forces to halt construc­
tion.^^ By the time the legalities were all ironed out, 
by the time the companies had explored all their legal 
options, inflation and legal fees could bring LEC to its 
knees. All this is not to say that LEC surrendered--On 
the contrary, it won the right to generate. And to Bonner, 
that was "a foot in the door."^^
Hamil came to REA in February, 1969. The compromise 
to connect the systems was underway by June. Hamil brought 
with him to the negotiations his right-hand-man, Reggie 
Cole. Cole was Hamil's engineering consultant and counselor, 
and when he returned to Washington, Cole stayed to carry on 
the negotiations. Cole was known for his expertise but not 
for his diplomacy. His occasional astringent attitude, 
though, was a consequence of direct orders from Hamil.
At one point in the negotiations in 1972, Coie'c strong 
language was entered into LEC's minutes : "Like it or not,"
Louisiana Electric Cooperative, "Minutes," June 17, 
1969, ALEC files. Baton Rouge.
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he stated, "LEC is going to have to join with Louisiana 
utility companies in certain areas. LEC will have to work 
with all other power suppliers." You must "pull together, 
support decisions, and quit 'snipping' at personalities 
and policies.
Sometime in early June, Hamil met with the leaders 
of all the groups involved. The dates of these meetings 
are not clear, but on June 17, LEC reported it had been 
served with an injunction to halt construction.^^ Eleven 
days later, Hamil agreed to approach Floyd Lewis, Presi­
dent of LP&L and Hamil's personal friend, "and advise him 
that LEC is not interested in compromising until the 
private utilities stop filing suit against them. . .
So, with that, or at least by that date, the compromise 
had begun. On June 23, the companies were apparently 
ready to agree to a compromise, but, in a letter to Hamil, 
Lewis was not willing to have the Dow Pool as any part of 
i t T h i s  became a sticking point in the compromise, 
mainly because Robinson felt a moral obligation to Dow, 
Plaquemine, and Lafayette, and did not want to leave them
files. Baton Rouge). Hamil made this remark to Schwab, an 
LEC attorney, who informed Robinson of the conversation in 
this correspondence.
Floyd Lewis to David Hamil, June 23, 1969 (copy in 
ALEC files, Baton Rouge).
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high and dry without any standby arrangement.
The compromise, as it was finally laid out and agreed 
upon, came out of several closed meetings from June, 1969, 
to May, 1970. The two groups agreed that LEC would build 
the plant and produce the electricity. But the companies 
would buy the output of the plant and then wheel the power 
over their lines to co-op distribution points around the 
state for a fixed rate. In other words, the LEC plant 
would simply add to the overall pool of power within the 
private utilities' systems, and then the co-ops would buy 
back at a fixed rate the power they needed for their systems. 
It was a good deal for LEC; they avoided the cost of trans­
mission facilities, while receiving the right to generate. 
That the power traversed private lines was really of no 
consequence. LEC profited from the sale of the electricity 
they produced, which kept down the cost of purchasing it 
at the other end. Furthermore, there was no need for 
standby power with this arrangement ; the companies were 
more than capable of supplying that, too. At the same time, 
the consumers would receive electricity at a lower rate than 
if LEC had tried to build its own transmission system.
The integrated system was the foundation of the com­
promise, but there were other factors involved. In June, 
1970, LEC agreed to join the private companies in
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co-sponsoring a bill before the Louisiana Legislature to 
place the co-ops under the complete regulation of the PSC 
This was a weighty concession from LEC, but in exchange 
they received two concessions that were just as important 
to them. First of all, the companies agreed not to block 
a bill that would establish territorial integrity in the 
state, something that LEC had been fighting for unsuccess­
fully in the Louisiana Legislature since 1962. The new 
bill was the same as the old one; there would be no dupli­
cation of facilities within 300 feet of each other's lines 
The companies also agreed not to stand in the way of an 
ALEC bill to allow the state's co-ops to borrow money from 
lending institutions other than REA.^^ This opened the 
door for membership in CFC, but it also allowed LEC and its 
members to take advantage of a new loan system that was set 
up by the Nixon Administration in 1973. All in all, these 
were important concessions.
But LEC still demanded that some accommodation be 
made to Dow, Plaquemine, and Lafayette. The LEC pooling 
arrangement with these three generating concerns had rubbed 
the companies the wrong way, and now they did not want to 
take up LEC's obligation as a condition of the compromise.
House Bill #946. Legislative Calehdar of the State 
of Louisiana, 33 regular session, 1970, 260.
Ibid., 260.
Ibid., 111-112.
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But Robinson had arranged the agreements, and he did not 
want to turn his back simply because the arrangement was 
no longer convenient.^® He insisted that the three 
members receive the same benefits they would have received 
had the pooling relationship with LEC been carried out. 
Finally, in May, 1972, Bonner reported that the companies 
had agreed to work out some sort of arrangement.^^ In 
October, GSU (the company that would be serving the group) 
agreed to offer interconnection agreements to Lafayette 
and Plaquemine but would not agree to extend the same pro­
posal to Dow--GSU continued to consider Dow a purchaser 
rather than a generator of electricity. GSU did, though, 
agree to furnish standby power to Dow, which was apparently 
all Dow wanted because the agreement satisfied all con­
cerned. LEC and Robinson had fulfilled their obligation.
All of this, of course, had to be formalized in con­
tracts. In May, 1970, LEC and the three companies had come 
to an agreement to provide wholesale power to all the twelve 
c o - o p s . B y  September, Hamil was commending the LEC 
leaders for "their efforts toward resolving the long-standing
(n.p., n.d.), unnumbered page.
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differences with the power companies. A year later, 
he summed it all up: "The progress toward working out an 
agreement between Louisiana Electric Cooperative, the 
G&T federation, and the investor-owned companies, was a 
major accomplishment. . . .  It means an end to expensive 
litigation, involving the right to serve rural loads as 
well as the right to generate and transmit power through 
LEC, and legal recognition of your territorial rights, 
together with the right to generate power.
But agreeing to agree was only the first (although a 
giant) step toward completion of the compromise. It was 
necessary to bring the companies to the table to sign the 
necessary contracts. Not until May, 1972, did GSU agree 
to the terms of the interconnection a g r e e m e n t . T h e y  
would deliver power to the four southwestern-most co-ops : 
Dixie, Pointe Coupee, Beauregard, and Jeff Davis. When 
LEC's plant capacity expanded in the mid-seventies, allow­
ing it to fulfill the power needs of the other nine co-ops, 
then contracts were to be signed with CLECO and LP&L, but
Rural Louisiana, September, 1976, 6.
Ibid., September, 1971, 9. Hamil made this state­
ment on August 26, 1971. Ibid., 9.
The announcement that LP&L signed an interconnection 
agreement came at the LEC meeting Cby now changed from LEC 
to Cajun Electric) on May 25, 1976. Cajun Electric, "Minutes, 
May 25, 1976. One month later, CLECO signed. Ibid., June 
23, 1976. GSU signed the next year. Ibid., October 28, 1977.
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until then, it was only necessary to "lie down with" GSU.
There were no winners or losers in this compromise.
But LEG did earn the fundamental right to generate power, 
while at the same time the companies had to surrender their 
advantageous position as the sole wholesale power producers 
in the state. This right (as much a right as a precedent) 
would allow LEG to grow unhampered in the future--one plant, 
then two, then more, until they could generate all the 
electricity the state's co-ops needed.
The companies were charged with buying this power, 
but that power enhanced their pooling and generating 
capacity. In the case of LP&L and GSU, their pooling range 
covers large parts of the Southeast and West. Any power 
brought into that pool was an advantage. Furthermore, by 
maintaining the transmission systems the companies con­
tinued to possess a degree of control over LEG and the 
co-ops, something they had always seen as important. There 
might be another generating system operating in Louisiana, 
but there was not another complete system (generation and 
transmission) in competition, setting rates. The co-ops 
were still buying electricity from the companies, and 
therefore contracts would have to be signed for the price 
of that electricity, even though they were somewhat com­
promised by having to buy it in the first place at the 
front end of the deal. The companies still had the monopoly, 
in a limited sense. They were in control, they had the
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leverage, they were still selling electricity to the co-ops, 
and, most of all, there was not an independent system run­
ning head-to-head against them.
Hamil was the key to the compromise. In fact, it is 
nearly impossible to underestimate his importance here.
As a Republican, he had the clout with the private com­
panies to bring them to the bargaining table. Clapp could 
not have done it. As a Democrat, Clapp was the enemy in 
the eyes of the Louisiana companies, he was out to destroy 
them, even take them over. At the same time, Hamil was a 
conservative, and, of course, REA Administrator. This put 
him on the side of both groups. Kamil's job of straddling 
these two antagonists was remarkable. Today, he counts 
both Mark Bonner and Floyd Lewis among his best friends, 
friends that he had made before his second term, before 
the negotiations and subsequent compromise b e g a n . A n d  
there is no doubt that he brought his friendship to bear, 
together with his political influence, to see to it that 
Louisiana (and Indiana, incidentally) developed an inte­
grated system whether they wanted it or not. The result 
in efficiency, to say nothing of money saved, was enormous.
From the compromise, LEC leaders discovered something 
that must have been distressing, at least to Bonner and 
Robinson. Independence, as sacred an ideal as it was, was
47 Interview with Hamil, May 31, 1983.
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very expensive, and, at least for now, unattainable. It 
was one thing to remove "REA" from the co-op buildings.
It was quite another to build transmission lines to each 
co-op. Also, by coming under PSC jurisdiction (the ul­
timate regulatory agency in Bonner's eyes) LEC left behind 
all thoughts of independence, at least for the immediate 
future. It must have been disheartening. In order to 
receive the all important right to generate, LEC had to 
come under PSC regulation, as well as surrender its dream 
of being totally outside the realm of the private utilities, 
of being totally independent of a total monopoly.
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CHAPTER 10 
CAJAN II AND THE QUEST FOR COAL
Compared to the rough trip from conception to con­
summation, the road for EEC's leaders from ground breaking 
to completion was relatively smooth. After carrying out 
that Christmas Day loan deposit and check-writing scheme, 
Robinson did not waste any time in getting the system 
organized, people hired, and construction started. His 
first move was to hire a manager, someone with experience 
who could supervise the plant's entire construction and 
operation. The manager's role would be similar to the 
manager's position at the smaller distribution co-ops ; he 
would be a paid professional who would head the operation 
with approval from the board of directors. Robinson did 
not go through any long-range search to fill the position. 
More through luck than anything else, he stumbled upon a 
highly qualified individual who, before he left LEC, be­
came an extremely powerful and important figure in it. 
Robinson is not disposed to dalliance. He gets things done. 
And so was the case in his hiring of Merle Burgin.
Burgin had been the chief engineer at Basin Electric 
Co-op in Bismark, North Dakota, from 1963 to about 1967.
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Basin is a generating co-op with the distinction of being 
the largest lignite-fired plant in the country. It also 
had the nation's lowest operating costs.^ Burgin had left 
his position there after completing his job of getting 
their first plant into operation, and went on to work for 
a contracting firm. He found quickly that contracting was 
not his calling, and, after only a year or so, began look­
ing for something else. He mentioned his interest in a 
new job to a friend at Basin Electric who told him about 
the situation in Louisiana— LEC had gotten its loan and 
would soon be needing top-level employees. His friend 
suggested that he call Bubba Robinson in New Roads. Finally, 
after some difficulty with the telephone operators in de­
ciphering Robinson's nickname, Burgin reached Robinson at 
about 9:00 p.m. on January 10, 1969. After telling 
Robinson of his interest in the position, he received one 
of Robinson's characteristic responses: "Can you be here 
at one o'clock tomorrow?" Burgin tried to meet the demand, 
but the best he could do was 2:30. So, they met January 11, 
a Saturday. By Tuesday, Robinson had contacted REA in 
Washington, received a favorable report on Burgin, and 
hired him. He called Burgin to tell him the news : "Can
People--Their Power: The Rural Electric Fact Book (n.p.,
1980) , 60. Interview with Merle Burgin, New Roads, Louisiana, 
August 5, 1982.
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Burgin could not make the Wednesday request, but he 
did come on the job January 20. Robinson had rented some 
space in the old King Theater in downtown New Roads.̂
The office was small, only about 900 square feet. They 
partitioned that small space into a reception area and 
three offices. By February first, they were in business.̂
To those who today complain that LEC is a billion- 
dollar operation that should not be in the hands of a few 
farmers, Merle Burgin should be offered as an example of 
experience and qualification. He is not from Louisiana, 
and in the late 1960's, when LSU and other Louisiana 
colleges were just beginning to upgrade their engineering 
programs, it was probably necessary to bring in such out­
side talent. Burgin, a native of Kansas, received both 
bachelor's and master's degrees from Kansas State University, 
and then went on to a career as manager of generating 
facilities in Rockport, Missouri, and Bloomington, Illinois, 
before he took the position at Basin Electric in 1963.  ̂
Burgin's experience at Basin would have a profound impact 
on LEC throughout the Seventies. VJhether or not he steered
^ Interview with Burgin, August 5, 1982.
^ Rural Louisiana, August, 1978, 8; Louisiana Electric 
Cooperative, l97l Ahriual Report (n.p., n.d. ), 5.
^ Interview with Burgin, August 5, 1982.
5 Ibid.
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LEC in the right direction in those years is a matter for 
debate, but, without a doubt, he was qualified for the job 
when Robinson hired him in 1969.
Before construction of the plant could begin a fuel 
source was required, and the obvious fuel for LEC was 
natural gas. In the Sixties fuel was seemingly abundant-- 
and cheap. But LEC was not large enough to attract good, 
low-priced, long-term contracts. Robinson had received 
some commitments from Texaco in 1968, but he was kept from 
signing a contract because he did not know how long the 
problems with the private utilities would last, and there­
fore did not know when LEC could take delivery on the fuel—  
an important part of any fuel contract. So, Robinson's 
hands were tied, at least until he could force solutions 
to his problems. Texaco certainly knew of Robinson's 
predicament— that once the legal barriers were removed, 
there would be a very short time before the loan was re­
leased. Robinson would have only that short time in which 
to negotiate a fuel contract. He would have to take what 
he could get. Texaco had made some tentative commitments 
that Robinson had relied upon, but just when the time came 
to sign the contracts, they backed out. Bonner still feels 
that the private companies had something to do with it.
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situation fell into Bonner's hands. The only way to bring 
Texaco around was to use some political influence, he 
thought. So he went to his old friend and savior-of-the- 
day, John McKeithen. On a Saturday, McKeithen, and his 
administrative assistant Lewis Quinn, wrote a letter over 
the governor's signature to the president of Texaco, and 
then they tried to reach him by telephone. The call was 
successful. McKeithen's clout forced the Texaco president 
to agree to work out some sort of contract with Robinson 
and LEC.^ Without this contract, the loan would certainly 
have been delayed, allowing the companies again to marshal 
their legal forces to stop the loan release; McKeithen had 
again saved the day.
The agreement that Robinson signed appeared at the 
time to be extremely bad for LEC. With gas prices running 
in the vicinity of seventeen to eighteen cents per million 
BTU's, LEC got stuck with an exorbitant twenty cents. It 
looked like a terrible deal. But three years later gas 
prices were sixty cents per million BTU's and Texaco was 
begging LEC to abrogate the contract.̂
Having acquired fuel, a loan, and a manager, LEC held 
ground breaking ceremonies on the plant site in New Roads
 ̂Ibid.
 ̂Interview with Burgin, August 5, 1982; Carroll P. 
Trosclair, Big Cajun (n.p., n.d., photostatic copy of 
pamphlet in ALEC files, Baton Rouge), 9; See also. Rural 
Louisiana, July, 1974, 3.
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between the companies and LEC was well underway, and by 
then it must have appeared that all would soon agree, that 
Hamil's influence would be successfully brought to bear on 
both sides of the fight. The ceremony itself was a modest 
affair. No big names attended, and Bonner did not even 
bother to report it in Rural Louisiana. This was partly 
because there were still some possibilities that the entire 
program would fall through, or be delayed even further. 
Nevertheless, on that date the ceremony occurred and con­
struction officially began.
From the beginning of construction in late June, 1969, 
until the plant was completed in May, 1972, things went 
so smoothly that the various problems are hardly worth men­
tioning. There was a labor dispute at the outset of con­
struction, and contract negotiations concinued with GSU, 
but for the most part, construction proceeded w e l l O n  
September 22, 1970, LEC leaders made their first on-site 
inspection of the plant. Bonner hailed it as a milestone 
in the history of the p r o g r a m . I n  April, 1971, Bonner
 ̂LEC, 1971 Annual Report, 11.
LEC, 1971 Annual Report, 5.
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announced that the plant was fifty percent complete, 
and two months later, he prematurely announced that the 
plant was nearing completion.
The engineering firms that built the plant were Bovay 
Engineers of Houston, and Burns and McDonnell of Kansas 
City. Bovay had had a long relationship with LEC. When 
the co-ops were first thinking about a G&T in 1960, Bovay 
did the feasibility studies. Over the years, Bovay had 
done a considerable amount of work for LEC on a provisional 
basis, that is, for no compensation until a loan was 
granted. Bovay's history of a good working relationship 
endeared that company Cand its founder and President,
Harry E. Bovay, Jr.) to LEC, and to Robinson and Roemer in 
particular. Later, when Roemer became Edwin Edward's 
Commissioner of Administration, Bovay became the chief 
engineering firm of the Edwards Administration. But, in 
1970, it was Bovay that ran the show at the LEC plant. The 
other firm. Burns and McDonnell, was a veteran in power- 
plant design, and was the principal designer of the plant. 
Art Hartung was in charge of the firm's operation at New 
R o a d s . B o v a y ,  and Burns and McDonnell worked together, 
dividing the engineering responsibilities of the plant—
Ibid., April, 1971, 4.
Ibid., July, 1971, 5.
LEC, 1971 Annual Report, 9; Rural Louisiana, May, 
1972, 10-A.
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and the fee, $ 1 , 2 3 7 , 0 0 0 . The boiler manufacturer was 
the Riley Stoker Company (now the Riley Company), of 
Skokie, Illinois. Riley also built the steam generators. 
The cost for both was in the vicinity of 5.5 million 
dollars. The total cost of the plant was $32 million, 
and its output was about 230,000 kilowatts, only thirty 
to forty percent of LEC’s needs at the time of completion 
On May 31, 1972, the plant was declared commercial, 
and on a sunny June 10, a fair-like dedication ceremony 
was held under a big tent near the plant in New Roads.
Three thousand people attended, and so did all the politi­
cians who hoped to bask in the political limelight of the 
event. Edwin Edwards, having just been inaugurated two 
months before, was the center of attention. Hamil, and 
even Norm Clapp, attended. Possibly the biggest surprise 
was that Ellender showed up to tell the crowd that he was 
delighted that the plant would be capable of producing 
power at such a low cost, and that LEC had been able to 
come to some agreement with the companies over transmission 
facilities. Ellender, running for his seventh term in the 
Senate, certainly would not miss such an opportunity to 
claim all the credit he could for the new facility. He 
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a heart attack on July 27 at his office in Washington.
The man to succeed him in the Senate, J. Bennett Johnston, 
also attended the dedication, as did other lesser-known 
figures, such as Congressman John Rarick, Congressional 
Candidate Gillis Long, and Commissioner of Agriculture 
Dave Pearce. As Louisiana political events go, this was 
a major affair
The ceremony was covered by a local Baton Rouge tele­
vision station, which interviewed all the dignitaries and 
most of the LEC officials. The Baton Rouge Morning Advo­
cate also did a story that made the top of the front page, 
that included a photograph of Hamil, Edwards, and Ellender.
The incident at the ceremony that deserves the least 
attention (but the incident that the Morning Advocate 
dwelled upon the most) was an ironic one : during Robinson's 
all-important opening speech, there was a power failure. 
Robinson had to complete his speech with a battery-powered 
bull horn. The embarrassment must have been evident in 
some red faces. The facilities around the plant, strangely 
enough, were hooked into the GSU system rather than the 
power system of the new plant, causing Roemer to speculate
New York Times, New York Times Obituary Index, 1969- 
1978 (New York Times PubHsHïng~T^pâïty7~TWBüJ7"lZôrrTri 
Sec. II, 33.
Baton Rouge Mofnihg Advocate, June 11, 1972, 1, 6.
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(although somewhat jokingly) that GSU was to b l a m e . B u t  
such an incident, with its all-too-coincidental feature, 
must have raised some discerning eyebrows. Was GSU sending 
a signal that they were still there, still in control as 
transmitter of the power? Or was it some kind of symbol?
A romantic might see it as the end of an era of antagonism, 
and, with the return of power thirty minutes later, the 
dawning of a new cooperative age. Whatever the cause,
Edwards made the best of it. Just as it was time for him 
to speak, the power returned. And, to nobody's surprise 
Edwards took the credit. He went on from that glorious 
beginning to compare himself to the plant. "We both generate 
sparks. Possibly one irony deserves another.
After all had said their piece, everyone ate jambalaya 
and barbecue beef and went home. The plant, though, con­
tinued to run at nearly full capacity for the next three 
to four years, generating nearly forty percent of the power 
needed by the LEC system.
Just prior to the dedication ceremonies (.sometime in 
early May) the LEC board decided that the plant needed a 
name. Bonner came up with the name Cajun, intending to 
dedicate it to Edwin Edwards, the one person who Bonner
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
felt did more than any other Louisiana political figure to 
aid the p r o g r a m . I t  might also have been in Bonner's 
mind that this newly elected governor would probably have 
eight more years in office to assist LEC in future endeavors, 
endeavors that would soon dwarf that little 230 megawatt 
plant. Edwards, of course, would want more than a simple 
namesake in exchange for his support, but such a gesture 
might endear him to LEC. Bonner then decided that alone, 
the name Cajun lacked flair, and suggested that the name 
be Big C a j u n . T o  many supporters, Edwards had often been 
referred to as the Big Cajun, (just as McKeithen had been 
referred to as Big John) in obvious reference to Edwards' 
standing among his fellow Acadians. At the dedication 
ceremony, Edwards stated his approval of the name : "How 
could I turn down an invitation to speak at the dedication 
of a plant called Big Cajun No. 1?"^^
Hamil approved of the name Big Cajun, and at the 
ceremonies he called it "colorful and distinctive." But 
he went on to suggest that the LEC board might consider 
changing its name from LEC to Big Cajun, Inc.^^ Hamil felt
Telephone interview with Mark Bonner, September 2, 
1983; Rural Louisiana, May, 1972, 1-A. This is the first 
reference to Big Cajun in Rural Louisiana.
Telephone interview with Mark Bonner, September 2,
1983.
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that the name Louisiana Electric Cooperative was too easily 
confused with the public relations group, the Association 
of Louisiana Electric Cooperatives, particularly since both 
groups were made up of many of the same people. Also, the 
acronyms, ALEC and LEC made the whole thing even more con­
fusing. Bonner agreed. If it did nothing else, a new 
name would straighten out the post office; each group too 
often received the other's mail. So, it was done. In 
November, 1972, Bonner announced in Rural Louisiana that 
Louisiana Electric Cooperative would be renamed Cajun 
Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. (not the Big Cajun that 
Hamil had suggested), and the always present acronym was 
adopted: CEPCO.^^ But in this case, CEPCO did not stick, 
except for use on occasional letterheads, correspondences, 
and publications, while the name Cajun Electric did. So, 
there is still some confusion between Cajun the plant 
(usually referred to as Big Cajun), and Cajun the organiza­
tion (usually Cajun Electric). ALEC, of course, kept its 
old name and purpose, and, in the spirit of growth and 
development, built a new building in Baton Rouge in 
September.
May 31, 1983.
Rural Louisiana, November, 1972, 6. The board of 
directors officially adopted the name in December. Cajun, 
"Minutes," January 30, 1973, ALEC files. Baton Rouge.
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Also in September, SLEMCO came back into the fold, 
or at least partially so, by rejoining ALEC.^^ Among all 
the reasons for this occurrence, probably the most im­
portant was the intervention of the ubiquitous David Hamil, 
always ready to force a compromise between warring factions 
by applying pressure at just the right point. As in the 
compromise between the companies and LEC in June, he used 
his club of friendship to pound out this agreement. Hamil 
had known Gajan from his first stint in office. After all, 
SLEMCO was the largest co-op in the nation at that time, 
and Gajan was probably the most influential co-op leader 
in the state. The two had met both socially and profes­
sionally on several occasions. Relating to the reunion, 
Hamil states that he did not cause it, but that he did 
encourage it.^^
Another factor in all this is that the ten-year con­
tract that SLEMCO signed in 1962 had just come to an end. 
The new ten-year contract that they had to sign with GSU 
was less generous than the earlier one. So, a move to
Interview with Hamil, May 31, 1983; Interview with 
U. J. Gajan, Lafayette, Louisiana, November 16, 1981.
U. J. Gajan to Allen Ellender, January 29, 1963, 
copy in ALEC files. Baton Rouge. This letter discusses 
the 1962-ten year contract.
Interview with Earl Broussard, Baton Rouge, March 
4, 1983. Broussard is public relations director for GSU.
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Cajun for cheaper electricity was characteristic of Gajun, 
SLEMCO had had several studies done and even considered 
buying a part of a CLECO plant under construction, but,
"we looked at [the alternatives] very closely," Gajun 
recalls, "and based upon the study that we made, right or 
wrong, it showed that we'd be better off with Cajun. Cajun 
wanted us to join, so we agreed, . . This was late
in 1975, and his decision must also have been influenced 
by the fuel situation that had changed drastically with 
the Arab boycott of 1973. By then, few were questioning 
how much electricity would cost, only that there would be 
enough for the future. In the Cajun minutes of September 
23, 1975, it was entered that Gajan had inquired about 
j o i n i n g . I t  was not until April 26, 1977, that he was 
accepted as a member of the Cajun board, and the great 
schism was patched up. Even Robinson agreed, having his 
agreement placed in the record seconding the motion for a 
unanimous v o t e . T h e  only lagging problem was SLEMCO's 
1972 ten-year contract with GSU. But finally with some of 
his characteristic muscle-flexing, Hamil was able to bring 
GSU and Cajun to an agreement on that. The GSU-SLEMCO
Interview with Gajan, November 16, 1981; Cajun 
"Minutes," October 28, 1975.
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contract was assigned to Cajun. It ran out in 1982.^®
Merle Burgin's experience had given him an insight 
into the future. Well before the 1973 Arab oil embargo, 
well before the Federal Power Commission decided that gas 
was a fuel too pure to burn in boilers, and before gas was 
priced out of sight, Burgin was pushing for a switch from 
natural gas to coal. It must have been difficult to make 
Louisiana residents consider coal as a fuel source. Why 
should this state, sitting on one of the largest gas re­
serves in the world, ever consider shipping coal from the 
north to fuel its power plants? "I could see the hand­
writing on the wall," he states today, "there wasn't going 
to be any gas. I knew they couldn't continue to burn 
natural gas in power plants. It's wrong to take [as] fine 
a fuel as natural gas is and use it in a power plant that 
can burn coal, or something else not as e x o t i c . O f  
course, Burgin was from Kansas, and natural gas was more 
exotic to him than to his all-local board members at Cajun. 
But several things helped Burgin get his point across and 
bring around his skeptical Louisiana friends.
The coal that Burgin wanted to use was Great Plains 
lignite. The transportation costs, though, from Wyoming
Ibid., July 25, 1977.
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or Montana to Louisiana were prohibitive before 1972. But, 
as Burgin had predicted, things changed drastically as the 
decade progressed. As gas prices increased in 1972, and 
then went through the roof during the 1973 oil embargo, 
the price of Great Plains lignite, plus shipping, dropped 
below those high gas prices. In 1973, the cost of natural 
gas to Cajun was about the same as the cost to buy and 
transport lignite from the Northern P l a i n s . A s  the 
Seventies progressed, not only did coal become increasingly 
cheaper than gas, but gas became impossible to get. "I 
called Texaco one time," Burgin recalls, "and I said, what 
would you say to me if I told you I wanted to buy firm 
gas for two 500 megawatt units? They said, we'd tell you 
to go find some other source of e n e r g y . S o  gas was 
generally out of the question as a fuel for the future.
Moreover, in late 1973, the Federal Power Commission 
ruled that, because of the shortages created by the oil 
embargo, interstate gas (the only gas that the FPC has 
jurisdiction over) would be curtailed and sent north for 
priority use. Just as Burgin had predicted, "I knew they 
couldn't continue to burn natural gas in power plants.
Trosclair, Big Cajun, 9. Rural Louisiana, August, 
1974, 3; ibid., Febîïïaïy7T^72, 9.
Interview with Burgin, August 5, 1982.
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But Texaco was able to deliver on its contract for the most 
part. Burgin recalls that several times they tried to pur­
chase the contract, and even one time came up with the 
excuse that their wells had frozen. But because of some 
curtailment of Louisiana gas, Gajun was forced to buy stand­
by fuel oil to keep the plant at 100 percent capacity, and 
that also drove up the price of generation, making coal 
even more attractive. Robinson stated in Cajun Electric's 
1974 Annual Report that over a three-year period prices 
climbed from 2.5 mills per kilowatt hour with natural gas 
to nearly thirty mills with the use of fuel oil.^^ This 
was a bleak situation, and it appeared that the future held 
an even worse prospect.
In early 1972, the Southwestern Electric Power Company 
took the first big step in the South and purchased a large 
tract of coal-producing land in W y o m i n g . S W E P C O  is an 
investor-owned company located in Shreveport, serving north­
west Louisiana and parts of Texas and Arkansas. Because of 
its early entrance into the field of coal generation, SWEPCO 
gained an advantage over all other power companies in
Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., 1974 
Annual Report (n.p., n.d.). 2.
Telephone interview with W. G. Brandon, March 4, 
1983. Brandon is the Vice-President at Southwestern Elec­
tric Power Company in Shreveport. SWEPCO's purchase of 
Wyoming coal was first announced at a Cajun board meeting 
on October 24, 1972. Cajun, "Minutes," October 24, 1972.
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Louisiana, and today serves its customers with the lowest 
rates in the s t a t e . B u r g i n  and Cajun were only a short 
step behind.
The coal itself has some properties worth discussing. 
It is lignite, a soft coal, but, in this case, with a very 
low sulphur content. This makes it more desirable than 
Kentucky, Illinois, or West Virginia bituminous coal. 
Lignite (at least this lignite) does not require expensive 
scrubbers to keep the plant from polluting the air. It 
had not been used before because of the tremendous expense 
of transporting it such long distance from the Northern 
Plains. But now, in 1973, it was f e a s i b l e . B a s i c  Elec­
tric, the plant that Burgin supervised and helped build, 
was constructed directly on a lignite deposit, eliminating, 
of course, the problems and cost of transportation. Basin 
paid only thirteen to seventeen cents per million BTU's.
It would cost Cajun, according to Bovay's studies, some 
sixty cents after transportation costs were a d d e d . T h a t  
translates to a cost per mined ton of about five dollars. 
Transportation costs would be an additional $10.50.^^ 
Lignite is a poor quality coal, and it also has a high 
moisture level that would later produce severe problems.
45 See Appendix XXI.
46
Big Cajun, 9.
Interview with Burgin, October 5, 1982; Trosclair,
Trosclair, Big Cajun, 9.
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But, as Burgin has stated, "it can be burned in a power 
plant." But probably the most important factor was that 
there was plenty of it. "There's enough coal up there 
to take care of our needs for hundreds of years," Burgin 
stated in 1974.^^ So, western lignite seemed the thing.
But to install two five-hundred megawatt plants, no 
matter how good the idea was, would be expensive, costing 
something in the vicinity of six hundred million dollars. 
After the difficulty LEC had in obtaining fifty-four 
million dollars from REA, how could Cajun have such a 
large amount approved? Nixon managed to take care of that 
on the day of his innauguration when he declared that all 
REA loans "will be made as guaranteed and insured loans 
under the authority of . . . the Rural Development Act of 
1 9 7 2 . It was a real dumping of the whole REA program, 
but a "new REA Act," signed May 1, 1973, fell right into 
the hands of programs like Cajun's that needed large 
amounts of money to continue their plans. REA, today, 
refers to it as a broadening of the program because it 
allows REA borrowers to borrow increasing amounts of money. 
Most of the assistance would be in the form of loan 
guarantees. REA would simply guarantee the money needed.
Trosclair, Big Cajun, 9.
NRECA, People— Their Powe , .
lished in its complete form here, 178-188, under the title 
"Rural Electrification Act of 1935 with Amendment as Ap­
proved through August 4, 1977" [U.S. Code, Title 7, Chapter 
31].
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and Cajun (and other co-op borrowers) would go into the 
private sector and borrow what they needed. The standard 
interest rate was set at five percent, with some two per­
cent money available for sparsely settled areas.
Many of the ideas for this new program came from 
Bonner. He suggested to NRECA the final format of the 
bill that was finally passed in January, just ten days 
after Nixon killed the original bill. Bonner could not 
simply stand by and allow nature to take its course. He 
knew that if REA, or NRECA, did not come up with a workable 
compromise, Nixon would. Bonner also made his usual pil- 
gramages to Washington to testify before various committees 
In 1974, NRECA recognized him for his efforts by present­
ing him with an award. Robert Bennett, from NRECA, de­
livered the award, stating that: "Mark Bonner is the man 
who lit the match to mobilize the rural electric leadership 
that eventually succeeded in convincing Congress to restore 
the direct loan program of the Rural Electrification Ad­
ministration after it had been abolished by the X-Jhite House 
In addition to the guaranteed loans that would be pro­
vided by REA for borrowing in the private sector. Congress 
created the Federal Finance Bank on December 29, 1973. In
2; ibid., May, 1972, 1.
Ibid., February, 1974, 5.
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August of the next year, FFB agreed to lend money to REA 
borrowers with government guarantees. This further ex­
panded Cajun's borrowing power.
It seemed as though Cajun's luck had turned. There 
were no more powerful company lobbyists to stand in their 
way, no more all-powerful senior senators. Cajun had 
reached an agreement with the companies, and now borrowing 
was outside the interest of Congress since no hands would 
be dipping into the federal treasury. It also looked as 
though Cajun had gotten around the energy crisis and taken 
the first steps toward the fuel of the past— and the future 
--coal. Now all they had to do was bring all these variables 
together and make it all work, and of course, they had the 
man to do it: Burgin.
It is easy to guess when Burgin began thinking about 
coal as a fuel for Cajun. In his 1974 report, he wrote 
that coal had been considered three years e a r l i e r . B u t  
probably he was thinking about it much earlier than that. 
Bonner first mentions coal in Rural Louisiana the month 
before the dedication of Cajun #1, when he wrote, "LEC is 
studying the possibility of using coal to generate its 
future plants. That's why Big Cajun #1 is located on the
United States Department of Agriculture, Rural 
Electrification Administration, Rural Lines--USA; The Story 
of Cooperative Rural Electrification (Washington, B.C., 
USGPO, 1981), 26.
CEPCO, 1974 Annual Report, 9.
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Mississippi River where coal could be barged in cheaply.
If it is true that the plant was located in New Roads for 
that reason, then coal had been looked at as a possible 
fuel for the future as early as the late Sixties, even be­
fore the first loan was released. But most likely, Burgin 
brought the idea for a coal plant with him from Basin Elec­
tric in 1969,
Even before the first plant was dedicated in June,
1972, Bonner began preparing his reading public for the 
new project, even though it would be three years before it 
was announced. As early as August, 1971, eleven months 
before Big Cajun #1 would go on line, Bonner wrote that 
"Louisiana's consumption of electricity is tripling every 
10 years, even faster in some areas of the state. This 
means that the co-ops in the state must immediately plan 
to add to the generating facilities of LEG or come up with 
some suitable alternative. . . . The G&T is just the 
beginning, not the end."^^ In May, 1972, one month before 
the plant was dedicated, Roemer was quoted in Rural Louisiana: 
"I urge that we expedite our economic and engineering studies 
leading to early additions to our 230,000 kilowatt plant in 
New Roads, or the building of others elsewhere.
Rural Louisiana, May, 1972, 4-A.
Ibid., August, 1971, 2.
Ibid., May, 1972, 5-A.
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What Burgin, Robinson, and the Cajun board had in mind 
was to build two 550 megawatt plants at the New Roads site 
under the name Big Cajun #2, The first of the two units 
was to go on line sometime in 1979, and the second in 1982. 
On September 22, 1973, the board completed the loan applica­
tion to REA for the expansion. At the same meeting a 
feasibility study from Bovay for the coal-fired units was 
accepted, and Burgin announced that he had contacted some 
coal companies in the West and that prospects looked 
promising.
Burgin's first contact was with Peabody Coal Company 
of St. Louis, in early 1974. Peabody gave Burgin a commit­
ment that was satisfactory, but they unexpectedly backed 
out of the d e a l . S u n  Oil seemed willing to deal with 
Burgin, and in September, 1974, he told the board that they 
looked the most p r o m i s i n g . B u t  Sun decided, as Burgin 
recalls, to tie the cost of their coal to the price of 
Middle Eastern oil. It was Burgin's response that the 
cost of coal should have some relationship to the cost of 
producing it. "That was quite a session," he remembers.
He went on to contact Kerr-McGee, Carter Coal Company (an
Interview with Burgin, October 5, 1982. 
Cajun, "Minutes," September 24, 1974. 
Interview with Burgin, October 5, 1982.
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Exxon subsidiary), Arch Minerals, Decker Coal, and several 
others. It quickly became apparent to Burgin that Cajun 
Electric, despite its needs and plans, was just not big 
enough to deal with these giants of the coal industry.
The obvious thing to do, and something Louisiana co-ops 
had had experience doing, was to join together with other 
groups in similar situations, form a co-op (in this case 
a super co-op, as this type of organization is called) that 
was big enough to get the job done— in this case, buy coal. 
To Burgin, it was necessary to have a negotiating position, 
"a big enough demand so that we can go to a [coal] company 
and say, we want you to build a mine and dedicate it to us 
--all the output of that m i n e . T h e  hope was that this 
would cost the company less, and then cost Cajun less. So, 
the strategy was to join with other generating groups like 
Cajun to create a consortium large enough, and with a 
demand big enough, to buy large amounts of western coal.
Burgin first contacted the manager at Basin Electric 
who was having a similar problem, and the two men discussed 
the idea on the telephone. In the spring of 1974, Burgin 
met with a representative from Basin, Ken Hollum, in a 
hotel in San Francisco, and there they decided to set up 
what became Western Fuels. They called the manager at Tri- 
State G&T in Denver, Lynn Garwood, and eventually that
63
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group joined. Between the three, they needed something 
between twelve and twenty million tons of coal per year, 
enough to make the big companies listen,
While all of this was going on, Robinson had his own 
answer to the problem of bringing ;the coal companies to 
the negotiating table. But Robinson differs from Burgin 
in outlook: his answer was political. He went to Edwards, 
probably the only man in Louisiana with enough influence 
over the oil companies in the state (the oil companies, of 
course, own the coal companies) to make them listen.
Edwards was accommodating. "I told them to form the let­
ters in the language and terminology that they thought 
would best serve their purposes, and I would send them out 
with my signature, which I did."^^ According to Robinson 
these letters were responsible for the contracts that 
Cajun eventually signed.Edwards, though, is not so 
sure. To him, the reason Cajun was not able to sign a 
contract was not that their market for coal was too small, 
but that, in the midst of the energy crisis of 1973, the 
demand nationwide was too great. "I don't think that these 
companies out west paid any attention to [the letters]. I
Ibid. Cajun needed about four million tons of coal 
per year. Cajun, "Minutes," September 24, 1974.
Interview with Edwin Edwards, Baton Rouge, June 3,
1982.
Interview with A. A. Robinson, New Roads, Louisiana, 
September 11, 1980.
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don't think they were concerned at all whether they ef­
fected a deal with Louisiana unless it was to their long 
and short range interests. People were beating their 
doors down trying to buy what coal they had since it was 
low sulphur coal, and they did not feel they had to bend 
over backwards to work with anybody. But at that time, 
in mid-1973, Cajun needed a coal contract to move forward, 
and no one knew how long the energy situation would last.
In fact, to most the 1973 price hikes and shortages were 
just the beginning. Fuel costs at that time might have 
been as low as they would ever be again. The strategy was: 
take what you can before it is all gone.
Burgin returned from San Francisco with what he 
thought at the time was the solution to the coal problem. 
Western Fuels. On May 28, 1974, he presented the idea to 
the board, but they did not like it and voted it down.
The opposition was led by J. S. Robbins, the manager at 
Jeff Davis. He saw Western Fuels as "poorly organized," 
and he feared that Cajun would get locked into contracts 
that would be binding and cause problems for the future. 
Western Fuels went on to organize without Cajun. But 
Robinson liked the idea of Western Fuels, and he had the 
power to build a majority coalition among the Cajun board
Interview with-Edwards, June 3, 1982.
Cajun, "Minutes," May 28, 1974; ibid., September 
24, 1974.
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members to join. "I saw we needed to be in it," he recalls, 
"especially if we were going to add these other units." He 
agreed with Burgin that Cajun was too small to deal with 
the big coal companies. "Cajun may be a big little co-op, 
but when you butt heads with Mr. Exxon and Mr. Shell, they're 
big boys, but Western Fuels is a big boy, and Western Fuels 
can deal with Shell on their own l e v e l . S o ,  Robinson 
marshaled his influence to build a coalition that would 
agree to join Western Fuels. Finally, on September 24,
1974, the board voted to join. This decision was reached 
over the strenuous objections of Robbins, who made certain 
that his side of the argument was entered into the minutes.
After the May, 1974, vote opposing Western Fuels,
Burgin had set out alone to find a fuel source for the 
plant and had worked out a contract with Shell. After the 
September agreement to join, he turned the Shell contract 
over to Western Fuels. It looked as though Big Cajun #2 
would have a coal supply.
But simply having the coal was not enough ; it had to 
be transported some 1,700 miles from Montana, where the 
Shell mine was located. Burgin and the board members 
looked at several possibilities. They could haul the coal
Interview with Robinson, September 24, 1974.
Cajun, "Minutes," September 24, 1974.
71 Ibid., September 24, 1974.
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by train to Minneapolis, transfer it to barges, and ship it 
down the Mississippi to New Roads, but Burgin feared that 
ice in the river might curtail winter deliveries. A second 
option was to have the coal shipped by train the entire 
distance from Montana, but that proved too costly. The 
third plan, and the one most viable, was to ship the coal 
by train to St. Louis, and then by barge to New Roads.
The only problem was that a transfer point, or terminal, 
would have to be built at St. Louis. The terminal would 
have to be built by the barge company, and the cost of 
building it would be included in the cost of hauling the 
coaiy2
The transportation deals were concluded much earlier 
than the coal supply problem was solved. While Burgin 
was contacting coal companies as early as late 1972, he 
was also talking to representatives of the Burlington- 
Northern Railroad, the only railroad to serve the Northern 
Plains and to connect as far south as St. Louis. By June, 
1973, Burgin had signed a letter of intent, and a contract 
soon followed. The plan was that Cajun would provide the 
railway cars to carry the coal, a total of 770 cars, 110 
for each of seven trains.
The barge contract went nearly as smoothly, even
Interview with Burgin, October 5, 1982 ; Cajun Elec­
tric Power Cooperative, Inc., 1976 Annual Report Cn.p., n.d.), 
12-13.
73 Ibid., 13.
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though railroad and barge companies have reputations for 
being mortal enemies who avoid working together whenever 
possible. The Burlington-Northern people, though, told 
Burgin that they had had some success working with American 
Barge Company (ABCL Western of St. Louis). Bids were sub­
mitted, American came in low, and a deal was struck. They 
agreed to deliver four million tons of coal per year to 
Cajun. The completion date for the terminal was set for 
October, 1 9 7 8 . At the closing of the contract, Burgin 
recalls telling the American Barge officials how important 
it was that the coal be delivered on t i m e . H e  would 
later regret those words.
Meanwhile, Bonner was locked into another tooth and 
nail fight in the Louisiana Legislature. In the 1973 
special session, a Senate bill was introduced that would 
have nullified all intrastate gas contracts and required 
renegotiation with the new price to be based on the price 
of gas as of July, 1973. The purpose of the bill was to 
aid Louisiana gas producers who were dying a slow death 
under long-term contracts at very low prices. Or, some 
might say, Louisiana's gas producers wanted to take full 
advantage of the shortages by raising prices to as many 
consumers as possible, even those who had signed long-term
Interview with Burgin, October 5, 1982; Cajun Elec­
tric Power Cooperative, Inc., 1977 Annual Report (n.p., 
n.d.), 18.
Interview with Burgin, October 5, 1982.
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contracts. Nevertheless, the bill whizzed through the 
Senate with Edward's support and only four dissenting 
votes. On Friday, November 30, Edwards apparently had 
reconsidered the measure, and walked down to the House 
Chamber floor to have the bill returned to the calendar 
so that he might consider a change of heart over the 
weekend, thereby keeping the bill from being passed by the 
House on that day. The next Monday, December 3, Bonner 
and a group of co-op leaders brought their influence to 
bear. They met with Edwards and pointed out that Louisiana's 
municipalities were specifically exempt from the bill, and 
that the investor-owned utilities received their gas pri­
marily from interstate pipelines. So, only the co-ops 
would be hurt by the passage of the bill; specifically, 
they would lose that now lucrative gas contract with Texaco 
that Robinson had signed in 1968. Bonner and his group 
convinced Edwards that they were right, and he had the 
section dealing with the mullification of gas contracts 
deleted from the bill. Bonner reported in the December 
issue of Rural Louisiana that Edwards had said, "I'd rather 
be right than consistent.
Senate Bill #9. Official Journal of the Procedures 
of the Senate and House oF"Representatives, and the Legis­
lative Calendar. Forty-second Extraordinary Session of 
the Legislature, 1973, 113-125. For a synopsis of the bill, 
see also the Legislative Calendar, included in this volume, 
390-391.
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Finally, when it looked as though there would be 
smooth sailing ahead, Bonner made the formal and official 
announcement of Cajun #2 on February 24, 1975.^^ With the 
Shell coal contract in hand, the rail and barge connections 
made, and the loan guarantee about to be released, what 
possibly could stand in the way? What stood in the way 
were Indians and environmentalists; neither group liked 
the idea of digging up the Northern Plains for the coal.
The Shell contract signed by Burgin in 1974 gave 
Cajun (through Western Fuels) everything it could possibly 
want. The quality of the coal was good, producing about 
9,500 BTUs per pound. Also, Shell agreed to produce the 
four million tons of coal per year that Big Cajun #2 would 
need; and the price was right, at about five dollars per 
ton. Shell had even allowed escape c l a u s e s . T o  many on 
the Cajun board, the whole project had been made feasible 
by this lucrative contract.
But problems resulted when, in 1974, the Sierra Club 
filed suit in Federal District Court in Washington, D.C. 
against the Department of Interior to have the Northern 
Great Plains region declared a province. This would mean 
that the coal producers, principally Shell and Exxon, would
Telephone interview with Mark Bonner, September 14,
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have to supply environmental impact statements of that 
specific area, and that could delay the operation for as 
much as two years. But the court ruled on February 14,
1974, that the Department of Interior had, over the past 
ten years, made three impact statements that had included 
all or parts of that region, and another one was not 
n e c e s s a r y . B u t  the court also decided that until the 
case was finally resolved there should be an injunction 
against any mining in the r e g i o n . T h i s ,  of course, 
suspended Shell's operations, and that concerned the 
Cajun board. Even though Cajun #2 was not to go on line 
until 1979, it was necessary to have a workable fuel 
contract in hand before REA would release the loan guaran­
tee, and that was expected any time. The Sierra Club suit 
could well slow down the entire operation.
The Sierra Club appealed their case to the U.S. Court 
of Appeals in Washington on December 4, 1974, where the 
court agreed with their plea and reversed the decision of 
the U.S. District Court on June 16, 1975.^^ The Department 
of Interior, then, appealed that decision to the Supreme 
Court, and on April 28, 1976, the case of Kleppe v. Sierra
Federal Supplement, Vol. 421 (West Publishing Company, 
St. Paul, Minn., 1977), 638-652.
Federal Reporter, Second Series, Vol. 509 (West Pub­
lishing Company, St. Paul, Minn., 1975), 533.
Ibid., Vol. 51 
Minn., 1975), 856-893.
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Club was argued. On June 28, Justice Lewis Powell delivered 
the opinion of the court that there was no need (or that 
the law did not require) an environmental impact statement 
of that area. Justices Marshall and Brennen concurred, and 
each filed opinions on the case.^^
Bonner dealt with the case by maligning the Sierra 
Club in Rural Louisiana. He called them a "noisy and ap­
parently financially well-heeled handful of environmental 
industrialists, [and] anti-growth intellectuals." He went 
on to complain that they were "idealists.
But Cajun's biggest problem with the Shell coal deal 
was with a more formidable foe than the Sierra Club, The
land where the coal was to be mined was on the Crow Indian
Reservation on the Montana-Wyoming border. The Crows had 
sold the mineral rights to Shell, but, according to Burgin, 
the Indians had gotten the worst of the deal. They ap­
parently realized it and filed suit to abrogate the con­
tract. The case was thrown out of Federal District Court 
in Washington for lack of jurisdiction. It was later re­
introduced into the Montana state judicial system, but the 
final disposition of the coal leases became the decision of 
Secretary of Interior Thomas S. Kleppe who served under
Supreme Court Reporter, Vol. 96, October term (West 
Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minn., 1978), 772.
Interview with Burgin.
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Jimmy Carter. But he allowed the question to go unanswered. 
Cajun, of course, needed answers, and finally, in 1978, 
they agreed with Shell to give up the fight against inac­
tion and abrogate the contract.
On top of all this, the Montana Legislature, in the 
spring of 1975, passed a thirty-percent severance tax on 
all coal leaving their state. That would turn Cajun's 
good deal at $5.00 per ton into a bad deal at $6.50.^® The 
cards seemed stacked against Cajun.
Between 1975 and 1976, the Cajun board members must 
have feared a return to the horrid days of the Sixties when 
they were up to their necks in litigation, when LEG was 
nothing more than a series of court cases. The Shell coal 
deal, as lucrative as it was, had no future. Opposition 
from the Sierra Club and the Crow Indians, and then the 
final straw, the Montana severance tax, was enough to send 
them looking for other sources of fuel--anywhere but Montana. 
Burgin, in the name of Western Fuels, again began negotiating 
for western coal. By late 1975, he had had some promising 
discussions with Kerr-McGee. Their holdings were in Wyoming, 
in the Powder River Basin near Gillette, and not affected
Cajun, "Minutes," March 23, 1976; Telephone inter­
view with Mark Bonner, September 14, 1983; Rural Louisiana, 
June, 1980, 3.
Rural Louisiana, June, 1980, 3; Cajun, "Minutes," 
June, 19HD',' 3.
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by the Sierra Club, the Crow Indians, or the nefarious 
state of Montana. At first, the Kerr-McGee deal was to 
be simply an alternative supply of fuel to satisfy REA, 
and to supply the plant until the Shell deal could make 
its way through the courts. But as things got worse, as 
it looked as though Shell would never be able to deliver, 
and then when Montana applied its severance tax, the Kerr- 
McGee deal began to look better and better. In July, 1976, 
Burgin announced the Kerr-McGee contract to the Cajun 
b o a r d . I t  was the Kerr-McGee mine that would allow the 
release of the REA loan guarantee ; and it was the Kerr- 
McGee mine that would finally supply Big Cajun #2 when it 
went on line in 1980.
The most important contract to be awarded for Cajun 
#2 was for construction of the boiler. In August, 1974, 
Burgin commented in the Cajun minutes that there had been 
little interest in the construction of the boiler for Cajun 
#1, but now, for Cajun #2, several companies were eager to 
submit bids. There months earlier he had met with 
several boiler manufacturers, including the Riley Stoker 
Corporation. Riley Stoker’s construction of the small gas- 
fired boiler for unit #1 had been more than satisfactory, 
but Burgin, as he recalls today, was apprehensive about
Ibid., August 27, 1974.
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awarding them the bid for the coal-fired unit. He had 
hoped to take the bid of Babcock and Wilcox, the company 
that built the boilers at Basin Electric. They had spent 
two years in design testing, and even then, they had had 
some difficulty making the system work properly. There 
were few companies in the country that had experience 
working with lignite, and Riley Stoker was not one. But 
they had asked to submit a bid, and, according to Burgin, 
the board felt some loyalty to them for having done such 
a commendable job on the first unit that they were allowed 
to bid. Today, Burgin regrets the decision. "They should 
never have been on the bid list." But they were included, 
their bid came in low, and it was taken. Riley Stoker 
agreed to build the boiler for just under seventy-six 
million d o l l a r s , B y  1977, that cost was raised to over 
seventy-eight million.
By early 1976, everything was in line. A coal contract 
was signed, the awkward transportation system was arranged, 
and the contracts were awarded. There had been some dif­
ficult negotiations with the three investor-owned companies 
to buy the power and then wheel it back to the thirteen 
co-ops, but only GSU had been hard to please, and even they
Interview with Burgin, October 5, 1982; CEPCO, 1976 
Annual Report, 24.
Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, 1977 Annual Report 
(n.p., n.d.),16.
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had agreed to sign a contract as soon as some problems were 
smoothed over. The loan guarantee had not yet been re­
leased from REA, but all the criteria had been met. It 
seemed only appropriate, then, that the Cajun board should 
celebrate their victory with ground breaking ceremonies.
Those ceremonies took place sometime in April, 1976. 
(Bonner did not include the date in his article in Rural 
Louisiana about the function.) Of those attending, there 
was the always present Edwin Edwards, who again stole the 
spotlight. The chairman of the Public Service Commission, 
Louis Lambert, also a t t e n d e d . B u t  is was not quite the 
gayla event that the dedication ceremonies for the first 
plant had been. No crowd of 3,000 was invited, and no one 
ate jambalaya and barbecue. Also, there was none of the 
optimistic peering into the future that had characterized 
the earlier ceremony. In his editorial for that April, 
Bonner expressed a they-said-it-couldn't-be-done attitude 
of gloating success. He seemed to be topping off the en­
tire era that began in 1960 with a few words to those who 
had stood in the way of the progress, in the way of the 
dream. "To the calamity howlers, the preachers of doom.
It was entered into the minutes : "On the strength 
of a letter from GSU to Cajun agreeing to further negotia­
tions regarding the contract, REA has gone forward with the 
release of funds for Cajun Two." Cajun, "Minutes," April 
26, 1977.
Rural Louisiana, April, 1976, 7.
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the fearful and 'no growth' advocates," he wrote, "I 
'a plague upon your house!
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CHAPTER 11 
PROBLEMS AND CRITICISMS
From the groundbreaking ceremonies to the completion 
of the first unit of Big Cajun #2, that is from April,
1976, to spring, 1980, construction proceeded almost as 
smoothly as had construction of the first plant. Of course, 
it took longer ; two plants were being built simultaneously, 
and together they were five times larger than Cajun #1.
The plan was to push hard for completion of one unit, and 
then complete the second about a year later.
After the groundbreaking ceremonies came the loan ap­
proval. On June 22, 1976, Hamil signed the loan guarantee 
for $629 million. A previous loan of eleven million dollars 
had allowed some construction to begin before the June 22 
approval.̂  Of course, Hamil's signature only provided a 
guarantee ; the money had to come from other sources , but 
that posed no problem. The Federal Financing Bank agreed 
in the early months of 1977 to lend $400 million of the 
$629 million, or about sixty-three percent. This money
Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., "Minutes," 
August 31, 1976, 8; Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. 
1977 Annual Report Cn.p., n.d.), 8.
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was to be loaned at three different intervals throughout 
1977 and early 1978 at an average interest rate of 7.714 
percent for thirty-five years. The remainder of the $629 
million came from the New Orleans Bank for Cooperatives, 
an organization set up for the specific purpose of pro­
viding funds for federally insured loans. In addition, 
Cajun established a seventy million dollar line of credit 
with the Bank for Cooperatives to pay monthly construction 
costs, and sold seventy-five million dollars worth of tax- 
free bonds through the Pointe Coupee Police Jury to pay 
for the plant's pollution control facilities.̂
With all this accomplished, and with what seemed to 
be a thriving project and unlimited credit, Burgin and 
the Cajun board had already begun looking to the future. 
Burgin's ability to foresee the future, the natural gas 
shortages, the impossibly high rates, the government's 
restriction against gas as a boiler fuel, and the promising 
futn-^e of lignite--all had given him a lot of power on the 
Cajun board when it came to looking ahead. In 1976, Bonner 
wrote: "[E]ven before the energy crisis hit in 1973, CEPCO 
manager Merl Burgin envisioned a fuel crisis and eventual 
loss of our cheap natural gas to generate power. How, I 
don't know. Even before the Arabs began their blackmail, 
he was roaming the West in search of low-sulphur coal to
 ̂1977 Annual Report,
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assure a future supply of electricity for rural Louisiana. 
That's why we are a jump ahead of every utility in the 
s t a t e . B u r g i n  had good reason to see a greater need for 
the future. Demand for electricity in Louisiana was grow­
ing rapidly. His studies showed that within eight years 
of the completion of the second unit at Big Cajun #2, the 
state's thirteen co-ops would need nearly twice as much 
generating power as the Cajun plants could provide. To 
meet the demand, he planned to build a third unit at Big 
Cajun #2 to be completed in 1982. This would bring Cajun 
Electric's total generating capacity within the vicinity 
of 1,840 megawatts. And that, he wrote in his 1978 report, 
would keep Cajun above the estimated demand for only about 
three years. Next, he hoped to build a plant on the lig­
nite fields of north Louisiana. That plant was to be com­
pleted in the mid-Eighties, followed by a second north 
Louisiana plant in the late Eighties.̂  On top of this, 
Cajun had made some early noises about buying a portion of 
GSU's Riverbend nuclear plant. That plant is to generate 
940 megawatts when it is finished, and in 1976, GSU offered 
Cajun up to 200 megawatts, a little over twenty percent of 
the plant. Such a purchase would delay the need to build
Report (n.p., n.d.), 2, 15; Rural Louisiana, August,1978, 
8; ibid., April, 1979, 9.
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It would also transfer all of the headaches of construction 
to GSU. But the main advantage would be diversity. By 
making use of as many types of fuels as possible, Cajun 
stood a better chance of dealing with the anticipated 
energy problems of the future. This was the conventional 
wisdom of the Seventies. As it turned out, Cajun brought 
thirty percent of Riverbend, or 282 megawatts, and GSU 
purchased forty-two percent of the third unit at Big Cajun 
#2. GSU had also seen the need to diversify.
All of this expansion and growth had been Burgin's 
dream, but in 1978 he was within one year of the mandatory 
retirement age of seventy, a condition of employment that 
he himself had earlier insisted be made company policy.
The board wanted to bring in a new manager for the year 
before Burgin left, allowing him to learn the ropes under 
Burgin's direction. But that condition of employment re­
ceived a poor reception from prospective applicants ; hardly 
anyone applied. Finally, Jim Smith, the manager at SLECA, 
asked for the job and was hired. But Smith, according to 
Burgin, did not want to follow him around for a year, and 
asked the board to allow him to step into the position 
immediately. He was granted his wish, and Burgin left his
1978 Annual Report, 15; Rural Louisiana, October, 
1979, ir
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post in September, 1978, about one year early— with pay 
until age seventy, of course. "So, he came in and I 
stepped out, and you might say we were never in the office 
at the same t i m e . A f t e r  nine years, Burgin's influence 
had ended. It was not a bitter end, but it was an uncom­
fortable one.
Burgin's term at Cajun was during the good times that 
fell between two bad periods in the program's history.
He took the job just weeks after the fights with the private 
utilities ended, and he left just before fuel and transpor­
tation costs drove consumer rates through the roof. Prices 
began to rise in the mid-Seventies, and by the time Burgin 
left in 1978, they were high, but by 1980 fuel and trans­
portation costs had skyrocketed out of sight. Federal de­
regulation of the railroads in 1980 drove transportation 
costs up forty-four percent. That hope in the mid-Seventies 
for a twelve-to-fifteen dollar price per ton for delivered 
coal became a disappointment of over thirty dollars by
1980.^ Today, three years later, the cost is over forty 
dollars per ton.^ Rail charges alone went from seven dollars
Interview with Merle Burgin, August 5, 1982, New 
Roads, Louisiana. Bonner announced Burgin's retirement in 
Rural Louisiana in April, 1980, 11.
3.
^ Interview with Mark Bonner, September 21, 1983, Baton 
Rouge ; interview with Burgin, August 5, 1982; Rural Louisiana, 
January, 1981, 3.
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per ton in 1976, to just under thirteen in 1980,^ while 
barge rates doubled from 3.39 to 6.84.^^ Fuel oil, used 
in Cajun #1, went from three dollars per barrel in 1974 
to almost thirty-eight dollars in 1980,^^ while natural 
gas rose from twenty-three cents per thousand cubic feet
Seventies when Cajun was still buying power from the com­
panies, the cost was .6 cent per kilowatt hour. By 1979,
later, Cajun was producing power for 3.5 cents per kilowatt 
hour. Of course, all of this increase was transferred to 
the consumer. In 1974, the average consumer on the co-op 
system paid twenty-two mills per kilowatt hour. The aver­
age price charged consumers on the investor-owned utility 
system was twenty-six mills, with GSU and New Orleans 
Public Service paying as much as twenty-nine. By 1980, 
Cajun's prices were up to forty-six mills, while the aver­
age company prices were just under that, at forty-five.^^





3; ibid., February, 1980, 3.
13
Ibid., February, 1980, 3.
Ibid., January, 1981, 5; ibid., February, 1980, 3.
14
Ibid., January, 1981, 5.
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By 1983, Cajun's prices had gone up to eighty-one mills 
per kilowatt hour, while the investor-owned average rose 
only to s i x t y . F o r  Cajun, that is a seventy-six percent 
increase from 1980 to 1983, while the companies' consumer 
rates rose by only thirty-three percent. Some of this 
increase for Cajun between 1980 and 1983 had to do with 
other problems, but much of it was a result of increasing 
fuel and transportation costs.
The early Eighties brought these increases, but these 
years also brought headaches of a different kind. Design 
and engineering problems at the plant nearly brought the 
entire program to its knees. The first sign of trouble 
came when the boilers were being tested just prior to the 
May 1, 1980, completion date. The problem was in the 
boiler system, more specifically, in the boiler tubes. 
Because of an apparent slag build-up in these tubes caused 
by a high sodium content in the coal, the tubes got too 
hot. The result was an explosion in the system that shut 
down operations for over a y e a r T h e r e  were two immediate 
results. One was that a man-made mountain of coal began to 
pile up near the plant that could not be used, but had to 
be paid for. Second, contracts with the companies ran out.
See Appendix ICXI.
Interview with Burgin, August 5, 1982. Bonner 
first mentions the design problems at Big Cajun in "Rural 
LoUisiaha, January, 1981, 5.
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and Cajun had to purchase power from just about anywhere 
at any price. The consequence was that prices to the 
consumers went from thirty-eight mills per kilowatt hour 
at the end of 1979 to sixty-six mills in 1981.^^ Cajun was 
able to absorb some of the cost, but it was the consumer 
who had to bear the brunt of the expense.
There were other design problems. Coal, before it is 
burned for boiler fuel, must be pulverized into face-powder 
fineness, and then blown into the furnace. The mechanism 
used to crush the coal is called a ball mill. It is sixteen- 
to-twenty feet in diameter and thirty feet long, and filled 
about one-third full with steel balls. Hot air is blown 
through the turning ball mill, picking up coal dust, and 
transferring it into the furnace. The problem has been 
that the plant's eight ball mills, four on each plant, have 
not worked properly. It is difficult to grind lignite; its 
consistency is something akin to cordwood, according to 
Burgin. It also has a high moisture level, and that, in 
Louisiana's high humidity, causes additional problems. Un­
til early 1983, several, if not all, ball mills were down 
at one time or another, allowing the plant to operate at 
only partial capacity--if at all. Again, the coal continued 
to pile up, and Cajun had to pay top dollar for supplemental 
power to keep the system on line. In January, 1983, six of
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the eight mills were working, and by May, 1983, all eight 
were on line.
Who was at fault? Riley Stoker, who built the boiler 
system and the ball mills, has more often than not received 
the most criticism for apparently not having the experience 
necessary to build such a system. But some of the blame 
needs to be given to the Cajun board members for awarding 
the contract for such a large project to a company for rea­
sons of loyalty rather than for experience and ability. 
Furthermore, the one person who had the expertise to know 
which company could best do the job was Burgin. Today, he 
states that he had opposed allowing Riley Stoker on the bid 
list because the company was inexperienced in such proj ects. 
But his opposition, it seems, was not loud enough to be 
heard, because few did. If Burgin did make his opinion 
known, then the board is, again, at fault for not listening. 
But with all this fingerpointing, someone had to receive 
the blame for it all. It was Bovay that had set itself up, 
by its own design, as chief engineer, the one with the 
authority--and the responsibility. So, with costs rising, 
coal accumulating, consumer groups forming, and tempers 
flaring, Cajun fired Bovay in 1981, and handed the entire 
program over to Burns and Roe, the other engineering firm 
that built the plant. They were charged with taking care
Interview with Burgin, August 5, 1982; testimony of 
John Schwab before Foster Campbell's Senate Investigation 
Committee of Dixie Electric, Zachery, Louisiana, January 17, 
1983. Schwab is the principal attorney at Cajun, Dixie, 
and ALEC.
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of the problems and building the third unit that was 
scheduled for completion in the summer of 1983. The only 
retribution dealt Riley Stoker was that its bid was not 
taken for the third unit. The boiler contract went to 
Babcock and Wilcox of London, the company that built Basin 
Electric, and the company that Burgin had wanted to build 
the first two units in the first place.
The third unit went on line as scheduled in mid-summer, 
1983, with few problems. The cost for all three plants was 
1.3 billion dollars, and they produced 1,620 megawatts of 
power. Two hundred eighty-two megawatts will be added to 
that when the Riverbend Nuclear Plant goes on line in 1984, 
unless it is further delayed. The projected load for the 
summer of 1983 was 1,300 megawatts. With the two units of 
Cajun #2 on line, plus the output of Cajun #1, Cajun Elec­
tric was able to meet that demand with a 200-plus megawatt 
reserve, it is a requirement of the Southwest Power Pool, 
to which Cajun belongs, that systems maintain a twenty per­
cent reserve for emergency purposes, and Cajun fell short 
of that requirement. But by the mid-summer peak, the third 
unit came on line, boosting Cajun's capacity to 1,620 
megawatts.
Interview with Burgin, August 5, 1982; interview 
with Mark Bonner, September 21, 1983; interview with Mark 
Bonner, July 29, 1982, Baton Rouge.
Testimony of Schwab, January 17, 1983; 1978 Annual 
Report, 15.
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Future plans are to build Cajun #3, sometimes called 
Oxbow, in north Louisiana on the lignite fields there.
Four thousand acres have been purchased near Coushatta, 
and a loan guarantee for one billion dollars is currently 
under consideration at REA in Washington. This idea had 
its beginning when Burgin considered it as early as July,
1976. Plans were announced in August, 1977. The plan is 
to build two 540 megawatt units there.
There is no indication that demand for electricity 
has fallen off in Louisiana; in fact, it has continued to 
rise. In 1978, Cajun Electric estimated in its annual 
report that the 1983 needed capacity would be 1,310 mega­
watts, only 10,000 kilowatts over actual demand for 1983 
So, it appears that if it is the objective of Cajun to 
continue to serve the needs of its consumers statewide, it 
must continue to grow. The only alternative is again to 
purchase power from the companies.
All of Cajun's design and engineering problems turned 
into financial problems which, in turn, caused consumer 
bills to rise. This left Cajun open to controversy and 
criticism from those who felt that the rate increases could 
and should be regulated. So, for the last time, Bonner
Cajun, "Minutes," July 27, 1976; Rural Louisiana, 
August, 1977, 7; 1978 AnhUal Report, 15; Rural Louisiana, 
August, 1979, 11.
1978 Annual Report, 13, 15.
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entered the ring against those who would stop the forward 
movement of the co-ops. But this time, ALEC, and the co-ops 
it represented, came away divided and weak, rather than 
united and strong.
Of all the goals (or dreams) of this movement, prob­
ably the most important has been to attain independence-- 
from the federal government, from the state government, 
and from the private utilities. In 1972, it became apparent 
that dependence was a necessity of life for Cajun, that 
interconnection with the companies was the only way that 
self-generation (the greatest of all measures of independence) 
could be attained. But part of the 1969 compromise initiated 
by Hamil was for LEC to come under the regulatory umbrella 
of the Louisiana Public Service Commission. In 1978, with 
Hamil's influence limited to his cattle ranch in Colorado, 
Bonner again began taking steps toward independence--out 
from under the PSC.
It is the standard doctrine of ALEC and Cajun that the 
co-ops (and therefore Cajun) should not be under the PSC 
because they, themselves, are self-regulating. The co-ops 
and Cajun are non-profit organizations with unpaid board 
members who are elected by the people they serve. There 
is no profit motive, there are no stockholders to pay a 
previously established percentage of the profits, and there 
is no reason to raise prices beyond what it coats to pro­
duce the electricity. Also, REA, by determining loan
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repayment schedules and how much to lend, is itself a 
regulatory agency. Furthermore, the people who elect the 
board members have the power to remove them in open elec­
tions, and that in itself is the ultimate system of regu­
lation. Many, such as Bonner, see it as a decidedly 
American system of regulation, and therefore the best 
system. So, why should the PSC stick its nose in all this 
when it is the job of the directors, above all else, to 
keep prices as low as possible? In addition, if the PSC 
should deny Cajun a rate increase, Cajun would be tied up 
in expensive court appeals that the consumer would have to 
pay for.^^
This all makes sense, but there is an argument on the 
other side. On May 1, 1978, Bonner had a bill introduced 
in the State Senate to remove the co-ops from PSC regula­
tion. The bill was well presented by Edgar Mouton and 
Claude Duval, among others. It slid through both houses, 
and was quickly signed into law on June 15. It was a healthy 
victory. In the Senate, the vote was thirty-six to one.
But it was that one vote that has given Bonner, Cajun, and 
ALEC fits since then. Foster Campbell (the one vote). 
Senator from Bossier Parish, has worked since that day to 
bring Cajun back under the PSC, and he has developed
Senate Bill 557. 1978 Legislative Calendar, Fourth
regular session, 1978, 703.
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something of a following. To him, the co-ops and Cajun 
have the ability to regulate themselves, but they have not 
done it. To Campbell, the record at Cajun is miserably 
poor; the breakdowns and high rates are the result of mis­
management by a group that is unable to make decisions on 
the disposition of a billion dollar enterprise. "I think 
they're just in over their heads. What you have is two 
or three managers over there telling these board members 
what they ought to do. Who's checking on those three 
managers? That's a lot of power. They're responsible for 
a million p e o p l e . H e  also feels that if three-fourths 
of the state's consumers are protected by the PSC, then 
so should the rest; and he points to the fact that the 
unregulated one-fourth has had higher rates than the regu­
lated three-fourths. Campbell also argues that REA is not 
a true regulator of the co-ops, that it allows them a free 
hand in slmost every aspect until default, and thus, he 
says, regulation is too late. Furthermore, he does not 
see local co-op boards as self-regulating. In some areas, 
the by-laws of the co-op make it nearly impossible to re­
move board members from office, leaving these men unregulated, 
and unreceptive to consumer wishes. All of these illnesses, 
to Campbell, would be cured by PSC regulation, but he is 
not willing to stop there. "I think the time has come when
Interview with Foster Campbell, March 4, 1983, Baton
Rouge.
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we just probably don't need the REA's anymore. The private 
companies will do the job better. I think [the co-ops] 
ought to be bought out in Louisiana. I'll be willing to 
stake what I believe on that."^^
Campbell has made some points in light of the problems 
at the Cajun plant and the subsequent transformation of 
those problems into higher and higher consumer rates. This, 
along with a modest but growing following (that increases 
as rates increase) from such groups as Dixie Watch and 
others, has drawn some attention to Campbell. In the legis­
lature, his influence is also growing. In the past, he 
has won support for his anti-co-op bills from such diverse 
figures as Victor Bussey of the AFL-CIO, and Governor David 
Treen. Even Edwin Edwards, a close friend of Campbell, has 
stated that PSC regulation for the co-ops would end the 
squabbling and not be much more than an inconvenience to 
Cajun. But he has also stated that it it is the desire of 
Cajun to stay out from under the PSC, then he will give his 
support.
Campbell's one-man crusade against Cajun began in 
1978, but it was not until 1981 that he was ready to intro­
duce a bill to place the co-ops back under the PSC. His 
bill did well that year, partly because that was at the
28 Ibid.; interview with Edwin Edwards, June 3, 1982.
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height of Cajun's troubles, and electric bills were rising 
rapidly. It passed the Senate on June 16, with a respectable 
twenty-three to twelve vote. But in the House, the story 
was different; the bill received a rousing thumbs-down vote 
of eighty-seven to z e r o . T o  Bonner, this was a great 
victory. He had put together a coalition of groups that 
"normally wouldn't even sit down and talk together." He 
also received a commitment from Governor Treen to veto the 
bill should it reach his desk.
In 1982, Bonner again rallied his forces, and this 
time Campbell's bill died a quick and painless death in 
c o m m i t t e e . B u t  at the end of that session, Campbell re­
ceived permission from Senate President Michael O'Keefe to 
do a statewide study of Louisiana's co-op system, to go 
from co-op to co-op and hold hearings, to ask questions 
about their o p e r a t i o n s C a m p b e l l  held these meetings just 
prior to the 1983 legislative session, and although he 
visited only four or five co-ops, in addition to visiting 
Big Cajun and holding one or two hearings at the State 
Capitol, he received enough notice and publicity to launch
29 Senate Bill 20. 1981 Legislative Calendar, Seventh
regular session, 1981, Vol. II, 698.
Interview with Mark Bonner, S
Senate Bill 720. 1982 Legislative Calehdar, Eighth
regular session, 1982, 793.
Telephone interview with Foster Campbell, September 
26, 1983; interview with Mark Bonner, September 21, 1983.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
an effective political attack on the co-op system in the 
1983 legislative session.
At these investigations and hearings Campbell was able 
to browbeat co-op leaders and to get his point across to 
the public and the media that he felt the co-op system in 
the state at the least needed regulation, and at most, 
total elimination. He was accompanied on this crusade by 
a small committee made up of various public service com­
missioners and state senators, but Campbell was always at 
center stage, taking co-op leaders to task for everything 
from (what he considered to be) paying their lawyers too 
much, to attending national meetings in Las Vegas with 
co-op money. Campbell barred no holds, and took no prisoners ; 
his attacks were headlong, even ruthless.
a l e c 's reaction was to divide and prepare to be con­
quered. Bonner mobilized for battle, but the ALEC board 
decided not to go head-to-head with Campbell. Instead, 
they would send representatives to the hearings (principally 
John Schwab, Cajun's sagacious attorney) and cooperate with 
the study, concede to Campbell all he wanted and needed.
To Bonner, this was unconditional surrender. "You just 
don't win a fight that way," he says. In Louisiana politics, 
"if someone jumps on you, you jump on him twice as hard.
But the ALEC board did not see it that way and directed 
Alice Howard, the public relations director at Cajun, and
Interview with Hark Bonner, September 21, 1983.
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Paul Wood, the manager at Dixie, to coordinate the defense 
against Campbell's steamroller. They felt that to deny 
Campbell information, or to appear uncooperative before 
these open public hearings would have simply raised addi­
tional questions and added to Campbell's arsenal of alle­
gations.^^ This is especially true since the tone of his 
hearings was that he was a public advocate, himself on 
the Bossier co-op line, who was simply trying to find out 
what was going on in an organization of which he is part 
owner. Throughout the hearings, he continually reminded 
the audiences: "I just want to know what's going on at my 
co-op. I've got a right to know.
Whether or not Bonner was right, the hearings and 
the information Campbell attained through the process of 
conducting them propelled him into the 1983 legislative 
session stronger than he had been before. ALEC, on the 
other hand, went into the session not ready to do battle, 
but divided and weak. They may also have appeared beaten 
and bloodied from the "investigation," and not a good 
candidate for support in a big fight. Campbell, on the 
other hand, had a bandwagon on the roll, and was a good 
candidate to receive support from those who like to be on 
the winning side.
Senate Investigation Committee of Dixie Electric, 
January 17, 1983, Zachary, Louisiana; Senate Investigation 
Committee of Cajun Electric, Harch 11, 1983, Baton Rouge.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In such circumstances, both sides entered the 1983 
session. Campbell was pessimistic. As late as March, he 
stated that the odds against passage of his bill were too 
g r e a t . B u t  he went on to introduce the bill just as he 
had done in 1981 and 1982. He was able to get the bill 
through the Senate, but it became stalled in House com­
mittee under the weight of ALECs influence there. At the 
same time. Governor Treen introduced a bill that passed 
the House to require the co-ops to call meetings to inform 
their members of impending rate increases. In the Senate, 
Treen's bill became bogged down in committee, and it looked 
as though both bills would die on opposite sides of the 
legislature. But Treen and Campbell coordinated their ef­
forts to come up with a compromise bill whereby co-op 
consumers could by petition require their local co-op 
board to call an election to decide whether or not to go 
under PSC regulation. This local option bill passed both 
houses and was signed into l a w . A c c o r d i n g  to Bonner, 
there was a misunderstanding on the floor of the Senate.
He says that several senators saw the bill as a compromise 
between all parties, that it was a compromise that ALEC 
supported.Campbell states adamantly that this is not
Interview with Campbell, March 4, 1983.
1983; interview with Bonner, September 21, 1983.
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The bill is certainly not what Campbell wanted; he 
seemed more excited over his victory than over what the 
bill will do. But he states that his crusade has not 
ended, that he wants to see the government leave the 
electricity business.
In 1984, many of the old gas and oil contracts that 
the investor-owned utilities signed in the early Seventies 
will expire, and the companies will have to sign new con­
tracts at much higher rates. This could cause their con­
sumer prices to rise as high as, or higher than, the 
state's co-op consumers are now paying. Campbell insists 
that all of this will not happen, that investor-owned rates 
will always be lower than Cajun's rates, that Cajun has 
made mistakes from which it can never r e c o v e r . C a j u n  
leaders, of course, feel that they were the first to bite 
the bullet, that they had made the expensive commitment to 
coal early, that their costs are fixed for the immediate 
future, and that the companies' consumers will see rate 
increases before the end of 1984 that will turn all of
Telephone interview with Campbell, September 26,
1983.
40
Interview with Campbell, March 4, 1983.
Ibid.
41
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this around. Today, SWEPCO has the lowest rates in the 
state because it committed to coal earlier than anyone 
else.^^ Cajun was only a few years behind. The other 
investor-owned companies are still using fuel oil and 
natural gas in their boilers, or are bogged down in ex­
pensive nuclear plant construction. It is Cajun's argument 
that this disparity in rates will end very soon.
If this is true, it will take the wind out of Campbell's
sails. Despite his victory in the last legislative session,
he has done little more than yip at the heels of Big Cajun.
He says that "[occasionally] I've gotten more than just
their heels, sometimes I start grabbing at the seat of 
their p a n t s , a n d  certainly in the last legislative ses­
sion he did at least that. But if the rates of the investor-
woned companies do not soon rise to equal co-op rates, or
if worse, co-op rates continue to rise seemingly out of 
control, Campbell will be able to grab more than just seats 
of pants. He has already begun another crusade to stop 
further expansion of Cajun Electric, to halt plans for the 
north Louisiana lignite plant that has been scheduled to 
meet the demand of the late E i g h t i e s W i t h o u t  the ability
Testimony of Schwab, January 17, 1983; interview
with A. A. Robinson, May 19, 1982, New Roads, Louisiana; inter­




Interview with Campbell, March 4, 1983.
Telephone interview with Campbell, September 26, 1983.
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to grow, how will the co-ops obtain the electricity needed 
to meet future demand, buy it from the companies again?
Can the companies even provide it? Will they provide it? 
These are questions that must be answered before political 
decisions are made deciding the future of a public service 
that has a demand to meet.
The future of the Louisiana co-op system, though, is 
not in doubt; the co-ops will continue to exist. Even if 
Campbell should get his way and the co-ops should be placed 
on the block for some grand going-out-of-business sale, 
there would probably not be any buyers ; the buyout price 
would be exorbitant, since it would include the assumption 
of a huge debt, and the purchase from the consumer-owners 
of equity that has built up in the system over the years. 
But in what manner the Louisiana co-op system will live on 
is not so certain. Some current and former co-op leaders 
fear the worst. Over the last thirty years, Bonner has 
been the glue that has held much of the system together.
Now that he has retired, some feel that Cajun will simply 
take over ALEC, the huge giant will swallow its creator 
in one resounding gulp. In 1981, Cajun built its new 
facility right next door to the old ALEC building on Air­
line Highway in Baton Rouge. Bonner could look out his
Interview with Edgar Chaney, July 28, 1982, Jeanerette, 
Louisiana; interview with Mark Bonner, July 29, 1982; inter­
view with Mark Bonner, September 21, 1983; interview with 
Rickie Pietre, January 17, 1983, Houma, Louisiana.
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office window and see what he considered "them, looking 
down at me," both literally and figuratively.^^ Others 
fear that the local distribution co-ops will simply become 
branch offices of Big C a j u n . S h o u l d  this happen, it 
would be ironic that Big Cajun, the system the distribu­
tion co-ops created in the early Sixties to bring them the 
independence that they so desired, should be the entity 
to remove that independence in the mid-Eighties.
Whatever the future holds for Louisiana's co-ops, one 
thing is certain, a change is about to occur. The old 
guard, those men who have been, for fifty years, the 
standard-bearers and front line troops of the state's co-op 
system, is about to hand over the reins of power to a new, 
younger group. It is, at this point, impossible to tell 
whether or not these new leaders will continue to push for 
the old goal of independence, and whether or not the co-op 
spirit will continue on with them. But it is certain that 
Louisiana's co-ops and their subsidiaries, ALEC and Cajun, 
are at a turning point in their history. This is a history 
of people, and as the people change, so must the history.
Interview with Mark Bonner, September 21, 1983.
Interview with Edgar Chaney, July 28, 1982; inter­
view with Robinson, May 19, 1982.
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Consumera ServedBossier Rural Electric
60,000
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Appendix IV Consumers Served Washington-St. Tammany
60,000
Appendix V ■ Consumers Served Pointe Coupee
40,000
Appendix VIConsumers ServedTeehe Electric
60,000
Source I United States Department of Agriculture, Rural Electrification Administration,Annual Statistical Report, 1935-1980 (Washington, D.C,, USGPO, 1935-1980).
Appendix V UConsumers ServedConcordia Electric
60,000
Appendix VIII Consumers Served Southwest Louisiana
40,000
Appendix IX.Consumers ServedClaiborne Electric
60,000
Appendix X
Consumers ServedNortheast Louisiana Electric
40,000
Appendix XIConsumers ServedSouth Louisiana Electric
60,000
Source I United States Department of Agriculture, Rural Electrification Administration,Annual Statistical Report. 1935-1980 (Washington, D.C,, USGPO, 1935-1980).
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Total Megawatt Sales, 1980
600,000
400,000
Source I United States Department of Agriculture, Rural Electrification Administration,jAnnual Statistical Report. 1980 (Washington, D.C., USGPO, 1980),
Appendix XV
Total Equity as Percent of Assets, 1980
Source I United States Department of Agriculture, Rural Electrification Administration,
Annual Statistical Report. 1980 (Washington, D.C., USGPO, 19@0), 68-70,
Appendix XVI 
\ Loans, as of I960
600,000
400,000
si” United States Department of Agriculture, Rural Electrification Administration,
Annual.Statistical Report. 1980 (Washington, D.O., ÜSCP0, 1980), xxxi.
Appendix XVII 
Cost of Power as Percent of Total Costs, 1980
fuel, and the per-
Department of Agriculture, Rural Electrification Administration,
—  r— :rt. :ce: d.c., usgpo, 1980), 68-70.
  Annual Statistical Repo 1980 (Washington,
Appendix XVIII
Rural Consumera Served, 1935 -1980
Sourcei United States Department of Agriculture, Rural Electrification.Administration,
Annual S^tatistical Report, 1935-»1980 (Washington, D.C., USGPO, 1935-1980).
Appendix XIX
Power Generated and Purchased
purchased
purchased .
United States Department of Agriculture, Rural Electrification Administration,mual Statistical Report. 1980 (Washington. D.C., USGPO, 1980). xxxiiii ibid..
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Appendix XXI Residential Customers Mills per KWH
1321* -1976 1228 1222 12M 1281 1282 m i
NOPSl 37 41 47 50 63 - -
CLECO 35 41 45 51 61
GSU 27 30 35 39 55
SWEPCO 24 25 31 33 33 41 49 54
LP&I, 22 20 20 il 25 30 40 53 56 58
Average 26 27 30 33 35 39 45 55 57
Cajun 31 38 75
Source 1 Product of Senator Foster Campbell's Senate Investigation ofCo-ops, compliments of Senator Foster Campbell.
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